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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines three genre high fantasy texts published between 1954 and 2001: J. R. 
R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, Ursula K. Le Guin’s Earthsea cycle and Patricia A. 
McKillip’s The Riddle-Master’s Game. The emphasis is on examining how the three texts 
use a common set of structures to articulate a developing argument about forms of human 
engagement with the physical world in the face of environmental crisis. 
 
Using theories of literary ecology and narrative paradigm, I examine the common structure 
shared by the three high fantasies and the weight of ethical implications it carries.  The 
texts position the transcendent impulse of the mode of tragedy, and the behaviour it 
generates, as the source of crisis, and posit as a solution to the problem the integrative ethic 
characteristic of the comedic mode.  They argue that a transition between these two ethics 
is necessary for the continued survival of the Secondary World.  This thesis examines each 
text’s use of narrative paradigm to articulate methods by which this ethical transition may 
be achieved. 
 
An argumentative trend is documented across the three fantasies through the representation 
of situation, problem and solution.  In each text, as the Secondary World becomes more 
completely a closed physical system, the source of the solution to the problem caused by 
the transcendent presence and the achievement of ethical transition are both relocated 
within the control of human actors.  The three fantasies express a gradual movement 
toward the acceptance of not only human responsibility for, but the necessity for action to 
remedy, the damaged state of the world. 
 
I argue that the texts’ dominant concern is with the human relationship with and to context.  
Indeed, I argue that the three fantasies reflect the developing understanding of the human   iv 
role in not only precipitating, but responding to, environmental crisis, and may function as 
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‘ “It is sad that we should meet only thus at the ending. 
For the world is changing:  
I feel it in the water, I feel it in the earth, and I smell it in the air.   
I do not think we shall meet again.” ’ 
 
—Tolkien, III:229. 
   1 
1  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis traces genre development across three twentieth-century high fantasy texts: 
J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, Ursula K. Le Guin’s Earthsea cycle and Patricia 
A. McKillip’s The Riddle-Master’s Game.  I argue that The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea 
cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game are all stories about saving the world—about the 
necessity of doing so, and the methods by which it must be done.  In each of these three 
fantasies, the imaginary world in which the narrative takes place is under threat.  In each, 
the imaginary world is constructed differently. I argue that as the concept of the imagined 
world changes between the texts, so the response to the danger that threatens it also 
changes.  As the world changes, responsibility for not only the threat to the imaginary 
world, but also the solution to that threat, is shifted to the characters within that world.  In 
The Lord of the Rings, Tolkien positions his imaginary world of Middle-earth within a 
cosmic order.  He constructs the threat to Middle-earth’s integrity as the characters’ need 
to control their situations in despite of the greater order surrounding them.  The solution to 
this problem is for characters to actively promote the cosmic order in the world.  Tolkien 
argues that the world can be saved by a combination of public action that prevents damage 
to the world itself, and private confrontation with the need for control.  In the Earthsea 
cycle, Le Guin’s imaginary world (Earthsea) has an inherent order: the Equilibrium.  Le 
Guin constructs the threat to Earthsea’s balanced state as her characters’ need to escape 
death.  She argues that the solution to this problem is for the characters to learn to accept 
the fact of mortality as part of the world’s balance, and suggests that her characters can 
save Earthsea by consciously adapting both themselves and their societies to support that 
balance.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, McKillip reduces her imaginary world, the High 
One’s realm, to a closed physical system that is maintained by one character’s conscious 
effort.  She argues that the threat to this world is the individual’s choice to act 
irresponsibly, and represents the solution to this problem as another, free decision to act   2 
responsibly.  McKillip argues that the imaginary world can be saved by a private 
transformation from an irresponsible to a responsible perspective, combined with public 
action to prevent damage to the landscape.  In this thesis, I argue that The Lord of the 
Rings, the Earthsea cycle and the Riddle-Master’s Game constitute a series of thought-
experiments in the area of ethics (patterns of human interaction with the world).  I contend 
that Le Guin and McKillip can be read as writing back to Tolkien’s original theory of 
world-saving through their adoption, and adaptation, of the structuring motifs Tolkien 
develops in The Lord of the Rings: in their fantasies, they develop not only the form of the 
genre, but its argument. 
 
1.1  Key Concepts 
The word ‘fantasy’ has been used to mean so many different things, both in general use 
and in literary analysis, that it is necessary to take some time here to define how I use it in 
this thesis, and why.  In 1947, Tolkien published the essay ‘On Fairy-Stories’ in an attempt 
to define the ‘radical difference between the fairy story mode and all others’ (Seeman 75).  
In the essay, Tolkien responds to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Romantic theory of the 
imagination and the fancy (Seeman 75) by drawing a distinction between ‘the mental 
power of image-making’, which he calls Imagination (Tolkien, ‘Fairy-Stories’ 138) and the 
higher mental faculty of Fantasy.  Tolkien defines Fantasy as an exercise of non-mimetic 
imagination, which is free from ‘the domination of observed “fact” ’ and thus can 
encompass ‘images of things that are not only “not actually present”, but which are indeed 
not to be found in our primary world at all, or are generally believed not to be found there’ 
(139).  Imagination and Fantasy are the source of sub-creation; Tolkien constructs ‘the 
operative link’ between them and Sub-creation as Art (Tolkien, ‘Fairy-Stories’ 139), which 
is the specifically literary representation of what is imagined in such a convincing form as 
to inspire Secondary Belief—the reader’s active acceptance of and co-operation with the   3 
fantasy presented (Tolkien, ‘Fairy-Stories’ 132).  Tolkien’s essay constructs ‘Fantasy’ as ‘a 
natural human activity’, the impulse of the human mind to create and confront imperatives, 
impossibles and alternatives in forms other than the strictly mimetic (Tolkien, ‘Fairy-
Stories’ 144).  The type of literary text that presents Fantasy in a way that other minds can 
access is in Tolkien’s vocabulary a ‘fairy-story’, or story about Faërie. 
 
Kathryn Hume, in her study Fantasy and Mimesis: Responses to Reality in Western 
Literature, moves away from both Tolkien’s hierarchy of mental faculties, and his 
somewhat essentialist treatment of them.  In place of Tolkien’s categories of mental 
process, Imagination and Fantasy, Hume suggests that there are two creative impulses that 
govern literature.  These impulses are 
 
mimesis, felt as the desire to imitate, to describe events, people, situations, and objects with 
such verisimilitude that others can share your experience; and fantasy, the desire to change 
givens and alter reality—out of boredom, play, vision, longing for something lacking, or 
need for metaphoric images that will bypass the audience’s verbal defences. 
(Hume 20) 
 
The mimetic impulse can be roughly equated to Tolkien’s Imagination, and the fantastic to 
Fantasy.  But where Tolkien positions Fantasy as a higher process than Imagination, Hume 
constructs fantasy and mimesis as equal—and equally important—poles of a spectrum of 
literary method.  She argues that all fictions contain some elements of mimesis and some 
elements of fantasy, because ‘Mimesis without fantasy would be nothing but reporting 
one’s perception of actual events.  Fantasy without mimesis would be a purely artificial 
invention, without recognisable objects or actions’ (Attebery, Strategies 3).  In Hume’s 
analysis, fantasy is a literary impulse, a way of telling stories to achieve a particular effect,   4 
a method of speaking. A text in which the fantastic impulse is dominant can be said to be 
in the fantastic mode.  Texts in the fantastic mode can take many forms, from Tzvetan 
Todorov’s ‘fantastic’ literature with its characteristic ‘hesitation’ between real and 
supernatural explanations for events (Todorov 26), through science fiction, magic realism 
and fairy-tale, to detective fiction and pornography (Hume 55-8). 
 
So ‘fantasy’ can mean both a form of mental activity, a way of exercising the imagination, 
and an impulse that influences the creation of a text.  It can mean both the desire to 
imagine impossibilities and alternatives, and the artistic representation of what has been 
imagined—‘an alternative vision, a critique, and the basis of opposition’ to aspects of the 
‘real world’ (Zanger 227).  The mental activity of fantasy allows the generation of thought-
experiments; the literary impulse and technique enable their representation.  The ability to 
first produce imaginative alternatives to reality and then represent them in literature is what 
enables the discussion of world-saving that runs through The Lord of the Rings, the 
Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game. 
 
However, ‘fantasy’ is also a label attached to some—but not all—texts in the fantastic 
mode, to group them into a category.  Many scholars of the fantastic have attempted to 
isolate the specific characteristics that allow a fantastic text to be classified as a fantasy.  
The most common, and obvious, means of identifying a text as a fantasy has been content.  
Jane Mobley suggests that ‘Magic is the key informing principle in fantasy and delineates 
both the focus . . . and the form . . . of the genre’ (120).  Similarly, but less specifically, 
C.N. Manlove in Modern Fantasy: Five Studies defines a fantasy text as one ‘containing a 
substantial and irreducible element of the supernatural with which the mortal characters 
in the story or the readers become on at least partly familiar terms’ (1: original emphasis).  
‘Supernatural’ in this instance is synonymous with ‘impossible’, and means ‘of another   5 
order of reality from that in which we exist and form our notions of possibility (Manlove, 
Fantasy 3).  However, Hume and W.R. Irwin broaden these definitions considerably.  For 
Irwin, any story ‘based on and controlled by an overt violation of what is generally 
accepted as possibility . . . the narrative result of transforming the condition contrary to fact 
into “fact” itself’ (4) is a fantasy.  The violation of ‘fact’ need not be anything to do with 
‘the supernatural’, although that is one of the five categories by which Irwin classifies 
fantasy texts in his study.
1
 
  There only needs to be a difference of some sort.  Hume’s 
analysis is concerned not with fantasy as such, but with fantastic literature, and it shows 
that the characteristic of ‘any departure from consensus reality, an impulse native to 
literature and manifested in innumerable variations, from monster to metaphor’ (21: 
original emphasis) can be found in any text in the fantastic mode.  Any text influenced in 
any way by the fantastic impulse contains some violation of consensus reality.  Therefore, 
the presence of such a variation on reality, of whatever sort, in a text—while it might be a 
characteristic of a fantasy text—is not enough, in and of itself, to define a text as a fantasy.   
The second means by which texts have been defined as fantasy has been reader response.  
For a text to be a fantasy, it must not only incorporate a departure from consensus reality, 
but use it to produce (or at least, attempt to evoke) a particular quality of response in the 
reader.  Hume states that all texts in the fantastic mode can activate, through their 
violations of consensus reality, ‘whatever it is in our minds that gives us the sense that 
something is meaningful’ (20).  This suggests that reader response, like the presence of a 
violation of consensus reality, is not the factor that definitely identifies a text as fantasy.  
However, there is a specific quality of response that is arrogated to fantasy texts in 
particular.  Tolkien asserts that a fantasy text has three purposes and three effects on 
                                                 
1 The others are: ‘impossible personal change’, ‘incredible societies’, stories centring on an ‘unorthodox 
notion of innocence’, and ‘literary parody’ or ‘contravention of established ideas about historical fact’ (Irwin 
100).   6 
readers.  The first of these is Recovery, which is the ‘regaining of a clear view’ of the 
world, so that we can see things ‘ “ . . . as we are (or were) meant to see them”—as things 
apart from ourselves’ (Tolkien, ‘Fairy-Stories’ 146).  The second is Escape, which is the 
empowering recognition of the ‘permanent and fundamental’ (Tolkien, ‘Fairy-Stories’ 149) 
that underlies the transient and superficial surface of the world.  The third and most 
important is Consolation.  Consolation is achieved through the text’s resolution in the 
eucatastrophe, or happy chance.  Eucatastrophe is the change that saves the world and 
brings about the right (not necessarily happy) ending of a story; it ‘denies . . . universal 
final defeat’ (Tolkien, ‘Fairy-Stories’ 153), and by doing so produces a feeling of ‘joy’ in 
the reader: 
 
it can give to the child or man that hears it, when the ‘turn’ comes, a catch of the breath, a 
beat and lifting of the heart, near to (or indeed accompanied by) tears, as keen as that given 
by any form of literary art, and having a peculiar quality. 
(Tolkien, ‘Fairy-Stories’ 154) 
 
Tolkien’s construction of eucatastrophe and the emotion it inspires is explicitly religious: 
he states that it offers readers an access to ‘evangelium, giving a fleeting glimpse of Joy, 
Joy beyond the walls of the world, poignant as grief’ (‘Fairy-Stories’ 153).  Later critics 
have moved away from this specifically religious definition, but have retained the idea that 
the evocation of a specific, positive emotional response in the reader is one of the 
characteristics that defines a fantastic text as a fantasy.  For Manlove, in order for a text to 
be a fantasy its ‘supernatural’ elements must be intended to evoke a response of ‘wonder’ 
in the reader (Fantasy 1).  The Encyclopedia of Fantasy offers a more cognitive 
explanation with the suggestion that a fantasy text is defined by its capacity to (in 
Tolkien’s phrase) ‘[rend] . . . the very web of story’ at the point of narrative resolution, and   7 
make evident to the reader the full workings of narrative, thus enabling a complete, holistic 
understanding of the text at its moment of completion (Clute and Grant 323).  However, 
the component of the reader’s positive and affirming response to the text remains central: 
whether it is called joy, wonder or understanding, it is one of the factors that defines a text 
as not just fantastic, but a fantasy.  
 
The final element that critics have considered to define a text as a fantasy—and the one 
least often discussed—is its structure.  Fantasy ‘is not a form—like horror—named solely 
after the affect it is intended to produce’ (Clute and Grant 337).  Fantasy texts also share a 
characteristic pattern of development.  Brian Attebery points out that ‘the characteristic 
structure of fantasy is comic.  It begins with a problem and ends with resolution’ 
(Strategies 15).  Fantasy narratives are ‘self-coherent’, meaning that they are ‘designed to 
be lived within’ and to offer the reader an aware engagement with Story (Clute and Grant 
338).  And they follow a pattern of  
 
an earned passage from bondage—via a central recognition of what has been revealed and 
of what is about to happen, and which may involve a profound metamorphosis of 
protagonist or world (or both)—into the eucatastrophe, where marriages may occur, just 
governance fertilize the barren land, and there is a healing.  
(Clute and Grant 338-9) 
 
Moreover, fantasy texts do this consciously.  They reject the suspicion and subversion of 
the linear narrative form which are characteristic of Modernism and Postmodernism, and 
of fantastic literature in general, in favour of an aware engagement with, and conscious use 
of, Story, ‘the “naïve” connective tissue that permits narrative consequences to follow on 
from narrative beginnings’ (Clute and Grant 338: original emphasis).   8 
 
So a fantasy narrative can be defined as one that develops an alternative vision to set 
against the ‘real world’—a vision that tells a story of movement from a state of bondage, 
through a moment of change, into the healing of the world, that uses that story to evoke an 
eucatastrophic response in its readers, and that uses an explicit violation of consensus 
reality in order to do so.  This is the definition of ‘fantasy’ that I use in this thesis.  I use it 
not only because it incorporates all of the factors that qualify texts as fantasies, but also 
because it privileges the element of the texts that is central to my analysis: their structure, 
with its explicit focus on transforming and saving the imaginary world.  
 
The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game can all be 
considered fantasy texts by this definition.  In each, the Secondary World begins in a state 
of bondage: in The Lord of the Rings, this is the threat of Mordor’s dominion; in the 
Earthsea cycle it is the fear of death; in The Riddle-Master’s Game it is the destructive 
illusions of Ghisteslwchlohm and the shape-changers.  In each, the landscape moves, via 
narrative, into a moment of transformation and healing that is capable of evoking a 
response of ‘wonder’ from the reader: the destruction of Sauron, Tehanu’s flight into the 
west beyond the west, Morgon’s achievement of peace in the last line of The Riddle-
Master’s Game.  And each fantasy incorporates a clear violation of consensus reality, in 
that its narrative occurs within a discrete invented landscape incorporating magic, fantastic 
creatures and events, and impossible occurrences along with recognisably human 
characters. 
 
Unfortunately, however technically accurate it might be, the definition of ‘fantasy’ set out 
above has very little in common with what readers tend to think of when they think of 
fantasy.  The word is more likely to call to mind books about implausible nonexistent   9 
worlds, or impossible variations on our own world; it carries overtones of magic, quests, 
unconvincing archaic language, pre-industrial societies, battles against Evil and landscapes 
comprising 
 
a range of spiky Mountains in the distance, from which a tall Waterfall descends adorned 
with a rainbow at its crest . . . huge and intensely gnarled Trees in the foreground . . . [a] 
line of horsemen making its way across a misty green plain towards the Mountains.  The 
sky is orange and purple. 
(Jones, Tough Guide 113) 
 
It has not escaped my notice that The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The 
Riddle-Master’s Game can all qualify as fantasy according to this definition also.   
 
The above is the characteristic content, and presentation, of many of the texts that have 
been grouped together into the publishing category of ‘fantasy’.  It represents the formula 
end of the concept of fantasy literature.  Formula fantasy tends to reflect the surface 
characteristics of the literature strongly, while failing to engage with the implications of 
those characteristics (or at least, to do so effectively).  However, in Strategies of Fantasy, 
Attebery suggests that between the overarching mode of the fantastic and the formula of 
the publishing category are many texts that can be considered to belong to the genre of 
fantasy.   
 
Attebery points out that although the fantastic mode is theoretically unlimited in its subject 
matter, ‘The freedom it offers is offset by the need to be understood’, and that in order to 
be understood, writers can choose to work within a vocabulary of pre-existent 
‘psychological and social’, and literary, codes (Strategies 9).  It is a too-close adherence to   10 
this vocabulary of motifs, structures and codes without a simultaneous engagement with 
their implications that produces the formulaic fiction described above.  But, as Attebery 
states, some fantasists ‘follow conventions but not slavishly’; they write in a full awareness 
of the implications of the vocabulary they use, and thus ‘remake the language as they speak 
it’ (Strategies 10).  Such fantasists manipulate and stretch the vocabulary of codes and 
motifs to make it encompass, express or reveal new possibilities.  Fantasy texts that operate 
in this fashion are genre fantasies.   
 
The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game work through a 
set of shared conventions—the invented landscape, the imperilled world, the heroic 
quest—but each fantasy inflects those motifs in a unique way in order to speak a new 
meaning, a new argument about the nature of the imaginary world, what threatens it, and 
what must be done to save it from that threat.  The ground of genre, marked by authorial 
awareness of and play with a common vocabulary of literary codes and structures, the 
inflection of known images to create new meanings, is where the three fantasies in my 
study fit within the mode of the fantastic and the category of fantasy.   
 
However, this is not the limit of their similarity.  Even within the category of genre 
fantasy, texts can be grouped according to the particular codes and motifs with which they 
work.  The Lord of the Rings offers a clear model of structure, content and reader response 
that other authors have been able to both replicate and respond to more or less successfully 
(Attebery, Strategies 14); texts that reflect Tolkien’s model are often grouped into the 
category of ‘high fantasy’.  While this term has been used somewhat elastically, high 
fantasies can be defined by two factors: setting (Zahorski and Boyer 58) and concern.  
They are ‘fantasies set in otherworlds, specifically Secondary Worlds . . . which deal with 
matters affecting the destiny of those worlds’ (Clute and Grant 466).     11 
 
This definition may appear overly simple—even simplistic—as a way to classify texts.  
However, it makes a crucial point when it specifies that a high fantasy is set in the kind of 
invented landscape known as a Secondary World.  Kenneth J. Zahorski and Robert H. 
Boyer suggest that a secondary world is any setting for a fantastic narrative that can offer 
explanations of the ‘nonrational happenings’ in that narrative ‘that are plausible in those 
other-world settings . . . that point to magical (faery tale) or supernatural (myth-based) 
causality’ (56).  Modern fantasy features many different types of invented landscape, from 
Middle-earth and Narnia, through the deliberately hollow Land of Stephen Donaldson’s 
Chronicles of Thomas Covenant the Unbeliever and the mythologised England of Susan 
Cooper’s The Dark is Rising sequence, to the subtly magical alternate Europe of Caroline 
Stevermer’s A College of Magics.  In Zahorski and Boyer’s analysis, these invented 
landscapes differ only in terms of how closely they resemble, and are attached to, Primary 
Reality (58-9).  They are not Primary Reality; therefore they are secondary worlds.  But the 
term Secondary World has a much more complex definition than that put forward by 
Zahorski and Boyer, and it is this definition to which John Clute refers when he 
distinguishes it from other invented landscapes in the Encyclopedia of Fantasy definition 
quoted above.   
 
The term Secondary World was coined by Tolkien, following Coleridge’s model of 
Primary and Secondary Imagination in his Biographia Literaria (167), to articulate the 
relationship between the reader’s experiential world, or Primary Reality, and the fully 
constructed invented world of a fantasy.  In Tolkien’s formulation of the concept, a 
Secondary World is an  
   12 
autonomous world or venue which is not bound to mundane reality . . . which is impossible 
according to common sense and which is self-coherent as a venue for Story (i.e., the rules 
by which its reality are defined can be learned by living them, and are not arbitrary like 
those of a wonderland can be). 
(Clute and Grant 847) 
 
A Secondary World is a fantastic, but also discrete and coherent, textual reality that is, 
within the text, entirely distinct from the Primary Reality of the reader’s everyday 
experience and existence—although as Jules Zanger points out, this does not prevent the 
fantasist from engaging with Primary Reality issues within the detached space she or he 
creates (227).  A Secondary World ‘creates an absolute reality which is not contingent 
upon everyday reality, but is instead self-sustaining’ (Mobley 118), with which the reader 
can actively engage, and above all, in which the reader can trust (Tolkien, ‘Fairy-Stories’ 
132).   
 
The concept of the Secondary World developed by Tolkien draws on the fluid landscapes 
of medieval romances and the ‘identifiably historical’ (Miller 32) but technically 
inaccurate landscapes of epic.  However, a Secondary World is not such a fluid landscape 
itself.  The landscapes of epic and romance are always to some degree indeterminate, and 
are governed primarily by the requirements of narrative or allegory.  They exist to be 
travelled through, and to illuminate the significance of the narrative’s events.  A Secondary 
World, in contrast, is a fixed landscape presented to the reader with scrupulous ‘precision 
of detail’ (Swinfen 75), which exists independently of the needs of the narrative, and in 
fact imposes conditions on the narrative told within its parameters. 
   13 
Such a world now has a precise geography, often including maps, which is quite foreign to 
the shadowy and imprecise journeyings of Spenser’s knights in the realm of Gloriana.  The 
particular culture portrayed is not isolated, but set in a long context of mythology, legend 
and history. . . . The religion and beliefs of the inhabitants of the Secondary World are at 
least implicit, and frequently become explicit and central . . . The existence of a literature is 
established, and sometimes complex languages . . .  
(Swinfen 75) 
 
There exist in modern fantasy literature many detailed, coherent invented landscapes, from 
Dalemark, Tortall and Prydain, through the Discworld, to Valdemar, the Kingdoms of the 
Alorns and Angaraks, and Krynn.  However, not all of these can be described as Secondary 
Worlds, because a Secondary World is not just a fixed and coherent theatre for story.  It is 
also a part of the story told within it.  The invented landscape of a fantasy narrative cannot 
be considered a Secondary World unless it is somehow involved in and affected by the 
narrative being played out within its parameters:  
 
All fantasylands are forms of the [Secondary World]; the main distinction is that a 
fantasyland is a template venue inherently resistant to change, but no such repudiation of 
the possibility of metamorphosis, arguably essential to any definition of the fully structured 
fantasy, is implied by the use of the term [Secondary World]. 
(Clute and Grant 847) 
 
A Secondary World has an impact on narrative through its fixed physical landscape.  
Likewise, and more importantly, in a Secondary World, narrative has an impact on the 
invented landscape within which it occurs—to be specific, it changes the nature of that 
landscape, and by transforming it, saves it.  The nature of a Secondary World changes in 
response to the events of the story that is played out within it.     14 
 
The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game are all high 
fantasies.  Douglas Barbour asserts that 
 
in the years since The Lord of the Rings became a runaway best-seller, many similar but 
inferior fantasies have appeared . . . lacking the historical and mythological depth [Tolkien] 
gave to Middle-earth.  Only Ursula K Le Guin’s Earthsea Trilogy [sic] and Patricia 
McKillip’s Quest of the Riddlemaster are better than threadbare copies of his originals. 
(Barbour 675) 
 
While this may be an exaggerated claim, there are few other invented landscapes in 
modern fantasy that are as completely realised as Middle-earth, Earthsea and the High 
One’s realm.  These three landscapes are also discrete: Middle-earth might be an 
hypothetical pre-historic Earth, but it is comprehensively distanced from Primary Reality 
by being placed so far in the past that whole landmasses can be presumed to have altered 
their position and shape since its time; Earthsea and the High One’s realm incorporate no 
awareness of the existence of Primary Reality at all.  Earthsea, Middle-earth and the High 
One’s realm are all fixed landscapes, which impose conditions of time, space and climate 
on the narratives told within them—they are presented to the reader visually, by means of 
maps, further inscribing their fixed quality on the reader’s awareness.  They are self-
coherent: in each, unique laws of nature and physics obtain, but not randomly.  In Middle-
earth, Elves are immortal and trees have shepherds, and a ring can wear down a human 
being into an undead wraith.  In Earthsea, some people can perform magic, dragons can fly 
beyond the physical limits of the world, and places can be inhabited by inimical nonhuman 
intelligences.  In the High One’s realm, some people can change their shapes and others 
can see through whatever they look at.  Intelligence and awareness can persist past death;   15 
some characters live for thousands of years as a matter of course; the land is magically 
connected to those who rule it.  In each fantasy, these facts exert an influence on the 
narrative, and the stories told within the three invented landscapes make sense only when 
taken on the landscapes’ own terms.   
 
Finally, all three landscapes display the capacity for metamorphosis in response to 
narrative.  In The Lord of the Rings, the landscape of Middle-earth is initially magical, the 
home of Elves.  As a result of the combined efforts of Gandalf, Frodo and Aragorn, 
Sauron’s Ruling Ring is destroyed: this saves Middle-earth from Sauron, but destroys the 
power of the three Elven-Rings to sustain the landscape.  With the destruction of the 




  This is not simply an alteration to the population or social organisation of 
Middle-earth.  With the departure of the Elves, the landscape of Middle-earth changes its 
character, from magical to mundane: Treebeard the Ent makes this clear when he says to 
Galadriel after the destruction of the Ring, ‘ “ . . . the world is changing: I feel it in the 
water, I feel it in the earth, and I smell it in the air. . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, III:229).     
In Le Guin’s Earthsea cycle the change in the nature of the Secondary World is not 
expressed directly.  However, the landscape of Earthsea is initially established as 
fragmented, both literally (it is a mass of small and medium-sized islands) and in political, 
social and magical terms (Bailey 256).  There are divisions between islands and hostilities 
between cultures.  A wall—a constructed symbol of separation—stands between the world 
of the living and the Dry Land of the Dead (Le Guin, Wizard 95).  Throughout the six 
books of the cycle, there is a consistent tendency toward recoherence of cultures and of the 
                                                 
2 Although I use the MLA referencing system in this thesis, I have adopted the convention of referencing 
quotes from The Lord of the Rings by volume number and page number, rather than by title and page 
number, as is common among Tolkien scholars.   16 
landscape, which culminates in The Other Wind with the dismantling of the barrier 
between the Dry Land of the Dead and the living world: ‘ “What was built is broken.  
What was broken is made whole” ’ (Le Guin, Wind 240).  This is an alteration in the 
constitution of Equilibrium—a change in the nature of the world—that saves Earthsea from 
catastrophe (Le Guin, Wind 227). 
 
The High One’s realm, the invented landscape of The Riddle-Master’s Game, also 
undergoes a change in its nature as a result of the narrative played out within it.  It is 
established early in the trilogy that this landscape is trapped within a conflict between 
irreconcilable opposites, when the dead children of the Earth-Masters tell Morgon that 
‘ “The war [of the Earth-Masters and shape-changers] is not finished, only silenced for the 
regathering. . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 180).  At the climax of the narrative, Morgon 
assumes the role of High One and imprisons the shape-changers in Erlenstar Mountain.  As 
a result of his actions, the landscape becomes reoriented to peace: 
 
[Morgon] tapped randomly into the continual stream of thoughts just beneath the surface of 
his awareness.  He heard Tristan arguing placidly with Eliard as she set plates on the table 
at Akren.  In Hel, Nun and Raith of Hel were watching a pig being born.  In Lungold, Iff 
was salvaging books out of the burned wizards’ library.  In the City of Circles, Lyra was 
talking to a young Herun lord, telling him things she had not told anyone else about the 
battle in Lungold.  On Wind Plain, the broken pieces of a sword were being slowly buried 
under grass roots. 
(McKillip, Game 614) 
 
This is not a change in the landscape’s inhabitants, but an alteration to the state of the 
landscape.  Danan Isig, the two-thousand-year-old King who is so closely identified with   17 
the landscape of the High One’s realm that he can hear stone and transform himself into a 
tree at will, can sense ‘the ending’ of the age of the High One ‘deep in the earth’ long 
before it occurs (McKillip, Game 191).  By the end of the narrative, Morgon, as the new 
High One, is so completely identified with the landscape that its reorientation to peace can 
mitigate his personal grief: ‘Peace, tremulous, unexpected, sent a taproot out of nowhere 
into Morgon’s heart’ (McKillip, Game 616).   
 
In The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea trilogy and The Riddle-Master’s Game, effecting 
this saving change in the nature of the Secondary World is in some sense the goal of the 
narrative.  Frodo aims to destroy the One Ring knowing in advance the effect that doing so 
will have on Middle-earth (Tolkien, I:257).  By destroying the Ring, he protects Middle-
earth from Sauron.  Ged, Tenar, Lebannen and Alder all act as they must to alter the nature 
of the Equilibrium in Earthsea, and by doing so, they preserve that Equilibrium, in 
increasingly pure forms.  Morgon solves the High One’s riddle-game and takes on the role 
of High One himself in order to protect the land from the shape-changers’ desire for 
power; the transition to peace confirms the integrity of the land-law.  In each case, 
inducing metamorphosis in the landscape saves that landscape, and confirms Middle-earth, 
Earthsea and the High One’s realm as Secondary Worlds.   
 
The Lord of the Rings and the Earthsea cycle have been the focus of a great deal of 
scholarly attention since their publication, both separately and as a pair.  The Riddle-
Master’s Game has been the subject of only a handful of essays and theses.  However, 
across the whole of works addressing the three texts, there exists a trend towards close 
readings that focus on the figure of the hero, or heroes.  While such readings have covered 
territory as diverse as examinations of types of heroism and representations of 
masculinities and female archetypes, far more common are Formalist readings based in   18 
schemata such as Vladimir Propp’s folktale morphology, Jungian archetypal readings, and 
Structuralist readings based on Joseph Campbell’s ‘heroic monomyth’—the supposedly 
universal (Campbell 38) narrative structure that Campbell claims in The Hero With a 
Thousand Faces underlies all heroic myths and reveals their function as metaphors for 
psychological individuation.    
 
It is not entirely clear why the trend for such readings has been either so persistent, or so 
influential.  Possibly Structuralist readings of high fantasy texts are attractive because they 
offer a framework that can incorporate the elements of a fantasy text not easily accessible 
to the vocabulary of traditional literary criticism.  Perhaps they are attractive because their 
point-by-point rigour lends to a marginalised genre, and field of study, an appearance of 
scientific validity and psychological applicability (Moorcock 17) that trumps the 
commonly-levelled charge of escapism.  Or possibly it is precisely because high fantasy 
texts—rather like classic detective fictions—are so obviously constructed, and so evidently 
an abstract play of codes and motifs, that reducing the text to a ‘real’ meaning derived 
from that play of motifs seems a logical method of ‘decoding’ them.
3
 
  Whatever the reason 
for their popularity, such hero-centric readings of genre fantasy texts have been highly 
influential.   
One way in which such readings have imposed their influence on critique of high fantasy 
texts is through the assumptions they make about the relationship between the protagonist 
and the Secondary World.  The idea that the narrative of a fantasy is a metaphor for the 
process of psychological individuation—or at least that the protagonist represents the 
individual psyche—leads logically to the idea that the Secondary World and its inhabitants 
are metaphors for aspects of the protagonist’s psyche:  
                                                 
3 I am grateful to my supervisor, Dr Joy McEntee, for this insight.   19 
 
In a romance the ‘real’ world of the social novel is reversed; the protagonists are placed in 
landscapes directly reflecting the inner landscapes of their minds.  A hero might range the 




In a reading that constructs both landscape and narrative as metaphors, the metamorphosis 
of the landscape that occurs as a result of the protagonist’s narrative serves only to signal 
the psychological transformation of the hero.  In such a reading, the Secondary World 
exists in relation to the hero. 
 
A case can be made for reading the high fantasy narrative as a metaphor for psychological 
development, and the Secondary World as an externalisation of the psyche.  However, this 
is not the only possible way to read high fantasy texts, or the narratives of their 
protagonists.  The explicit narrative focus in The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and 
The Riddle-Master’s Game on saving the Secondary World from destruction suggests 
another possibility.  It suggests that the protagonist’s narrative can be read as modelling the 
development of understanding about the individual’s place in the physical world; it 
suggests that the protagonist be read in relation to the Secondary World, not the other way 
around.  High fantasy texts can be read as scenarios that explore and model human 
attitudes to and patterns of interaction with the closed physical system that is a world—that 
is, ethics.   
 
In his essay ‘Tolkien and the Ethical Function of “Escape” Literature’, Lionel Basney 
suggests that in the current social climate, concepts of ethics, morality, good and evil are   20 
both acutely needed, and increasingly ineffective in influencing the course of events to 
which they are applied.  Basney argues that the Secondary Worlds of modern genre fantasy 
can function to restore to readers spaces in which ‘ethical meaning is of the essence, from 
which it is inalienable,’ and which ‘asserts the possibility of ethical action that initiates 
ethical results’ (‘Escape’ 27).  In Basney's reading, a Secondary World is a site within 
which ‘ethics have objective reference’, making it possible ‘to prescribe, or proscribe, 
actions’, and within which decisions about ethics ‘are urgent, because they are embodied in 
a story of crisis and apocalypse’ that reflects the sense of urgency attached to such 
decisions and their lack of impact in Primary Reality (Basney, ‘Escape’ 27).  Basney 
hypothesises that the object of the genre high fantasy is ‘to assert the general possibility of 
ethics, of ethical action, in an imaginative world specifically designed to display them’ 
(‘Escape’ 27).  High fantasy texts are ways of asserting that, despite the apparent 
ineffectiveness of ethical decisions in Primary Reality,  
 
making ethical choices, whether deliberate or not, is central . . . actions do bear 
consequences not only for oneself but for society, and sometimes apparently insignificant 
actions can bring about momentous consequences . . .  
(Molson 130) 
 
This is the perspective from which I approach The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle 
and The Riddle-Master’s Game in this thesis.  When I use the terms ‘ethic’ or ‘ethical 
transition’ in my discussion of the texts, I therefore do not use ‘ethic’ as it is most often 
used—as a synonym for ‘moral’.  Rather, I use it to refer to ‘Rules of conduct recognised 
in certain associations or departments of human life’ (Simpson and Weiner 244).  Ethical 
transition is not a moral change, but a change in patterns of behaviour within the 
Secondary World (although it is generally taken for granted in each of the three fantasies   21 
that the change enacted is inherently moral, that meaning is not the one I access here).  
This is why, although I am aware of both the explicitly Catholic Christian framework and 
morality within which Tolkien wrote The Lord of the Rings (Tolkien, Letters 172) and the 
Taoist philosophy that informs Le Guin’s work on the Earthsea cycle (Wytenbroek 173), I 
have chosen to exclude these factors from my study.  While I acknowledge them as 
influences on the texts, I focus my reading on the authors’ construction of the Secondary 
World, and the specific relationships that pertain between worlds, characters and actions, 
as the locus of ethical argument in each text. 
 
1.2  Parameters 
I have limited this study to The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-
Master’s Game for two reasons in addition to their common concern with ethics and the 
saving of the world.  The first reason is order of publication.  The three fantasies can be 
considered to form a roughly chronological sequence.  The Lord of the Rings comprises 
three volumes: The Fellowship of the Ring and The Two Towers, both published in 1954, 
and The Return of the King, published in 1955.  The publishing history of the Earthsea 
cycle is complex, being separated into two parts.  The original trilogy, comprising A 
Wizard of Earthsea, The Tombs of Atuan and The Farthest Shore, was published between 
1968 and 1973; of the more recent continuation volumes, Tehanu (optimistically subtitled 
The Last Book of Earthsea) was published in 1990, the novella ‘Dragonfly’ in 1998 and 
The Other Wind in 2001.  The three volumes of The Riddle-Master’s Game are The Riddle-
Master of Hed, published in 1976, Heir of Sea and Fire (1977) and Harpist in the Wind 
(1979).
4
                                                 
4 McKillip’s trilogy has been published and discussed under many titles—the Riddle of Stars, the Riddle-
Master trilogy, the Riddle-Master of Hed trilogy, the Star-Bearer trilogy, The Quest of the Riddlemaster.  The 
Riddle-Master’s Game is the most recent title, derived from the Gollancz ‘Fantasy Masterworks’ series 
omnibus publication of the trilogy: as that is the edition from which I quote in this thesis, that is the overall 
title I use.   
  Although McKillip’s trilogy was published well before the Earthsea   22 
continuations, it is impossible to say for certain whether the Earthsea continuations have 
been influenced by it.  That uncertainty, plus the continuation volumes’ insistent referring-
back to the original trilogy, makes it more logical to treat the Earthsea texts as one unit, 
and to examine the three fantasies as a rough sequence. 
 
My second reason for limiting the study to these three texts was the specific relationship 
that pertains between them.  The Lord of the Rings is, as Attebery states, the earliest text 
that can be classified as high fantasy according to the definitions given in the first part of 
this Introduction.  Because of this, it stands at the centre of the genre of modern fantasy: 
 
Tolkien is most typical, not just because of the imaginative scope and commitment with 
which he invested his tale but also, and chiefly, because of the immense popularity that 
resulted . . . Tolkien’s form of fantasy, for readers in English, is our mental template, and 
will be until someone else achieves equal recognition with an alternative conception. 
 (Attebery, Strategies 14) 
 
The Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game both show a close structural similarity 
to The Lord of the Rings.  However, in creating the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-
Master’s Game, Le Guin and McKillip can be read as not only replicating but responding 
to Tolkien’s original.  Le Guin’s writings about the original Earthsea trilogy suggest that it 
is a response to an unexplored aspect of Tolkien’s text: the genesis of the wizard figure.  In 
the essay ‘Dreams Must Explain Themselves’, Le Guin states that she developed the story 
of A Wizard of Earthsea by wondering 
 
about wizards.  Wizards are usually elderly or ageless Gandalfs, quite rightly and 
archetypically.  But what were they before they had white beards?  How did they learn   23 
what is obviously an erudite and dangerous art?  Are there colleges for young wizards?  
And so on. 
(Le Guin, Language 41) 
 
McKillip writes that after reading The Lord of the Rings as a teenager, ‘I wanted to go back 
to the place where I had been in those books, to that land, that richness, that mystery, that 
story’ (Game v), and that writing The Riddle-Master’s Game was her method of doing so: 
 
Some twelve years . . . later, I finished the Riddle-Master trilogy.  Even after so many 
years, I can find small jewels of inspiration mined from Tolkien’s novels . . . What I found 
in Tolkien inspired me to learn; what I learned I put into The Riddle-Master of Hed, Heir of 
Sea and Fire, and Harpist in the Wind.  
(McKillip, Game v-vi) 
 
However, the article ‘Three Ways of Looking at a Trilogy’ suggests that The Riddle-
Master’s Game is a response to Tolkien founded partly on the things McKillip found to be 
lacking in The Lord of the Rings—in particular, female protagonists (5).  There is no direct 
evidence that McKillip is similarly aware of, or responding to, the original Earthsea 
trilogy.  However, there is a pattern of emphatic stresses in the worldbuilding of The 
Riddle-Master’s Game that suggests an engagement with the same issues with which the 
original Earthsea trilogy deals. For these reasons, The Riddle-Master’s Game is well 
placed to serve as the end point of my study.  
 
One way in which Le Guin and McKillip write back to Tolkien is through their treatment 
of gender in their fantasies.  The narrative tools Tolkien uses in The Lord of the Rings—the 
paradigms of tragic, epic and romance heroes—are heavily gendered, and construct   24 
significant action in the Secondary World as a male domain and a male prerogative 
(although this is somewhat undercut by the extent to which his two protagonists are 
‘codedly female’).  By bringing into Tolkien’s structure different narrative paradigms such 
as the servant-heroine of romance and the female Gothic heroine, Le Guin and McKillip 
challenge Tolkien’s gendering of action and contribution to the Secondary World, and 
assert a feminist perspective that values female action and contribution.  Various 
commentators including Attebery (in Strategies of Fantasy) and Charlotte Spivack (in 
Merlin’s Daughters) have examined Le Guin’s and McKillip’s fantasies from a gender 
perspective.  Unfortunately, although I give considerable attention in this thesis to the 
innovations Le Guin and McKillip make on Tolkien’s structure, an analysis of these in 
gender as well as ethical terms is beyond the scope of my study. 
 
Both Tolkien and Le Guin have produced other, significant texts set in the Secondary 
Worlds of Middle-earth and Earthsea—The Hobbit and The Silmarillion, and the Earthsea 
short stories.  I occasionally use The Silmarillion to provide information about Tolkien’s 
cosmology in this thesis; however, I have chosen to exclude these other texts from the 
study proper.  Neither The Hobbit nor The Silmarillion is high fantasy according to the 
criteria set out in the first part of this Introduction, and neither text has had the same 
influence on its field as The Lord of the Rings has had on genre fantasy.  While The Hobbit 
fits firmly into a tradition of British children’s fantasy literature (Kuznets 150), it has not 
influenced that tradition to the same extent as The Lord of the Rings has influenced the 
genre of modern fantasy.  The Silmarillion has had an effect on high fantasy in terms of its 
relationship to The Lord of the Rings, but has not made any substantial impact on the genre 
in its own right.  Furthermore, The Silmarillion was published for the first time in 1977, 
four years after the publication of The Farthest Shore and in the same year as Heir of Sea 
and Fire.  It therefore cannot be considered as an influence on either the early Earthsea   25 
books or The Riddle-Master’s Game.  Finally, while Le Guin’s Earthsea short stories share 
many of the same concerns, and even some of the same characters, as the Earthsea cycle 
proper, they neither fit the definition of high fantasy, nor form part of the Earthsea cycle’s 
ongoing narrative.  Nor do they show the relationship of response to Tolkien that the cycle 
does.  
 
1.3  Theoretical Approaches 
In order to analyse how the narratives of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The 
Riddle-Master’s Game construct ethical arguments, I use the strategy of close reading 
informed by four theoretical approaches.  These are genre theory, narrative theory, literary 
ecology and the concept of narrative paradigm.  In his book The Political Unconscious: 
Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, Fredric Jameson claims that genres are ‘essentially 
literary institutions, or social contracts between a writer and a specific public, whose 
function is to specify the proper use of a particular cultural artifact’ (106).  In other words, 
genres are coded ways of speaking about the relationships that exist between the 
individual, society and the world.  This is the understanding of genre texts that underpins 
and enables my thesis.  Jameson also suggests that 
 
in its emergent, strong form a genre is essentially a socio-symbolic message . . . an 
ideology in its own right.  When such forms are reappropriated and refashioned in quite 
different social and cultural contexts, this message persists and must be functionally 
reckoned into the new form. . . . The ideology of the form itself . . . persists into the later, 
more complex structure as a generic message which coexists—either as a contradiction or, 
on the other hand, as a mediatory or harmonizing mechanism—with elements from later 
stages. 
 (Jameson 140-1)   26 
 
This is the relationship that I theorise pertains between the three fantasies in my study.  The 
Lord of the Rings can be considered the ‘emergent’ form of the high fantasy sub-genre, as, 
while it has precursors such as William Morris’ prose romances and the works of E.R. 
Eddison and Lord Dunsany, it has no direct sources.  The Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-
Master’s Game, written later, by female American authors working from different 
perspectives and driven by different concerns, stand as refashionings of that form.  While 
‘the “proper use” [of the specific cultural artifacts] to which Jameson refers is presumably 
the socially sanctioned use’ (Cranny-Francis 18), or in other words the politically 
conservative use, as Anne Cranny-Francis points out, it is possible for politically aware 
authors to stage a ‘fundamental intervention in the relationship between reader and text, a 
disruption of the reader’s conventionalized understanding of the contract, the literary 
institution of the particular genre’ (18).  They do this by taking up and reworking the 
conventions of the genre, to both expose their conventionality and deconstruct it, and to 
reveal alternative interpretations and possibilities by doing so.  This is the process I suggest 
that Le Guin and McKillip undertake in the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s 
Game: in effect, I read them as writing back to The Lord of the Rings.   
 
Because of the fantasy genre’s emphasis on the form of Story, the means by which this 
intervention in the genre is achieved is narrative.  In Reading for the Plot: Design and 
Intention in Narrative, Peter Brooks constructs narrative as an engagement with ideology.  
He suggests that narrative patterning reflects political, social and ideological positioning; 
the plot of a story can be considered an exploration of ideology.  Narrative, in Brooks’ 
formulation, is ‘a form of understanding motivated by our desire and narrative fictions 
[are] what trace the circuit and subterfuge of that desire working out its patterns of 
meaning’ (Brooks 323).  Brooks’ theory has been challenged on the grounds that it is   27 
somewhat essentialist.  As Cranny-Francis shows, Brooks’ Freudian formulation of the 
concept of ‘desire’—the foundation of his analysis—is heavily gendered, and Brooks fails 
to acknowledge this in his analysis, or deconstruct its effect (Cranny-Francis 15).  
However, it is possible to set this aspect of the analysis aside, and use only Brooks’ idea of 
consciously constructed linear narrative as an exercise in problem-solving on the 
ideological level alone.  This is how I read the narratives of The Lord of the Rings, the 
Earthsea trilogy and The Riddle-Master’s Game, and this is the aspect of Brooks’ analysis 
I use in this thesis. 
 
If narrative encodes ideology, Joseph Meeker suggests in The Comedy of Survival: Studies 
in Literary Ecology that the literary modes of tragedy and comedy encode two specific 
ideologies about the relationship between the individual and the world.  He locates in the 
tragic mode a set of assumptions that ‘nature exists for the benefit of mankind … human 
morality transcends natural limitations’, and the individual personality is of ‘supreme 
importance’ (Meeker 42).  He considers the comedic mode to be informed by 
presuppositions about the inescapability of limitations imposed by the physical world (30), 
a focus on survival and a privileging of the pair or society over the individual.   Meeker 
suggests that these two ideologies or ethics, and the degree of importance to which they are 
elevated by societies, are the source of the current environmental crisis (6).  I employ 
Meeker’s readings of tragedy and comedy to examine the kinds of relationship that pertain 
between different characters and the Secondary Worlds of The Lord of the Rings, the 
Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game, because those relationships are expressed 
through the narratives attached to the characters.  Don D. Elgin has written a 
comprehensive literary-ecological analysis of The Lord of the Rings in his book The 
Comedy of the Fantastic: Ecological Perspectives on the Fantasy Novel; my thesis is not   28 
an ecocritical reading per se, but I do develop some of Elgin’s points, and apply them 
across the two later fantasies. 
 
The primary tool I use in my analysis of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The 
Riddle-Master’s Game is the concept of narrative paradigm.  This is the idea that stories 
have shapes, and that those shapes encode the core ideology of a genre.  The specific 
realisation of the paradigm in a text constitutes an engagement with that ideology, and with 
the history of the genre.  A narrative paradigm is identifiable by a set of consistent markers 
that recur across texts (Leyerle 69); however, the concept does not assume a point-by-point 
match with an underlying ‘real’ meaning as Structuralist schemata such as Campbell’s 
monomyth do.  Rather, the theory of narrative paradigm posits a loose organisational 
framework within which narrative and meaning can be relatively freely constructed by the 
author, as a form of literary play: 
 
Such literary games allow great scope for individual expression because they establish 
patterns that are widely understood and therefore allow great scope for individual variation 




In my reading, I consider not only the narrative paradigm of the high fantasy narrative as a 
whole, but the way each text makes use of specific narrative paradigms within that larger 
pattern, the variations in usage in each text, and the way they function to express elements 
of the ethical argument.   
   29 
Hero-centric readings such as those I discussed earlier tend to focus on only one narrative 
paradigm in a high fantasy text—the hero’s journey.  In these readings, narratives attached 
to characters other than the protagonist or at most secondary protagonists tend to be 
ignored.  Characters who are not heroes do not have stories; they are incorporated into the 
hero’s story, and serve as challenges, externalised aspects of the hero’s psyche or 
archetypes with which the hero interacts.  However, when the focus of a reading is on the 
Secondary World rather than the protagonist, it becomes possible to acknowledge that 
characters other than the protagonist have narrative paradigms attached to them.  These 
narratives articulate characters’ relationships to and interactions with the Secondary World; 
through them, the characters contribute to the text’s ethical argument.   
 
1.4  Overview 
In this thesis, I will examine five separate elements of the high fantasy scenario, and the 
narratives attached to them.  I will of course analyse the protagonists, the traditional hero-
figures, of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game, and 
the secondary protagonists and/or foils that surround them, because these are the crucial 
narratives that create the eucatastrophe and effect the preservation of the Secondary World.  
However, I will also examine the antagonists of the three fantasies, as figures independent 
of the protagonists.  I will also discuss a category of character that has not to my 
knowledge previously been identified or analysed as a separate element of the text—the 
orchestrators, the characters who organise the narrative and create eucatastrophe in The 
Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game, and thus engineer 
the saving of the Secondary World.  Above all, I will discuss the Secondary World itself 
and the story associated with it.  Through these separate analyses, my thesis will map the 
three fantasies’ presentation of past, present and necessary future patterns of interaction 
with the closed physical system of a world.  It will also demonstrate how constructions of   30 
both the problem that threatens the integrity of the Secondary World, and the solution 
necessary to reverse its effects, have changed across the three fantasies. 
 
Each chapter of my thesis focusses on one element of the high fantasy scenario, with 
internal discussion of each fantasy in chronological order.  Chapter Two discusses the story 
of the Secondary World and the ideology it encodes, and the significance of how each 
author constructs the Secondary World.  Chapter Three investigates the antagonist and 
secondary antagonists of each text, and analyses the changing interpretation of the 
transcendent impulse.  Chapter Four focusses on the orchestrators or focal-narrative 
organisers: it offers a definition of this character type, and considers the development of 
the figure and its relationship to the Secondary World across the three texts.  Chapter Five 
investigates the specific scenarios and narrative paradigms that Tolkien uses in The Lord of 
the Rings to construct an effective response to the transcendent presence within the 
Secondary World, and explores his use of those narrative tools, with particular reference to 
the characters of Boromir, Aragorn and Frodo.  Chapter Six examines Le Guin’s 
adaptation of Tolkien’s narrative tools in the original Earthsea trilogy; it considers the 
process by which Le Guin constructs an alternative response to the transcendent impulse, 
and how this writes back to Tolkien.  It then further investigates her interrogation and 
critique of her own initial vision in the continuation volumes.  Chapter Seven examines 
how McKillip uses Tolkien’s and Le Guin’s tools in The Riddle-Master’s Game; it 
investigates her insertion of additional elements into the base scenario, and the response to 
Tolkien’s and Le Guin’s solutions that she constructs thereby.  In my Conclusion, I both 
summarise the conclusions arrived at in the body of my thesis, and discuss their possible 
implications.  I will also note some ways in which the trend documented here has 
manifested in later fantasies.  
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The quotes I use as chapter titles are drawn from the three fantasies that are the subject of 
this study, with the exception of the title of Chapter Two, which is taken from A College of 
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2  ‘THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD’:  NARRATIVE, 
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND ETHICS IN THREE HIGH FANTASIES 
In The Lord of the Rings, Sauron threatens to gain dominion over Middle-earth, to cover it 
in darkness and reduce it to a barren landscape as he has Mordor. In the Earthsea cycle, 
characters from Cob to the Master Summoner Thorion struggle to control their world and 
unbalance Equilibrium in the process.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, Eriel and her shape-
changer allies want to strip the landscape of power for their own use, and threaten to 
reduce it to a wasteland by doing so.  In each of these three fantasies, in other words, there 
exists a direct threat to the physical integrity of the Secondary World; and the purpose 
driving the narrative in each is the preservation of the Secondary World.  The Lord of the 
Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game are stories about saving the 
world—about the need to do so, and the ways in which it must be done. In each fantasy, 
the process is represented as a confrontation between individuals or groups—Frodo against 
Sauron and the West against Mordor, Earth-Masters against shape-changers, Ged and 
Arren against Cob.  At the same time, however, it is represented as a confrontation 
between systems of values. 
 
In this chapter, I will examine the shared structure of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea 
cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game; I will use narrative theory and the model of narrative 
historiography to interpret the three texts as ethical arguments, and the theory of literary 
ecology to elucidate the terms of that argument.  I will argue that there is a consistent 
ethical argument at the core of the three texts.  However, I will also examine each text’s 
separate conceptualisation of the Secondary World, and discuss briefly how this changes 
the realisation of the core argument in each text. 
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In his discussion of narrative structure in Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in 
Narrative, Brooks suggests that narrative—especially the simple and apparently naïve 
linear narrative such as the hero’s quest structure—constitutes ‘a form of thinking, a way 
of reasoning about a situation’ that develops a solution to an initial problem ‘without 
explanation, through description of what needs to happen’ (9).  Linear narrative is 
organised according to what Attebery calls ‘narrative necessity’ (Strategies 25).  This 
means that the elements of a story are selected so that they lead apparently self-evidently to 
a logically, aesthetically and morally satisfying conclusion for both teller and audience: 
‘Why does Cinderella’s mother die?  So that her father can marry again, so that Cinderella 
may be mistreated by her stepmother and stepsisters, so that her fairy godmother can 
intervene, and so on’ (Attebery, Strategies 25-6).  The techniques by which a linear 
narrative is shaped are not tools for revealing inherently meaningful links between events 
so much as they are tools for creating both links and meaning.  When the end of a narrative 
is reached, a line of logic from beginning to conclusion is implicitly present: the 
conclusion can be understood as an element in ‘a single and concrete complex of 
relationships’ from which it derives its significance (Mink 551).  In Brooks’ analysis, 
narrative is a rhetorical strategy employed to persuade an audience of the literal, moral and 
aesthetic fitness of the solution to a problem: it is an argument. 
 
The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game are—or at a first 
glance appear to be—simple linear narratives structured on the model of the hero’s quest.  
The Lord of the Rings follows Frodo’s anti-quest and Aragon’s quest; the Earthsea cycle 
deals with Ged’s various quests and the other stories that develop around and after them; 
The Riddle-Master’s Game follows Morgan’s quest to solve the riddle of three stars and 
Raederle’s to solve the riddle of her self.  The narratives can all be read as attempts to 
develop solutions to a problem.  The conclusion of each is the eucatastrophe.   34 
 
Eucatastrophe is, as discussed in the Introduction, a moment that evokes a particular 
emotional response from the reader of a fantasy; however, it is also an element of the text’s 
structure.  It is the qualified happy ending (Attebery, Strategies 15), the ‘final “turn” of a 
plot’ (Clute and Grant 323) that occurs as a ‘sudden and miraculous grace, never to be 
counted on to recur’ (Tolkien, ‘Fairy-Stories’ 153).  Its effect is to metamorphose the 
imaginary landscape into its ‘healed’ or regenerated (Clute and Grant 459) state.  The 
eucatastrophe is also a conclusion that ‘confirms the generic principles behind [a] work, 
making the end, however it is brought about, a positive statement, indeed a celebration, of 
the work’s social, moral or aesthetic vision’ (Lenz 6).  It is, in part, the recognition of this 
confirmation of the text’s vision that prompts the crucial emotional response from the 
reader. 
 
Middle-earth, Earthsea and the High One’s realm all pass through the transforming 
moment of eucatastrophe: they all change in response to narrative.  In The Lord of the 
Rings, as a result of the destruction of the One Ring, Middle-earth moves from the Elven to 
the human, the magical to the mundane (Tolkien, III:220).  In the Earthsea cycle, the 
fragmented landscape of Earthsea undergoes a consistent movement toward recoherence, 
starting with Ged’s assimilation of his Shadow in A Wizard of Earthsea and finishing with 
the destruction of the wall between the living world and the Dry Land of the Dead in The 
Other Wind.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, as a result of Morgon’s riddle-solving, the 
landscape of the High One’s realm reorients from war (McKillip, Game 180) to peace.  
The metamorphosis of the landscapes of Middle-earth, Earthsea and the High One’s realm 
into their healed states occurs, in each case, as the result of a linear narrative inspired by a 
specific problem within the Secondary World.  The eucatastrophe can therefore be 
understood as the solution to that problem.  And because an examination of the structure of   35 
the three fantasies shows that both problem and solution are, not the characters themselves, 
but the value systems they espouse, the eucatastrophe in each fantasy can be considered to 
articulate the text’s—and the genre’s—ethical stance.  
 
The narrative of The Lord of the Rings develops a structure that is taken up by McKillip 
and Le Guin in their later works.  It is constructed not as a story, but as a history.  The 
narrative is preceded by a pseudo-anthropological introduction on the subject of hobbits, 
which treats hobbits as beings with an existence outside of the text.  The narrative itself 
includes several references to events being recorded as or shortly after they occur by Bilbo 
and Frodo Baggins (Tolkien, I:265, III:271-2).  It is followed by a series of appendices 
dealing with the historical context of the narrative’s events (Appendices A and B), 
genealogies of several characters (Appendix C), the calendar and languages of Middle-
earth and the process of translating them (Appendices D, E and F).  The whole is 
accompanied by detailed maps of the landscape of Middle-earth (a map, as a representation 
of a landscape, presupposes the physical existence of the landscape it represents in Primary 
Reality).  And the whole text is rendered randomly accessible by an index, textbook 
fashion, which gives page references for ‘Songs and Verses’ (by both title and first line, as 
is the convention in poetry anthologies), ‘People, Beasts and Monsters’, ‘Places’ and 
‘Things’.   
 
These features are markers of a work of non-fiction.  However, they do not disguise the 
fact that The Lord of the Rings is a fiction; nor are they intended to.  Rather, Tolkien uses 
these addenda to the narrative to position the narrative as an historical document relative to 
its Secondary World (Basney, ‘Time’ 17).  He uses them to construct the fiction that The 
Lord of the Rings is his translation of the ‘Red Book of Westmarch’ (Tolkien, I:13), which   36 
has survived from the Third Age of Middle-earth into the present world, and which 
constitutes a record of   
 
THE DOWNFALL OF THE LORD OF THE RINGS AND THE RETURN OF THE 
KING (as seen by the Little People; being the memoirs of Bilbo and Frodo of the Shire, 
supplemented by the accounts of their friends and the learning of the Wise.)  
(Tolkien, III:271-2) 
 
Furthermore, as the narrative history of Middle-earth, The Lord of the Rings is governed by 
the writing and reading conventions of narrative history; and it is through these 
conventions that Tolkien articulates his ethical argument. 
 
A similar construction of the high fantasy narrative as history relative to the Secondary 
World is visible in Le Guin’s Earthsea cycle.  Le Guin does not reproduce all of the 
elaborate framing devices that Tolkien uses to position The Lord of the Rings as a narrative 
history.  However, she does use some of them, in combination with other devices of her 
own, to create a similar effect.  Each volume of the Earthsea cycle is accompanied by 
maps relevant to the specific narrative—A Wizard of Earthsea and The Farthest Shore 
have as frontispieces maps of the whole of Earthsea, for example, whereas The Tombs of 
Atuan has maps of the Place and the Labyrinth, and Tehanu a map of Gont.  And the 
opening paragraphs of A Wizard of Earthsea establish the narrative as ‘a retrospective 
view’ (Barrow and Barrow 25).  They are spoken by a narrative voice for which the events 
of the book constitute part of an already-known, mostly verifiable sequence of events, 
which has already occurred in the past of the Secondary World. 
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. . . some say the greatest [Gontishman], and surely the greatest voyager, was the man 
called Sparrowhawk, who in his day became both dragonlord and Archmage.  His life is 
told of in the Deed of Ged and in many songs, but this is a tale of a time before his fame, 
before the songs were made. 
(Le Guin, Wizard 11) 
 
This authoritative narrative voice, which speaks out of the Secondary World to the reader 
to narrate much of A Wizard of Earthsea and The Farthest Shore, implicitly identifies the 
narrative as a transcribed or adapted oral history of the Archipelago. 
 
Some of the volumes of the Earthsea cycle, notably The Tombs of Atuan and Tehanu, do 
not feature this authoritative narrative voice, or include any overt historical framing.  This 
may be a deliberate acknowledgement of the fact that these volumes deal both with 
perspectives excluded from traditional narrative history (such as the lives and stories of 
women, children and the elderly) and with matters excluded from Tolkien’s model of high 
fantasy, such as the consequences of eucatastrophe.  Nevertheless, the presence of the 
authoritative voice framing the beginning and end of the original trilogy (Le Guin, Shore 
213-14) implies that the initial Earthsea trilogy stands in the same relationship to Earthsea 
as The Lord of the Rings does to Middle-earth; the continuation volumes can be read as a 
continuation of that history that focusses on less conventional areas. 
 
The Riddle-Master’s Game incorporates neither an elaborate framing apparatus like The 
Lord of the Rings, nor an historicising narrative voice like the Earthsea cycle.  However, it 
does display vestigial traces of both.  The three volumes of the trilogy are accompanied by 
a frontispiece map and an appended list of the ‘People and Places’ that appear in the 
narrative.  The summary that follows the text of each volume in the original, separate   38 
publications defines the subject of the narrative as ‘Morgon, Raederle, the world they live 
in and the end of an age’ (McKillip, Riddle-Master 222)—that is, a story known in its 
entirety, the end of which is already fixed.  Each volume opens with a scene-setting 
sentence from an detached, omniscient viewpoint, that implicitly positions the narrative as 
already complete, known to the narrator and open to comment and summary: ‘In spring, 
three things came invariably to the house of the King of An: the year’s first shipment of 
Herun wine, the lords of the Three Portions for the spring council, and an argument’  
(McKillip, Game 205).  While these devices constitute only a gesture toward the 
techniques used by Tolkien and Le Guin, they nevertheless imply that the narrative of The 
Riddle-Master’s Game shares the same relationship with its Secondary World as The Lord 
of the Rings shares with Middle-earth and the Earthsea cycle with the Archipelago.  
Relative to the High One’s realm, it is history rather than story.  And like The Lord of the 
Rings and the Earthsea cycle, it is structured as a narrative history. 
 
Narrative was the dominant historiographic mode in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  Traditional narrative histories, whatever their subject or surface organisation, 
have a consistent structure.  They appear to present one narrative to the reader, organising 
 
historical material around particular people, actions, places and time, recounted with 
primarily chronological rather than thematic control . . . [and] informed by . . . ideas that 
order the material and draw the reader along. 
(D. Potts 15) 
 
In fact, as Robert J. Berkhofer Jr. shows in Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and 
Discourse, they present two.  The first and most prominent of these is the focal narrative.  
This deals with the subject of the history, and is comparatively small-scale—it might be   39 
the story of a life or a place, a political tendency, a scientific event, a philosophy or artistic 
movement or economic trend.  However, this small-scale, usually linear narrative does not 
exist in isolation.  It is sited, either explicitly or implicitly, within another, larger-scale 
narrative of a kind that Berkhofer calls a ‘Great Story’.  The Great Story supplies the focal 
narrative with a context, and moreover a context that is deliberately selected by the 
historian to illuminate certain elements of the focal narrative which are seen as meaningful, 
interesting or important: 
 
the Great Story need not be any well-known “master interpretive code”, “grand governing 
narrative”, or metanarrative . . . a, or the, Great Story can be the explicit or presumed 
larger contextual (hi)story behind the biography of a life, the history of a specific place or 
region, or the account of a year or a decade.  On a broader scale, a, or the, Great Story can 
depict the rise and spread of capitalism or nationalism or imperialism across continents 
and centuries.  The notion of a or the Great Story also embraces the macro-processes and 
grand transformations that historical sociologists see as shaping the modern world. 
(Berkhofer 39) 
 
The Great Story is the means by which the historian writing narrative history in effect 
creates the meaning of the focal narrative (Berkhofer 40).  It is also the means by which an 
historian creates the end of a history narrative.  Locating the end of a sequence of events in 
history is an impossible task—after all, there is always something that happens next.  
Traditional narrative histories therefore tend to site the close of a sequence of historical 
events not at a point of physical change or the ending of a sequence of events, but at a 
moment of transition between dominating social structures, value systems or paradigms of 
morality. 
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. . . we cannot say, surely, that any sequence of real events actually comes to an end, that 
reality itself disappears, that events of the order of the real have ceased to happen.  Such 
events could only have seemed to have ceased to happen when meaning is shifted, and 
shifted by narrative means, from one physical or social space to another.  
(H. White 22: original emphasis) 
 
The Great Story sets up a dominant value system against which the focal narrative reacts; a 
traditional narrative history ends with a change in the tenor of the Great Story—a shift in 
values—that is brought about by the events of the focal narrative.  The focal narrative is 
the means by which a narrative history writer expresses, among other things, a judgement 
regarding the value systems surrounding past events.  A narrative history can be 
understood to tell a story of comparative value systems, of which the focal narrative is the 
concluding movement.   
 
Both of these narrative history characteristics—the use of Great Story and focal narrative, 
and closure sited at a moment of transition between contrasting value systems—are visible 
in The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game.  In each of 
these fantasies, there is one narrative that is the focus of attention.  This is the narrative that 
sets out the journeys, actions and transformations of the primary and secondary 
protagonists—the combined stories of Frodo and Aragorn in The Lord of the Rings, of 
Ged, Tenar and Arren, Therru, Irian and Alder in the Earthsea cycle, and of Morgon and 
Raederle in The Riddle-Master’s Game.  However, in each case this focal narrative occurs 
within the context of a second story, which deals with the past of the Secondary World.   
 
This contextualising story is rarely recognised as a story in its own right; it is most often 
characterised by critics as a static literary device intended to support and give ‘depth’ or   41 
‘texture’ to the ‘illusion’ of the Secondary World (Irwin 161).  The contextualising story is 
not recounted as a linear narrative—even the extensive appendices of The Lord of the 
Rings supply only an outline of the extended history of Middle-earth, in the minimal, 
dates-and-events annal format (H. White 5).  In each fantasy, information about the 
contextualising story is given at intervals, as and when it is needed during the focal 
narrative to allow understanding to develop.  The linear progress of the focal narrative 
allows both protagonists and reader to amass that information and assemble it into a 
coherent narrative, and use it to both discover the context of, and judge the appropriateness 
of, the protagonists’ actions.   
 
The contextualising story is realised differently in each text.  In The Lord of the Rings, it is 
the story of Sauron’s attempts to rule Middle-earth, and the ‘long defeat’ (Tolkien, I:338) 
of the Elves.  In the Earthsea cycle, it appears as the attempts of ancient wizards and more 
recent Kings to secure power and eternal life.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, it is the story 
of the war and the long riddle-game played by the High One and the shape-changers.  It is 
the world-story, the context of past events within the Secondary World from which the 
characters, events and concerns of the focal narrative derive their significance, but which is 
not complete until the events of the focal narrative have been played out.  The world-story 
is the high fantasy narrative’s equivalent of the Great Story of narrative history.  And it is 
directly concerned with human value systems. 
 
In the discipline of history, the format of traditional narrative historiography is recognised 
to be problematic.  In a traditional narrative history, there is a ‘presumption of the 
singularity of a Great Story as context’ (Berkhofer 40): the format implies that there exists 
one master narrative of history, of which all other historical narratives are fragments, and 
from which they derive their meaning.  The Great Story imposes interpretation and   42 
judgement on the events of the focal narrative.  In traditional narrative histories, it tends to 
function as an attempt to approach the ‘master narrative’ and to fit the focal narrative into a 
place within it; it imposes ideology on the focal narrative.  Since the middle of the 
twentieth century, historiography has moved away from the model of Great Story and focal 
narrative (Stone 75-6), and under the influence of Marxism, modernism, postmodernism, 
poststructuralism and feminism has developed forms that both refuse assumptions about 
value systems, and admit multiple voices.    
 
Writing between 1936 and 1949, Tolkien modelled The Lord of the Rings on the then still-
current form of narrative history.  By the time Le Guin and McKillip began to respond to 
The Lord of the Rings, historiographic practice had developed beyond this mode; but as Le 
Guin and McKillip write within the genre of fantasy rather than the discipline of history, 
their format reflects the model of The Lord of the Rings rather than recent historiographic 
practice.  This means that in all three texts, the structure of focal narrative framed in Great 
Story clearly appears.  However, it does not appear invisibly, as a convention taken for 
granted by the authors.  Tolkien’s elaborate construction of narratively ‘unnecessary’ 
supporting material such as genealogies and languages, Le Guin’s directly-speaking 
narrative voice, and McKillip’s deliberately literary gestures to both, serve to highlight the 
structure and direct attention toward it.  Tolkien adopts the format of traditional narrative 
historiography deliberately in The Lord of the Rings, because it serves his purpose; Le 
Guin and McKillip adapt it from Tolkien’s model in order to write back to his ideas 
effectively.  In these three high fantasies, the world-story can be read not as a problematic 
expression of ideology imposing a meaning on the focal narrative, but as a means of 
articulating a problematic ideology to which the focal narrative constitutes a response.  The 
world-story is the tool with which Tolkien, Le Guin and McKillip set up their ‘problem’; 
the linear focal narrative is the tool with which they develop solutions to that problem.      43 
 
Like the Great Story of a narrative history, the world-stories of The Lord of the Rings, the 
Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game are loaded with a weight of values, which 
are expressed through literary conventions.  As the three fantasies share a common 
structure, so do their world-stories follow a common paradigm.  In each, the world-story 
begins in the far past of the Secondary World (in The Riddle-Master’s Game, literally its 
pre-history).  Each world-story features the rise of a power in the Secondary World.  This 
may be an individual or a culture (Sauron in The Lord of the Rings, the early mages of the 
Archipelago, the Grey Mage of Paln and more recently the Kargish Godkings in the 
Earthsea cycle, and the mysterious Earth-Masters in The Riddle-Master’s Game).  This 
power grows until it over-reaches itself.  It then suffers a series of catastrophes affecting 
not only the physical, but also the social and political planes, and is greatly diminished as a 
result of them.  In The Lord of the Rings this pattern of achievement followed by 
diminishment appears in the destruction of Númenor and the disembodiment of Sauron.  
The Earthsea cycle mentions various past disasters, including the sinking of Soléa and the 
loss of the Ring of Erreth-Akbe.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game there is the cataclysmic 
war between the Earth-Masters and shape-changers.   
 
The past power, though diminished by catastrophe, is not entirely destroyed; it is exiled to 
the periphery of the Secondary World, and over a long period of time it rebuilds itself.  It 
may be watched as it does so by an observer present at the moment of its downfall: 
Galadriel and Elrond, and later Gandalf, in The Lord of the Rings, and the High One in The 
Riddle-Master’s Game fill this role (the Archmages of Roke, in the Earthsea cycle, do not 
consistently do so, but Ged as Archmage does in The Farthest Shore).  Eventually, the 
power out of the past intrudes into the present of the Secondary World, and begins to act 
with the goal of regaining its former prominence.  In doing so, it becomes the antagonist of   44 
the focal narrative.  Sauron builds up the armies of Mordor and launches his attack on 
Gondor.  Cob attempts to rework and outdo the spells of the Grey Mage of Paln.  Eriel and 
her shape-changer followers move out of their exile in the sea, and attack the Star-Bearer.   
 
The re-emergence of the power out of the past creates the focal narrative: it prompts the 
observer character (Gandalf, Ged, the High One) to orchestrate the events of the focal 




 leave home and take up the task of eradicating the relics of the 
past from the threatened present.  Frodo undertakes to destroy Sauron’s Ring; Ged and 
Arren search for the unraveller of Earthsea; Morgon of Hed sets out to solve the riddle of 
‘three stars’.  In the course of their journeys, the protagonists are presented with a choice 
between the past and the present or future—the Ring or the Shire, Cob or Ged, the shape-
changers or the High One.  They choose the present over the past, and by doing so bring 
about both the final failure of the antagonist’s bid for prominence, and the healing of the 
landscape. 
Each element of the world-story—the antagonist’s struggle for power, the observer’s 
organisation of a response, the protagonists’ journey—is associated with a set of values, 
and thus forms a part of the text’s argument about value systems.  The antagonist’s 
narrative sets out for the reader a problematic ethic that threatens the integrity of the 
Secondary World.  The orchestrator character’s narrative models a response to that 
problematic ethic (and indicates the source of the solution).  And the narratives of the 
protagonist and secondary protagonists model what action must be taken in the Secondary 
World for that solution to be effected.    
                                                 
5 There are always multiple protgonists in a high fantasy narrative, although they may not all be of equal 
importance.  Even in the Earthsea cycle, while some volumes have lone protagonists, the series accumulates 
them, until they come together in The Other Wind to function as a group.   45 
 
The narratives of antagonist and protagonists in The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle 
and The Riddle-Master’s Game reflect two diametrically opposed (Frye, Anatomy 162) 
literary modes: comedy and tragedy.  In The Comedy of Survival: Studies in Literary 
Ecology, Meeker suggests that these literary modes express and model two opposing 
understandings of human relationship to the world, and inform human action in the world.  
Meeker theorises that the major concern of the tragedic mode is the individual moving 
towards isolation, his or her potential for perfection, and the obsessive struggle to achieve 
that ideal of ‘self-consummation’ (Langer 85).  The tragedic mode is informed by the 
presuppositions that ‘nature exists for the benefit of mankind’, that ‘human morality 
transcends natural limitations’, and that the individual personality is of ‘supreme 
importance’ (Meeker 42).  It expresses the belief that ‘the universe cares about the lives of 
human beings . . . that some superior order exists, and that man will be punished if he 
transgresses against it’ (Meeker 36), but also that such transgression is not only possible 
but desirable, even morally imperative: ‘ . . . it is a movement toward man’s proper 
essence, which he comes to know as his own in the presence of his doom’ (Jaspers 43).   
 
This, as Raymond Williams points out in Modern Tragedy, is a reading of the tragic mode 
that has only become dominant in Western literary criticism since the nineteenth century.  
Williams suggests that tragedy began as a dramatic mode with a strong social dimension.  
Classical Greek tragedy, because of its choral form, embodies ‘not an isolable 
metaphysical stance, rooted in individual experience, but a shared and indeed collective 
experience, at once and indistinguishably metaphysical and social’ (Williams 18).  
Williams argues that as Western society has changed, so has its understanding of tragedy; 
particularly as a result of the Romantic movement and its focus on the importance of the 
individual, the social dimension of tragedy has been stripped away, and the form’s ‘moral   46 
question, of the nature and therefore the effect of a tragic action’ has become instead ‘a 
question in abstracted human nature . . . an attempt to find reasons for an assumed general 
form of behaviour’ (Williams 27).  The tragic hero has become not only the focus, but the 
whole of tragedy. 
 
Meeker’s reading of the tragedic mode can be seen as a partial restoration of this social 
dimension of tragedy, in that it focusses attention on the tragic hero’s effect on his or her 
context, and on the crucially important aftermath of the tragic action (Williams 55).  
However, the concept of tragedy on which Meeker bases his analysis is firmly in the 
modern tradition.  This is not necessarily a drawback.  As T.A. Shippey states in his 
discussion of The Lord of the Rings in J.R.R. Tolkien: Author of the Century, Tolkien’s 
fantasy is explicitly concerned with ‘responding to the issues and anxieties’ of the 
twentieth century (xxvii); so are texts such as the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s 
Game, which both develop from The Lord of the Rings and respond to it.  Such texts 
necessarily incorporate a twentieth-century understanding of tragedy.  Meeker’s reading of 
the tragedic mode is well-adapted to examine The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle 
and The Riddle-Master’s Game make of that mode. 
 
In contrast to the tragic mode’s focus on the individual, Meeker considers that the major 
interest of the comedic mode is with individuals who are at first isolated, but who come 
together through narrative to form pairs, groups and communities (Frye, Anatomy 207).  In 
Meeker’s reading, the comedic mode is concerned with ‘self-preservation’ (Langer 85), 
and is informed by the presuppositions that ‘Man is a part of nature and subject to all 
natural limitations and flaws.  Morality is a matter of getting along with one’s fellow 
creatures as well as possible . . . ’ (Meeker 37).  The comedic mode puts forward the 
perspective that individual transcendence of the world is not admirable, or even dangerous,   47 
so much as rather ridiculous (Frye, Anatomy 167).  Whereas tragedic endings tend to 
feature the erasure of a corrupt old order and the establishment of a new, comedy 
emphasises the continuation of, or adaptation of, an existing society (Hoy 315).  Comedy 
allows, even insists on, the solution that tragedy rejects (Myers 138), a compromise 
between extremes.  As Meeker puts it, ‘the problem of comedy is always how to resolve 
conflict without destroying the participants.  Comedy is the art of accommodation and 
reconciliation’ (38). 
 
In Meeker’s reading, the tragedic mode positions human beings—or more specifically, 
human minds—as both superior to, and exterior, to the environment within which they 
exist.  The comedic mode positions human minds as part of human bodies; in other words, 
as part of the environment, able to be affected by it.  Tragedic and comedic narratives not 
only illustrate these perspectives, but model patterns of behaviour based on them.  The 
literary modes of tragedy and comedy are not only expressions of systems of thought, but 
also structures that shape human judgement and behaviour in the world.  They are 
expressions and performances of ‘values and beliefs’ that ‘help shape the character of the 
people in … society, teaching them what is good and bad’ (Roth 283)—in short, they are 
representations of systems of ethics.  
 
The tragedic and comedic ethics do not just appear in the world-stories of The Lord of the 
Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game; they do so in a consistent 
pattern.  In each world-story, the transcendent ethic of tragedy is associated primarily with 
the past.  In The Lord of the Rings it appears in two places.  As Elgin shows (42), Sauron’s 
actions display a tragedic disdain for physical context, and a commitment to transcendence 
of that context.  Sauron can and does ‘torture and destroy the very hills’ (Tolkien, I:255), 
and reduce the entire landscape of Mordor to slagheaps, in pursuit of his goal of dominion   48 
over Middle-earth.  Sauron’s followers, particularly Saruman, display a tendency to the 
same behaviour.  And, as Elgin points out, so do the Elves and Gandalf, the other face of 
Middle-earth’s history.  Through the power of the three Elven-rings for ‘understanding, 
making, and healing, to preserve all things unstained’ (Tolkien, I:257), which they use to 
defend the landscape against Sauron’s destructiveness, Elrond, Galadriel and Gandalf, like 
Sauron, ‘manipulate nature to the ends that best serve’ their purposes (Elgin 43)—though 
they do so in a conspicuously non-destructive fashion. 
 
The transcendent worldview appears in many places in the past of the Earthsea cycle.  It is 
gestured to in the political history of the Archipelago, in the tales of the Kings such as the 
story of Morred and Elfarran the Fair, and their Enemy.  This story is not told in full in the 
cycle itself, but the outline provided in Tales of Earthsea links Morred’s Enemy strongly 
with the transcendent ethic: ‘If Elfarran will not be my own I will unsay Segoy’s word, / I 
will unmake the islands, the white waves will whelm all’ (278).  The Kargish version of the 
death of Erreth-Akbe also matches the tragic hero’s pattern of striving and failure (Le 
Guin, Tombs 56).  However, as the cycle progresses, the ethic of transcendence becomes 
increasingly associated with the practice of magic—particularly magic that dates from 
before the era of the Roke school and the understanding of the principle of Equilibrium.  
The assumption that the human mind is detached from the physical world, and of more 
importance than anything else, underlies Cob’s attempt to defeat death (Le Guin, Shore 
195), the Grey Mage of Paln’s summoning of the dead (Le Guin, Shore 85), and indeed the 
whole practice of Archipeligan magic:  
 
‘The ancients saw that the dragons’ realm was not of the body alone.  That they could 
fly. . .outside of time, it may be. . .And envying that freedom, they followed the dragons’ 
way into the west beyond the west.  There they claimed part of that realm as their own.  A   49 
timeless realm, where the self might be forever.  But not in the body, as the dragons were.  
Only in spirit could men be there. . .So they made a wall which no living body could cross, 
neither man nor dragon.  For they feared the anger of the dragons.  And their arts of naming 
laid a great net of spells upon all the western lands, so that when the people of the islands 
die, they would come to the west beyond the west and live there in the spirit forever. . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Wind 227-8) 
 
The whole of Archipeligan culture and thought is linked to the practice of magic: the 
Hardic language is derived from the Old Speech in which magic is worked, and Hardic 
runic writing is derived from the True Runes which are spells in written form (Le Guin, 
Tales 271-2).  True names are words of the Old Speech, and are part of the ancient 
wizards’ spells of eternal life.  The transcendent worldview at some level informs the 
whole of Archipeligan culture. 
 
The transcendent ethic is also present in the past of the High One’s realm in The Riddle-
Master’s Game.  It is strongly suggested to underlie the culture of the vanished Earth-
Masters: the name ‘Earth-Masters’ points to a strong tendency to transcendence of their 
environment, which is supported by the fact that members of that society precipitated 
disaster by gathering power from the world for their own ends first without realising, and 
then without caring about, the implications of their actions (Mains 67).  However, the 
transcendent worldview also appears in the historic past.  There is the wizard 
Ghisteslwchlohm with his desire to become the High One—in other words, to become an 
Earth-Master—first in name, by usurping the High One’s place and political function, and 
then in fact by subsuming the power of the Star-Bearer (McKillip, Game 594).  The history 
of the Three Portions of An also features many individuals who seek to transcend 
limitation.  There is Awn of An, who ‘to discourage an army from Hel, . . . set fire to An,   50 
sending flames billowing over half the land, burning harvests, orchards, shearing the 
hillsides and river-banks’ (McKillip, Game 117), and Peven of Aum who ‘killed seven of 
his sons with misused wizardry’ (McKillip, Game 13).  Above all, there is Oen of An, the 
King who walled his shape-changer son Ylon into a tower in a futile attempt to stop him 
inheriting the land-rule (McKillip, Game 212).  This worldview is strong enough to affect 
the present: Oen’s personal and political hatred for his enemy Farr of Hel is so great that 
when Raederle raises Farr’s wraith in Heir of Sea and Fire, he rises out of his grave to put 
the world back the way he wants it to be: 
 
Oen’s face turned finally to Farr; their eyes met across the room for the first time outside of 
their dreams in six centuries.  ‘I swore that as long as the Kings ruled Anuin, Farr of Hel 
would rule the king’s midden.’ 
 
‘And I have sworn,’ Farr rasped, ‘that I would not close my eyes in my grave until those 
ruling Anuin were lying in theirs.’ 
(McKillip, Game 368) 
 
Like Middle-earth and Earthsea, the history of the High One’s realm is dominated by the 
transcendent ethic. 
 
So a cycle of tragedic striving after transcendence, failure, recovery and re-emergence 
dominates the history of each Secondary World.  However, this pattern does not repeat 
unchanged through time.  Each time it occurs, the antagonist’s attempts to transcend the 
limitations that confine him or her result not in a development toward the ideal of 
individual empowerment, but in a diminishment away from it.  The Sauron of The Lord of 
the Rings, the disembodied spirit trapped in a barren landscape, is a diminished version of   51 
the manipulator who contrived the downfall of Númenor and persuaded the peoples of 
Middle-earth to accept his Rings in The Silmarillion.  This Sauron is a diminished version 
of Sauron the Maia spirit, the servant of Morgoth.  At all of these levels, Sauron is himself 
only a lesser version of Arda’s original fallen angel, the Vala Morgoth (Tolkien, 
Silmarillion 23).  Likewise, in The Farthest Shore, Cob appears to outdo both the ancient 
wizards of the Archipelago and the Grey Mage of Paln, and achieve his goal of eternal life 
in his body, in the living world.  However, what he actually achieves is the thing he fears 
most: eternal unlife trapped in a decaying body, and the loss of self (Le Guin, Shore 197), a 
fate even worse than the Grey Mage’s namelessness, or entrapment in emotionless 
existence in the Dry Land of the Dead.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, after the Earth-
Masters’ war, Eriel and the rebellious Earth-Masters are confined to the sea by the 
bindings the High One places on them (McKillip, Game 593), and lose their ability to 
access power from external sources.  They diminish from Earth-Masters into shape-
changers.     
 
In addition to this, with each catastrophic failure of the antagonist’s attempt at 
transcendence of the Secondary World, the damage done to the landscape increases.  
Sauron goes from occupying land to causing the drowning of the island of Númenor and 
the removal of the Undying Lands from ‘the circles of the world’ (Tolkien, III:281).  
Finally, in The Lord of the Rings, he poisons the landscape of Mordor, corrupts several 
cultures, and threatens to reduce the whole of Middle-earth to a barren waste.  In Earthsea, 
the ancient wizards damage large parts of the lands in the west beyond the west in their 
attempt to create a haven for eternal life in the spirit: 
 
‘ . . . as the wall was built and the spell laid, the wind ceased to blow, within the wall.  The 
sea withdrew.  The springs ceased to run.  The mountains of sunrise became the mountains    52 
of the night.  Those that died came to a dark land, a dry land.’ 
(Le Guin, Wind 228) 
 
In the physical world, the actions of the ancient wizards inspire the enmity of the dragons, 
and leave the people of the Archipelago the target of their anger for centuries.  The Grey 
Mage of Paln ruins his homeland (Le Guin, Shore 85) by summoning the dead to advise 
the living.  Cob, in his attempt to outdo the Grey Mage, begins to unravel the whole of 
Earthsea.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, Eriel and her followers first destroy the Earth-
Masters’ cities, kill their own children and damage the landscape so badly that it takes 
thousands of years to recover from their first attempt to gain dominance (McKillip, Game 
589).  Their second attempt involves murder, the disruption of land-law and families, the 
destruction of a city, an attempt to drown an island and another to slaughter an army, and 
the devastation of an entire kingdom (McKillip, Game 607).  The threat is that they will 
reduce the entire realm to a wasteland if they are not contained in time.   
 
Through this pattern of repeated transcendent striving, diminishment and ever-increasing 
consequences, the world-stories of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The 
Riddle-Master’s Game position the transcendent worldview as a problem to which the 
focal narrative must develop a solution.  The solution the three fantasies present, through 
narrative, is the diametrically opposite ethic of comedy.  Modern fantasy tends to be 
characterised by an expression of ‘delight in the independent life of created things’ 
(Manlove, Impulse xii); it is a largely comedic response to the world, and tends to be 
conservative of it and the things within it.  The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and 
The Riddle-Master’s Game all share the characteristic structure of comedy in their 
movement from bondage to healing.  Furthermore, the focal narratives of the three texts are   53 
informed by the integrative worldview expressed by the comedic mode, which appears in 
each text associated predominantly with the present, the protagonists and their origins.   
 
As Elgin shows in his ecocritical analysis of The Lord of the Rings (51), the comedic ethic 
of existence within the limitations imposed by the physical world is coded into the lifestyle 
of the hobbits of the Shire. As a culture, the hobbits live within their environment rather 
than trying to dominate it with machinery and industry: ‘they love peace and quiet and 
good tilled earth: a well-ordered and well-farmed countryside was their favourite haunt’ 
(Tolkien, I:13).  Hobbits understand the relationship between individual and contexts well 
enough that anything unusual or out of scale, such as Bilbo’s and Frodo’s well-preserved 
longevity, worries them (Elgin 51).  The hobbit perspective on the relationship of 
individual to world is clear enough that it enables Sam to reject the influence of the Ring 
when he must carry it in Mordor after Frodo’s apparent death: 
 
. . . all the clouds rolled away, and the white sun shone, and at his command the vale of 
Gorgoroth became a garden of flowers and trees and brought forth fruit.  He had only to put 
on the Ring and claim it for his own, and all this could be. 
 
In that hour of trial it was the love of his master that helped most to hold him firm; but also 
deep down in him lived still unconquered his plain hobbit-sense . . . The one small garden 
of a free gardener was all his need and due, not a garden swollen to a realm; his own hands 
to use, not the hands of others to command. 
 
‘And anyway all these notions are only a trick,’ he said to himself . . .   
(Tolkien, III:155). 
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The secondary protagonist of The Lord of the Rings, Aragorn, is also associated with the 
integrative ethic through his double function as warrior and healer, and through his identity 
as the King of Gondor and Lord of the Western Lands (kingship is a healing function on 
the political and social planes: Monks 6). 
 
In the Earthsea cycle the integrative worldview characteristic of comedy is expressed 
predominantly through the concept of Equilibrium, the guiding principle of the relatively 
recently established (Le Guin, Tales 293) school of Roke wizardry.  The doctrine of 
Equilibrium constructs human beings and their actions as parts of a balanced system, and 
thus stresses the implications of action: 
 
‘ . . . an act is not, as young men think, like a rock that one picks up and throws, and it hits 
or misses, and that’s the end of it.  When that rock is lifted the earth is lighter, and the hand 
that bears it heavier.  When it is thrown the circuits of the stars respond, and where it 
strikes or falls the universe is changed.  On every act the balance of the whole 
depends. . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Shore 76-7) 
 
The doctrine of Equilibrium is a philosophical codification of a physical fact—that 
individuals exist as part of their environment.  It explicitly teaches the acceptance of 
limitations, through the principle that just because something can be done does not mean it 
should be done: ‘ “ . . . do only that which you must do, and which you cannot do in any 
other way” ’ (Le Guin, Shore 77). The integrative ethic also finds expression in the day-to-
day pragmatism of the nonwizardly protagonists of the Earthsea cycle, Tenar, Alder and 
Irian. 
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The integrative ethic is associated with Morgon of Hed, the protagonist of The Riddle-
Master’s Game, three times over.  It is visible in the culture of Morgon’s kingdom of Hed 
in The Riddle-Master’s Game—a deliberate contrast to the history of the Three Portions of 
An.  Hed, like the Shire, is a preindustrial farming landscape, with all the acceptance of 
inescapable physical limits that that implies (McKillip, Game 24).  Hed is also unusual in 
the High One’s realm for having an extremely peaceful past: 
 
‘ . . . [Hed] had nothing anyone would have fought for: no wealth, no great stretches of 
land, no seat of power or mystery, just good farmland and good weather, in a land so small 
that not even the Kings of An in their years of conquering, were tempted by it.  Men found 
the rulers they wanted to keep the peace, and their instinct for peace drove deep into the 
land . . . ’  
(McKillip, Game 102) 
 
The peaceful past of Hed is the one thing above all others that fits Morgon for the role of 
Star-Bearer (McKillip, Game 594).   
 
Existence within and acceptance of the restrictions imposed by context is also a feature of 
the discipline of riddlery practiced by Morgon, Raederle and most of the other major 
characters in the trilogy.  This discipline is never explained to the reader as Le Guin’s 
philosophy of Equilibrium is.  However, McKillip frequently shows it in operation, and 
through the formula of question, story-answer and derived stricture (moral rule) applied to 
immediate, real-world situations, she reveals riddlery to be concerned with the 
development of an holistic understanding of actions, their contexts and their effects 
(Schulyer 108).  The riddles are drawn from ‘the very fabric of the realm, its settlement, 
histories, tales, wars, poetry, its riddles’ (McKillip, Game 333). It is a set of abstractions   56 
derived from concrete examples, and its strictures—the lessons drawn from the solutions to 
riddles—operate as guides to action in the world, not only in abstract terms but in specific 
instances, as Morgon and Deth’s battle of riddles on the borders of Herun shows 
(McKillip, Game 91-2).  To be a riddle-master is to be concerned with the issue of 
identifying and undertaking right action in the world.   
 
Finally, Morgon is associated with the integrative ethic through his connection to the land-
law of Hed.  Land-law is an intense magical connection between a realm and the individual 
who rules it, which makes the land-ruler effectively a part of the landscape: 
 
‘. . . I [Morgon] felt [my father] die.  I didn’t know how or why or where; I simply knew, at 
that moment, that he was dying.  And then that he was dead, and the land-rule had passed 
to me.  For a moment I saw every leaf, every new-planted seed, every root in Hed…I was 
every leaf, every new-planted seed. . . .’ 
(McKillip, Game 77) 
 
Morgon is literally, physically integrated with his environment, and for so long as he holds 
the land-law, is bound to act in its best interests. 
 
The comedic ethic can be just as problematic as the tragedic ethic.  It can become, not just 
secure, but stagnant within its acceptance of limitations.  The hobbits of the Shire are so 
secure in their vision of the world that they reject not just the truly unnatural, but the 
merely unfamiliar, right down to the simple practice of boating (Tolkien, I:31).  This 
leaves them vulnerable to Saruman’s malice: ‘even though the hobbits recognize what is 
happening, they do not take action of any kind to stop it . . . because of their own 
unwillingness to recognize the difference between tragic revolt and comic survival’  (Elgin   57 
46).  The school of Roke is shown, particularly in the continuation volumes of the 
Earthsea cycle, to be unnecessarily limited in its interpretation of the principles of 
Equilibrium, particularly with regard to its own organisation. This is visible in its hierarchy 
and exclusivity, its exclusion of women from learning, and its inability to come to terms 
with the obsolescence of the office of Archmage.  Likewise, within the culture of Hed 
there is no place for Morgon’s enquiring mind.  Morgon’s farm overseer says to him after 
the revelation that he has won Peven’s crown, 
 
‘ . . . I told [your father] it was wrong to let you go away from Hed so long; it’s never been 
done, no good would come of it.  And I was right.  No good has come.  You running off to 
a strange land, playing riddle-games with—with a man who should have had the decency 
to stay put once he was dead and buried in the earth.  It’s not good.  It’s not—it’s not the 
way a land-ruler of Hed should want to behave.  It’s not done.’ 
(McKillip, Game 13) 
 
The simple presence of the integrative ethic in the Secondary World cannot effectively 
counter the damage the transcendent ethic does; it needs narrative expression to make it an 
effective presence. 
 
The narrative paradigm of comedy, like that of tragedy, begins with a social situation that 
appears to be stable.  This situation is disrupted—though not violently—by someone who 
is striving after a self-determined ideal state.  However, in comedy, instead of this 
disruption being amplified, it is systematically evaded or avoided by the protagonists until 
it can be neutralised through the fulfilment of pre-existing social institutions such as 
inheritance or marriage (Hoy 17).  The fulfilment of those institutions reconciles those who 
create the disruption with those against whom it was directed.  In neither The Lord of the   58 
Rings, the Earthsea cycle nor The Riddle-Master’s Game does a protagonist’s narrative 
follow this paradigm exactly, though Aragorn’s, Morgon’s and Raederle’s stories come 
close.  However, the overall focal narrative of each fantasy gestures to the comedic 
structure as well as promoting the comedic vision.   
 
In The Lord of the Rings, both Frodo and Aragorn begin their stories in more or less 
marginalised states.  Frodo, as a hobbit, is a member of a species and culture literally 
unknown to most of the world outside the Shire; Aragorn, as a Ranger, lives on the fringes 
of human society, and as unacknowledged King is out of his proper place in the world.  
Through Frodo’s attempt to destroy the Ring and Aragorn’s to defend Gondor, they (and 
their bathetic echoes, Sam, Merry and Pippin), neutralise the damage caused to their 
Secondary World by Sauron’s attempt to transcend its limitations.  In doing so, these 
characters achieve full integration into their own societies, and regenerate them into their 
healed states.  Sam, Merry and Pippin scour and then regenerate the Shire, and Aragorn 
achieves the throne of Gondor.  The only exception to this rule is Frodo, a discrepancy I 
will investigate more fully in Chapter Five.   
 
Le Guin’s protagonists follow the same trajectory.  They all begin their narratives in 
marginalised states.  Ged is a village bronzesmith’s neglected youngest son; Tenar is the 
nameless Priestess of a politically disfavoured faith; Arren, though a Prince’s son, is an 
adolescent and effectively powerless.  Therru, in Tehanu, is a disfigured child in a society 
that rejects difference.  Irian, the protagonist of ‘Dragonfly’, is provincial, uneducated and 
uncategorisable.  In The Other Wind, Alder is a petty sorcerer, isolated from the power 
structures of his world.  Nevertheless, each of these characters acts to neutralise a 
disruption caused by those who hold the transcendent worldview in their Secondary 
World—Ged, who must work to correct his own mistake, in A Wizard of Earthsea, the   59 
Kargish Godking, Cob, Aspen, Thorion, the ancient wizards who built the wall between 
the Dry Land of the Dead and the living world.  In succeeding, each protagonist 
regenerates and reintegrates with her or his society and landscape.   
 
The pattern holds for McKillip’s protagonists also.  Morgon of Hed and Raederle of An 
each begin at the margins of their world, both literally and socially.  Morgon is the farmer 
Prince of a tiny island widely held to have contributed nothing—not even a riddle 
(McKillip, Game 29)—to the world.  As the designated prize of whichever man manages 
to win a riddle-game with a murderous ghost, Raederle is a political cipher who cannot 
even act for herself.  However, through their efforts to solve the High One’s riddle-game, 
Morgon and Raederle counteract the damaging effects of the shape-changers and the 
wizard Ghisteslwchlohm on their world, and achieve a complete integration with their 
societies and their environment.  Morgon becomes the new High One, a Master of Earth 
and Air, and Raederle becomes the heir of sea and fire named in the title of the trilogy’s 
second volume. 
 
The comedic shape of the focal narrative is significant not just because it activates within 
the Secondary World a worldview that opposes the antagonist’s, but because the comedic 
narrative paradigm contains the tragedic paradigm—in both senses of the word.  The 
potential for tragedy is always present within the comedic paradigm.  It is what causes the 
initial disruption to the stagnant status quo.  However, the comedic narrative develops in 
such a way as to block this tragedic potential from achieving its full expression.  This is 
what produces eucatastrophe in The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-
Master’s Game.   
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In each of these three fantasies, the tragedic and comedic narratives of the antagonist and 
the protagonists share both a beginning and an end point.  The disruption caused by the 
antagonist’s re-emergence and attempt to achieve transcendence is also the disruption 
imposed on an apparently stable situation from without, which the protagonists must 
neutralise before they can achieve integration with their landscapes.  Sauron’s emergence 
from Mordor signals Frodo’s departure from the Shire and Aragorn’s movement towards 
Gondor; Cob’s return from death prompts Ged’s departure from Roke with Arren; the 
shape-changers’ attempt to prevent the Star-Bearer’s accession to power sends Morgon on 
his quest to answer the riddle of three stars.  And in each text, the two paradigms—tragedic 
and comedic—also end simultaneously.  Gollum’s destruction of the Ring, the climax of 
the focal narrative of The Lord of the Rings, diminishes Sauron to dust.  Ged’s closure of 
the rift between the Dry Land and the living world in The Farthest Shore confines Cob to 
death.  Morgon’s assumption of the role of High One and the power of the land-law checks 
the shape-changers’ re-emergence in time for him to rebind them and preserve the 
Secondary World.  When the protagonists of each fantasy negate the disruption to social 
and physical equilibrium caused by the antagonist, they stop short the development of the 
tragedic narrative, and cause the final failure of the antagonist’s attempt at transcendence.  
The transcendent ethic is erased from the Secondary World. 
 
This is only to be expected.  Tragedy characteristically closes with the erasure of the 
corrupt old order and the establishment of a new—though in the more cynical brand of 
tragedy this may be simply the old order redux, as is Fortinbras’ assumption of the throne 
of Denmark at the end of Hamlet.  But comedy, as previously discussed, ends with the 
affirmation and regeneration of a modified status quo.  The fall of the antagonist in The 
Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea trilogy and The Riddle-Master’s Game signals the end of 
the old order and the erasure of the transcendent ethic that dominates the history of the   61 
Secondary World.  It also generates the expectation, based in the reader’s familiarity with 
the tragedic narrative paradigm, that a new order will appear to replace it.  On the same 
principle, the simultaneous close of the protagonists’ comedic narrative generates an 
expectation of the regeneration and perpetuation of the status quo.   
 
And in each fantasy, this is precisely what happens.  Aragorn becomes the King of Gondor 
and Lord of the Western Lands, and Sam goes home to literally regenerate the Shire, using 
Galadriel’s gift of soil.  Arren becomes Lebannen, the King of All the Isles, and binds the 
Archipelago into a stable political entity.  Morgon and Raederle become the new High One 
and shape-changer, whose power maintains the High One’s realm.  Because this 
regeneration of the old order occurs simultaneously with a tragedic paradigm closure, 
which leaves space open for a new order, the protagonists’ establishment of the secure 
comedic future becomes the paradigmatically right ending of not only the comedic 
paradigm, but also the tragedic.  The regenerated comedic ethic becomes the new order 
that legitimately replaces the old in the tragedic paradigm.  The nature of the landscape 
changes, and eucatastrophe is achieved.  The focal narrative moves the integrative ethic 
into the dominant position in the Secondary World and erases the transcendent; Hayden 
White’s transition between value systems, the close of narrative history, is revealed as the 
point of the high fantasy narrative and the goal toward which it moves.  If the transcendent 
ethic that threatens the integrity of the Secondary World is the problem, action that 
promotes the integrative ethic appears to be the solution.   
 
The uniform pattern of ethical alignments that appears in The Lord of the Rings, the 
Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game, and the uniform construction of 
eucatastrophe in the three texts, suggests that the three fantasies advance a single, identical 
ethical argument.  They argue that a transition from transcendent ways of thinking about,   62 
relating to, and acting within the world, toward integrative ways of thinking and acting, is 
necessary to ensure the continued survival of the Secondary World. However, in each 
fantasy, there appears a different interpretation of the transcendent impulse, and a different 
construction of the ethical transition.  In each, the method the focal narrative proposes for 
containing the transcendent problem differs also.  These differences are the result of one 
factor: the way in which each author constructs the Secondary World.   
 
Tolkien’s construction of Middle-earth reflects the Christian vision of the physical world 
as part of a larger moral system, in which the divine plan is made manifest.  In The Lord of 
the Rings, Tolkien presents Middle-earth as part of an open system—in fact, as the focal 
point of a system that includes not just a physical universe but a consciously-determined 
cosmic order.  Although the narrative of The Lord of the Rings occurs entirely within the 
landscape of Middle-earth, reality extends beyond that landscape.  Elven-ships sail from 
Middle-earth to the Undying Lands, which are no longer a part of Middle-earth’s physical 
reality (Tolkien, III:281).  In order to reach them, Frodo must cross a form of threshold: 
 
. . . the ship went out onto the High Sea and passed on into the West, until at last on a night 
of rain Frodo smelled a sweet fragrance on the air and heard the sound of singing that came 
over the water.  And then it seemed to him that as in his dream in the house of Bombadil, 
the grey rain-curtain turned all to silver glass and was rolled back, and he beheld white 
shores and beyond them a far green country under a swift sunrise. 
(Tolkien, III:274-5) 
 
There may be no gods in Middle-earth (Dowie 266), but as reality extends beyond the 
limits of the world, so do belief systems.  The Valar are referenced as legendary figures, 
invocations of the Vala Elbereth frequently function as spells or answered prayers   63 
(Tolkien, I:192), and her star inspires Sam with hope in Mordor (Tolkien, III:175).  Entities 
from outside of Middle-earth can enter it at will: Gandalf suggests that Sauron has done so, 
and Treebeard states that Gandalf and the other wizards have also (Tolkien, II:66).  Other 
presences existing outside Middle-earth are concerned with events within it.  Gandalf 
states that Sauron is a ‘servant or emissary’ of other powers (Tolkien, III:137), while 
Elrond speaks of ‘other places and realms’ with an interest in the outcome of events in 
Middle-earth (Tolkien I:255-7).  And as Paul Kocher states (35), there is a clear 
implication that events in Middle-earth, when not obstructed by transcendent actions, 
manifest the design of at least one of those external powers:  
 
‘ . . . now, when [the Ring’s] master was awake once more and sending out his dark 
thought from Mirkwood, it abandoned Gollum.  Only to be picked up by the most unlikely 
person imaginable: Bilbo from the Shire!   
 
‘Behind that there was something else at work, beyond any design of the Ring-maker.  I 
can put it no plainer than by saying that Bilbo was meant to find the Ring, and not by its 
maker. In which case you [Frodo] were also meant to have it.  And that may be an 
encouraging thought.’   
(Tolkien, I:61-2) 
 
This power is most likely the creator figure called Eru or Ilúvatar in The Silmarillion (3), 
although that fact is never stated in The Lord of the Rings.     
 
The progress of events in Middle-earth manifests the greater order of which the Secondary 
World is a part.  The power that orders events in Middle-earth intervenes in the narrative 
directly only once, to send Faramir’s riddle-dream (Shippey, Road 137).  However, its 
influence is constantly present.  In Middle-earth, it is not just a truism but a matter of fact   64 
that, as Théoden puts it, Oft evil will shall evil mar (Tolkien, II:177), and ‘the very 
qualities of evil are … turned against themselves for other ends’ (Kocher 47).  Bilbo 
Baggins, with his inbuilt hobbit’s resilience, finds the Ring in The Hobbit and prevents it 
from making its way back to Sauron.  The Balrog’s destruction of Gandalf in Moria leads 
only to his return as the more powerful Gandalf the White (Kocher 46).  The factional 
quarrelling of the Orcs in The Two Towers helps Merry and Pippin to escape and avoid 
being killed by the Rohirrim, and reach Fangorn Forest in time to stir up the Ents and bring 
about the fall of Isengard.  Saruman is brought down by the Ents whose forests he has 
destroyed, and dies at the hands of his corrupted servant Gríma Wormtongue. The Ring is 
destroyed because it acts as it was made to, exerting an equal influence on Frodo and 
Gollum to make them want it for themselves at the Cracks of Doom, the one place and 
moment in the narrative in which it can be destroyed.  Sauron is thus undone by his own 
transcendent ambition.    The landscape of Middle-earth may be benevolent (Rivendell), 
amoral (Tom Bombadil) or malevolent in nature (Caradhras, Old Man Willow), but the 
events that take place within that landscape manifest the positive cosmic order of which it 
is a part. 
 
The situation is rather different in the Earthsea cycle.  Le Guin constructs Earthsea as more 
of a closed system than Middle-earth.  Earthsea is part of a physical universe, but as 
Richard D. Erlich points out, its landscape exists more or less on a single plane: ‘For all 
practical purposes, Earthsea is covered with the dome of the sky; there is no Heaven above, 
but only the ancient starry heavens (450).  The landscape of Earthsea extends into the 
realm of the nonphysical; the physical Secondary World is contiguous with the ‘west 
beyond the west’, the Dry Land of the Dead and the ‘other wind’ on which the dragons fly, 
which allows them to move beyond the limits of Earthsea (Le Guin, Wind 226).  However, 
there is no implication that the west beyond the west imposes any form of order on the   65 
physical Earthsea.  Despite the Kargish belief in gods, no presences exist beyond 
Earthsea’s limits, ordering or influencing it.  Segoy, the maker of the landscape of Earthsea 
(ie the dragon Kalessin), is indigenous to the system.   
 
Earthsea, and the universe it is part of, can adapt to the events that occur within them.  
When the ancient wizards of the Archipelago create the Dry Land of the Dead, the 
Equilibrium adjusts to its presence to such an extent that later wizards come to regard the 
Dry Land’s existence as the natural state of the world.  Cob’s door between the living and 
dead worlds will ‘suck all the light out of the world in the end’ if it is not closed (Le Guin 
Shore, 198); the ancient mages’ attempt to ensure the survival of the spirit after death not 
only turns the west beyond the west into the barren Dry Land, but eventually threatens to 
have physical consequences that extend beyond Earthsea into the universe around it: 
‘ “Greed puts out the sun.  These are Kalessin’s words” ’ (Le Guin, Wind 227).  However, 
that infinite physical universe cannot be overwhelmed, and nor, ultimately, can the 
Equilibrium of Earthsea.  Before his final encounter with Cob, Ged says of himself and 
Arren, 
 
‘ . . . we two must stand upon the balance-point, the very fulcrum of the world.  And if I 
fall, you fall, and all the rest…For a while, for a while.  No darkness lasts forever, after all.  
And even there, there are stars. . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Shore 171) 
 
Equilibrium will eventually reassert itself in Earthsea, no matter how badly Cob damages 
the landscape.  The larger universe will continue to exist despite the acts of the ancient 
wizards.  Le Guin’s Secondary World manifests not a cosmic order, but an inherent, 
ecological one.   66 
 
The situation is different again in The Riddle-Master’s Game; in her construction of the 
High One’s realm, McKillip goes one step further than even Le Guin, and creates a 
completely closed system.  Like Earthsea, the High One’s realm exists on a single plane.  
There are no belief systems in it, either truly or falsely founded, that extend beyond its 
limits: the High One is a source of order and a focus of belief, but he exists within the 
physical world, is associated with a specific, relatively accessible place (Erlenstar 
Mountain) and is integrated with the landscape through the land-law.  The shape-changers 
who threaten the land-law come from outside its sphere of influence, but not from beyond 
the limits of the Secondary World.  There is no indication anywhere in the text of a known, 
or believed-in, life after death in a different location.  Consciousness can persist past death 
in the High One’s realm, but it is tied to the body, and manifests in the physical world: the 
restless dead of the Three Portions of An have to be bound ‘in their graves’ (McKillip, 
Game 78), while the power of the Earth-Masters’ dead remains in the places where they 
died (McKillip, Game 596).  There is no awareness on the characters’ part that the High 
One’s realm is part of a greater physical system such as the universe that surrounds 
Earthsea.   
 
This closed system manifests neither a cosmic nor an ecological order.  Its original, 
inherent order has been disrupted by the shape-changers’ use of the natural world as a 
source of power.  The High One’s realm is held in balance artificially and from within, by 
the High One and the land-law (McKillip, Game 594).  While the land-law mimics 
Earthsea’s inherent balance, it does not replicate it entirely; it does not have the capacity to 
adjust to inimical forces within the Secondary World as Earthsea and Middle-earth do.  Its 
only response to a transcendent presence is to isolate it, to prevent it from doing more 
harm.  This can be seen in the High One’s imprisonment of the shape-changers in the sea,   67 
the death of Eriel and Heureu Ymris’ baby and the suicide of Ylon, and in the tale of Awn 
of An, who after setting fire to his land lost the land-rule, and was replaced by another, 
more effective caretaker (McKillip, Game 117).   
 
Because the land-law is created and held by the High One, it is as vulnerable to destruction 
as the High One is to death.  Unlike Middle-earth and Earthsea, the High One’s realm can 
be destroyed purely by accident—a point made early in the narrative, when Morgon nearly 
kills himself and Deth by provoking an avalanche.  Unlike Middle-earth and Earthsea, 
McKillip’s Secondary World is very nearly absolutely vulnerable to the transcendent 
actions of the characters within it; the only way in which the land-law can actively defend 
itself is through the production of the Star-Bearer to oppose the shape-changers (McKillip, 
Game 594).  The High One’s realm manifests only an artificial order, created and 
maintained by conscious effort from within the Secondary World.  
 
The construction of the Secondary World, whether as an open system manifesting cosmic 
order, a partially closed ecology, or a damaged closed system maintained by an artificial 
construct, is the single greatest influence on the problem-solving of The Lord of the Rings, 
the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game.  Although the overall argument 
outlined in this chapter remains the same, as the nature of the Secondary World changes, 
each author’s presentation of the elements that make up the high fantasy paradigm changes 
also.  The construction of the transcendent impulse changes; the representation of ethical 
transition, and its source, and the concept of what action is needed to preserve the 
Secondary World, change in response.  And as the external apparatus endowing the 
Secondary World with meaning and order is stripped away, responsibility for the situation 
is increasingly moved onto the characters within the Secondary World. 
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Despite the differences between their stories, worldbuilding and characters, the narratives 
of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game follow a 
common paradigm, and present a common argument.  In Middle-earth, Earthsea and the 
High One’s realm, the past has been dominated, to the detriment of the landscape, by the 
ethic of transcendence expressed in the tragedic mode.  In each Secondary World, in order 
for the landscape to survive, the characters within it must effect a modal shift, so that the 
integrative ethic of comedy becomes dominant instead of the tragedic ethic.  However, the 
construction of the Secondary World changes in each fantasy.  Middle-earth begins by 
presenting the world as invested with significance by its place within a cosmic order, but in 
the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game, this apparatus of support is stripped 
away.  The Secondary World becomes a closed physical system, and even its inherent, 
ecological order is lost, to be replaced by a simulacrum.  As the construction of the 
Secondary World changes, so does each fantasy’s interpretation of the generic argument. 
While the need for ethical transition is always present, through their handling of 
antagonist, orchestrator and protagonists—their representation of the transcendent impulse, 
the ethical transition and its implementation—Tolkien, Le Guin and McKillip present three 
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3  ‘THE SHADOW OF THE PAST’: THE TRAGIC HERO, THE 
TRANSCENDENT IMPULSE AND THE SECONDARY WORLD 
In the high fantasy paradigm, one thing consistently disrupts and threatens the integrity of 
the Secondary World: the major antagonist, the power out of the past, making its second 
bid for ascendency over the landscape and its limitations.  As discussed in Chapter Two, in 
The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game, the major 
antagonist is consistently associated with the worldview of tragedy—the worldview that 
constructs the human mind as superior to and isolated from its environment, and valorises 
the individual’s attempt to transcend the limits imposed by that environment.  In this 
chapter, I will examine the major antagonists of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle 
and The Riddle-Master’s Game—Sauron, Cob and Eriel—and the minor antagonists that 
surround them.  I will show how Tolkien, Le Guin and McKillip use these characters to 
discredit the transcendent ethic that has previously dominated the Secondary World, to 
construct the transcendent actor as a danger to the Secondary World, and to reveal why she 
or he is dangerous.  I will investigate how the three authors present the source of 
transcendent behaviour through their antagonists, and show how their interpretations of 
that behaviour change from text to text, and why.  Finally, I will discuss where each 
narrative locates the ultimate responsibility for the threat to the integrity of the Secondary 
World.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the major antagonist figures of The Lord of the Rings, the 
Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game all espouse the transcendent ethic 
associated with tragedy.  Additionally, they all conform to the paradigm of the tragic hero.  
The narrative paradigm of tragedy deals with the violent disruption of a previously stable 
situation, focussed around a particular individual.  This disruption grows greater and more 
widespread, often erupting destructively onto the physical plane (Meeker 51), until stability   70 
can only be restored by the deaths of those implicated in causing the disruption.  The focus 
of modern tragedy, and modern readings of tragedy, is the tragic hero, the individual who 
struggles to overcome the limits of his or her
6
 
 initial, uncongenial situation in order to 
achieve a subjective ideal state—‘avoiding or transcending the necessary in order to 
accomplish the impossible’ (Meeker 31).  Inevitably, sooner or later, the struggling 
individual fails, because of the limitations imposed by the context within which he or she 
acts: ‘the nature of the universal is such that it must crush this human greatness which 
opposes it’ (Jaspers 49).  The tragic hero is destroyed by her or his inability to let go of the 
struggle against impassable limits, despite the impossibility of attaining the ideal.   
It is the tragic hero’s repeated attempts to transcend his or her initial state that first cause 
the disruption to stability, then amplify it to the point where stability can only be restored 
by the erasure of the source of disruption—that is, the destruction of the tragic hero (which 
is usually a self-destruction: Hoy 6).  But in tragic literature, the tragic hero is usually 
presented, as far as is possible, from the inside.  The tragic hero has the privilege of the 
soliloquy, the speech that reveals his or her state of mind and thought processes directly to 
the audience or reader, and establishes a bond of understanding and sympathy.  Through 
the self-revelatory mechanism of the soliloquy, the tragic hero’s failure to achieve her or 
his ideal is constructed as a victory, because of what it reveals about the individual’s 
capacity to develop self-knowledge and move beyond the constraints set by nature.  In 
tragedy ‘Victory,’ as Karl Jaspers puts it, ‘is not his who triumphs but his who fails in 
defeat’ (Jaspers 49).  
 
Sauron, the major antagonist of The Lord of the Rings, can be identified as a tragic hero 
because of his repeated attempts to transcend his outcast and disembodied status by 
                                                 
6 Although the tragic hero is usually male, female characters have always had a certain degree of access to 
the tragic form.  Medea and Antigone, for example, can both be read as tragic heroes.   71 
becoming the ruler of Middle-earth. He reduces Mordor to a wasteland, and threatens to do 
the same to Gondor and the rest of the Western Lands beyond it—to bring Night to 
Middle-earth—in the course of his struggle to dominate it.  Sauron destroys himself, by 
investing so much of himself in the Ring that he cannot survive its destruction (Kocher 58), 
and by his failure to consider the possibility that the Ring’s holder might choose not to 
claim it.  His self-destruction is preceded by a moment of understanding of how he has 
brought about his own defeat (Tolkien, III:197).  Cob, the antagonist of The Farthest 
Shore, fulfils the paradigm through his attempt to defeat mortality and achieve eternal life.  
The effects of his spell of immortality begin to break down the social and physical fabric of 
Earthsea.  Cob literally kills himself, and worse: the spell intended to bring him back from 
death to immortal life in fact only traps him in an eternal unlife—a fact he fails to 
recognise until it is far too late (Le Guin, Shore 198).  Eriel the shape-changer, the major 
antagonist of The Riddle-Master’s Game, aims to escape the High One’s bindings and his 
land-law and attain an ideal state of absolute empowerment and freedom from constraint.  
She and her shape-changer allies disrupt the land-law, the foundation of both physical 
survival and social structure in the High One’s realm, and threaten to strip the landscape to 
a barren waste if they are not stopped.  Eriel brings about her own destruction, partly 
through her mistaken strategic choices, and partly because her own concern with power 
blinds her to the High One’s powerless disguises: her recognition of her role in her own 
downfall is registered in the expression of ‘astonishment and awe’ on her face when she 
finally confronts the High One at the climax of the narrative (McKillip, Game 600).  Thus 
Eriel also fulfils the paradigm of the tragic hero. 
 
The tragic form positions the tragic hero at the centre of the narrative, and the audience’s 
attention.  It privileges the individual’s desire for transcendence, the rationale behind it and   72 
the struggle to achieve it, and relegates awareness of the damage the tragic hero does 
during that struggle to the periphery: 
 
The tragic figure may act vigorously in the world, as Oedipus and Macbeth do, but his [sic] 
public action is important mainly for its revelation of the private reality. . . . Tragedy, much 
as it may and does take note of social and political effects, is less concerned with them than 
with the truth for and of the individual. 
(Heilman 97) 
 
However, The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle, and The Riddle-Master’s Game do 
not present their major antagonists in accordance with the conventions of tragedy.  Instead, 
Tolkien, Le Guin and McKillip reverse those conventions, and shift their antagonists to the 
periphery of both the narrative and the Secondary World.  Sauron, the great tragic hero of 
Middle-earth, is almost entirely absent from the narrative of The Lord of the Rings (Flieger 
113).  Sauron is not a character, but a name that serves as a focus of fear.  He exists on the 
physical periphery of Middle-earth.  He is encountered only as a disembodied Eye—he 
must use intermediary devices such as the palantíri or seeing-stones and the Seat of Seeing 
at Amon Hen, to interact with others.  On the rare occasions when characters interact with 
Sauron, the contact is depersonalised and distanced.  When Frodo encounters the Eye at 
Amon Hen, he neither sees Sauron nor hears him speak, but only feels the pressure of his 
awareness:  
 
. . . suddenly he felt the Eye. There was an eye in the Dark Tower that did not sleep.  He 
knew that it had become aware of his gaze.  A fierce eager will was there.  It leaped 
towards him; almost like a finger he felt it, searching for him.  Very soon it would nail him 
down . . . 
(Tolkien, I:379-80)   73 
 
Pippin’s encounter with Sauron in the palantír is even more distanced.  It is reported rather 
than shown (Ellison 24), and reported in such a way as to emphasise the lack of physicality 
in the encounter: ‘ “ . . . He did not speak so that I could hear words.  He just looked, and I 
understood” ’ (Tolkien, II:176).  Aragorn reports his encounter with Sauron in the palantír 
in even less detail (Tolkien, III:46).  The narrative voice of The Lord of the Rings provides 
glimpses into Sauron’s thoughts and intentions (‘ . . . Sauron had already laid his plans, and 
he had a mind first to play these mice cruelly before he struck to kill’: Tolkien, III:145), 
but the fact that the narrative is Frodo’s history of the War of the Ring means that these 
must be read as reconstructions made after the fact.  Sauron himself appears in the 
narrative only once, at the moment of his destruction (Ellison 24), and even then he is not a 
character, but a distant inhuman image:  
 
. . . as the Captains gazed south to the Land of Mordor, it seemed to them that, black 
against the pall of cloud, there rose a huge shape of shadow, impenetrable, lightning-
crowned, filling all the sky.  Enormous it reared above the world, and stretched out towards 
them a vast threatening hand, terrible but impotent: for even as it leaned over them, a great 
wind took it, and it was all blown away, and passed; and then a hush fell. 
(Tolkien, III:200) 
 
Although Sauron is a crucially important figure in the narrative of The Lord of the Rings, 
he remains at the periphery of that narrative.   
 
Le Guin uses the same device to present her major antagonist in the original Earthsea 
trilogy.  The Earthsea books feature multiple antagonist figures: Ged in A Wizard of 
Earthsea; the Kargish Godking; Cob; Aspen and the Master Summoner Thorion in Tehanu   74 
and ‘Dragonfly’.  The most prominent of these is Cob.  Throughout The Farthest Shore, 
Cob is a distanced figure, although not quite as distanced as Sauron is.  Cob exists on the 
edges of his Secondary World—he is confined to the island of Selidor, the westernmost 
point in the Archipelago, and to the Dry Land of the Dead in the west beyond the west.  
Although Cob appears several times in the narrative of The Farthest Shore, each time he 
does so he is in some way distanced.  His first appearance is in Arren’s dream, as a 
nameless and undescribed ‘tall lord of shadows’ carrying a flame of life in his hand, who 
calls on Arren to follow him into the Dry Land of the Dead (Le Guin, Shore 65). This 
image gestures to the glamour and importance with which Romantic literature has invested 
the figure of the tragic hero.  However, Cob’s later appearances undercut this glamour 
sharply.  He is reduced to an ordinary human being when Ged tells Arren about their 
confrontation on Havnor.  Then he becomes an abstract concept: the ‘Anti-King’ (Le Guin, 
Shore 149).  His first appearance on the island of Selidor is, as Ged explains to Arren,  
 
‘ . . . a sending.  A presentiment or image of the man . . . there’s no power in it . . . nor is it 
even true in seeming, unless the sender so wishes.  We have not seen what he now looks 
like, I guess.’  
(Le Guin, Shore 177) 
 
Only Cob’s final encounter with Ged and Arren is physical; and at this point even his 
appearance of individual humanity is stripped away by dragonfire.  Cob is reduced to an 
impersonal image of human ruin: 
 
The face lifted up towards them.  There was no comeliness left in it, only ruin, old age that 
had outlived old age.  The mouth was withered.  The sockets of the eyes were empty, and  
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had long been empty.  So Ged and Arren saw at last the living face of their enemy. 
(Le Guin, Shore 186) 
 
When Ged and Arren follow Cob into the Dry Land of the Dead, it becomes evident that in 
his attempt to achieve eternal life, Cob has lost or sacrificed his true name (Attebery, 
‘Shore’ 272).  By Archipeligan standards, he is no longer quite real.  Like Sauron, although 
Cob is a key figure in the narrative of the Farthest Shore, he remains at the periphery, and 
is only seen from outside. 
 
McKillip presents the shape-changer Eriel, the major antagonist of The Riddle-Master’s 
Game, in the same fashion.  McKillip goes further than Le Guin and Tolkien in that Eriel, 
unlike Sauron and Cob, is a presence in the narrative of The Riddle-Master’s Game—she 
appears at least five times, and each time is physically present and able to interact with 
other characters.  However, as a shape-changer, she is recognisable only when she chooses 
to take the shape of Eriel Meremont—the woman she murdered and replaced in order to 
gain access to the land-law of Ymris.  Her true nature and identity lie beyond the limits of 
human knowledge: ‘ “ . . . Go back as far as your mind will take you, to the earliest riddle 
that was asked, and I am older than that,” ’ she tells Morgon at their first meeting 
(McKillip, Game 65).  Her original name is unknown.  Her assumed face is described in 
terms that resist visualisation: ‘quiet’, ‘delicate’, ‘shy’.  Once Eriel reveals herself as the 
narrative’s major antagonist, she is replaced in the active role either by other masks—she 
attempts to kill Morgon for the second time wearing Astrin Ymris’ face, and puts out 
Astrin’s eye in the shape of a white bird—or by other characters.  Eriel does not appear 
among the shape-changers who confront Ghisteslwchlohm in Harpist in the Wind, or take 
an active part in the destruction of Lungold; and it is the wizard Ghisteslwchlohm, 
breaking free of Eriel’s bindings on his mind, who kills the High One at the climax of the   76 
narrative (McKillip, Game 600-1).  Despite her frequent appearances in the narrative, and 
her importance to it, Eriel is still a distanced figure and, like Sauron and Cob, a peripheral 
one.   
 
As shown in Chapter Two, the history of the Secondary World in each fantasy has been 
dominated by the ethic of transcendence. Reversing the presentation of the tragic hero and 
exiling him or her to the periphery of narrative and world allows Tolkien, Le Guin and 
McKillip to do three things.  Firstly, by reversing the tragic paradigm, Tolkien, Le Guin 
and McKillip deny the tragic hero the soliloquy, and confine him or her to speaking in the 
presence of others (usually the orchestrator).  Secondly, reversing the tragic paradigm 
foregrounds what tragedy, with its close focus on the individual’s development toward 
perfection, tends to obscure: that is, the damage the tragic hero does to the world in the 
course of his or her attempt to transcend it.  Finally, each author makes explicit what the 
tragic form only implies, and certainly obscures: the reason why the tragic actor is a danger 
to the world.  By using this strategy, The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The 
Riddle-Master’s Game all discredit the transcendent rhetoric of their antagonists, reveal 
them as dangerous, and reveal why they are dangerous to the Secondary World.   
 
Tolkien, Le Guin and McKillip revision the transcendent endeavour by means of a 
common strategy of allowing the antagonist to speak and then the orchestrator to reveal the 
distance between her or his rhetoric and the reality it conceals.  Because Sauron is exiled to 
the margins of landscape and narrative in The Lord of the Rings, he is, as John Ellison 
points out, denied the tragic hero’s privilege of speech (24).  Sauron never speaks for 
himself; Tolkien’s orchestrator characters, Gandalf, Elrond and Galadriel, speak for him in 
order to spell out his thought processes and decisions when necessary, as, for example, 
when Gandalf tells the Council of Elrond that   77 
 
‘ . . . the only measure that [Sauron] knows is desire, desire for power; and so he judges all 
hearts.  Into his heart the thought will not enter that any will refuse it, that having the Ring  
we may seek to destroy it.  If we seek this, we shall put him out of reckoning.’ 
(Tolkien, I:258) 
 
This constructs Sauron’s transcendent behaviour negatively from the outset.  However, 
because Sauron does not speak, he cannot offer the tragic hero’s justification for his actions 
at any point.  The rhetoric of transcendence is displaced onto one of the minor antagonists, 
the corrupt wizard Saruman the White.  Saruman advances the rhetoric of transcendence 
when he proclaims, during the conversation reported by Gandalf to the Council of Elrond: 
 
‘ . . . I am Saruman, the Wise, Saruman Ring-Maker, Saruman of Many Colours! . . . 
[White] serves as a beginning.  White cloth may be dyed.  The white page can be 
overwritten; and the white light can be broken.’  
(Tolkien, I:248) 
 
Gandalf undercuts this by reducing it to a logical fallacy: ‘ “In which case it is no longer 
white” ’ (Tolkien, I:248).  Shortly afterward, Saruman advances a justification for his 
transcendent endeavour—he suggests that he and Gandalf claim the ring and use it to bring 
‘Knowledge, Rule, Order’ to Middle-earth.  Gandalf’s reply this time constructs the 
transcendent worldview as not only a logical fallacy, but one deliberately used by the 
transcendent actor to further his or her self-serving ends:  ‘ “ . . . only one hand at a time 
can wield the One, and you know that well, so do not trouble to say we! . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, 
I:149).     78 
The conversation then ends with Gandalf’s imprisonment; neither Saruman nor any other 
antagonist is allowed to rebut Gandalf’s characterisation of the transcendent ethic, and so it 
is maintained throughout the whole of the narrative.   
 
Le Guin’s tactics in The Farthest Shore are slightly different from Tolkien’s: she allows 
her antagonist to speak directly, and to partially discredit himself.  When Cob enters the 
narrative properly, on Selidor, he is able to speak for himself, and he advances the 
fundamental premises of the transcendent worldview—human superiority to and isolation 
from the physical environment—as justification for his actions: 
 
‘I was in Paln . . . after you [Ged] in your wisdom thought you had humbled me and taught 
me a lesson . . . There I said to myself: I have seen death now, and I will not accept it. Let 
all stupid nature go its stupid course, but I am a man, better than nature, above nature.  I 
will not go that way, I will not cease to be myself! . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Shore 195) 
 
Le Guin undermines and discredits Cob’s argument in three ways.  Firstly, throughout the 
narrative that precedes Cob’s speech, Ged speaks for Cob as Gandalf does for Sauron, 
slowly building up a clinical explanation for his actions.  By the time Cob advances his 
self-justification, not only have his actions already been explained, but their consequences 
have been made clear: 
 
‘ . . . this blight upon the lands.  The arts of man forgotten.  The singer tongueless.  The eye 
blind. . . . A false king ruling.  Ruling forever.  And over the same subjects forever.  No  
births, no new lives.  No children . . . ’ 
 (Le Guin, Shore 151)   79 
 
This makes it clear in advance that Cob’s argument is self-serving and limited in its vision.  
Secondly, when Cob speaks, it is as a dead man, trapped in the Dry Land, with even the 
appearance of humanity stripped from him.  His situation reveals what his speech refuses 
to acknowledge, that he has not achieved the immortality he claims, but rather its inverse, 
eternal unlife.  Finally, as soon as Cob speaks, Ged, who as Archmage and orchestrator is 
the narrative’s voice of authority, refutes his argument by stating outright the gap between 
Cob’s rhetoric and the reality his situation reveals: 
 
‘ . . . You sold the green earth and the sun and the stars to save yourself.  But you have no 
self.  All that which you sold, that is yourself.  You have given everything for nothing.  
And so now you seek to draw the world to you, all that light and life you lost, to fill up 
your emptiness.  But it cannot be filled.  Not all the songs of earth, nor all the stars of 
heaven, could fill your emptiness.’ 
(Le Guin, Shore 197-8) 
 
Through this speech, Ged characterises the transcendent worldview as a self-serving self-
deception.  Like Saruman, Cob cannot reply to the orchestrator’s deconstruction of his 
transcendent rhetoric; in fact, Ged’s statement forces on him the tragic hero’s moment of 
full self-knowledge, in which he comes to understand (or at least, admit for the first time) 
his role in his own destruction.   Ged’s reinterpretation of the transcendent ethic is left to 
stand, and indeed is confirmed in the continuation volumes by the actions of Aspen and 
Thorion, and the ancient wizards of the Archipelago.   
 
McKillip uses a different tactic again to achieve the same end in The Riddle-Master’s 
Game.  Eriel, unlike Cob, speaks for herself well in advance of the High One doing so.    80 
When she visits Raederle at Isig in Heir of Sea and Fire, in an attempt to convince 
Raederle to take up her shape-changer’s power she represents her transcendent endeavour 
as a Romantic ideal of freedom and ‘immersion into a nature where all is holy’ (Nicholls 
1819).  She tells Raederle,  
 
‘You can know it: the essence of fire.  You have the power.  To recognize it, to hold it, 
shape it, even to become fire, to melt into its great beauty, bound to no man’s laws. . . . ’ 
(McKillip, Game 300-1) 
 
However, this attractive construction of the transcendent ethic is undercut by Raederle’s 
fear and rejection of the consequences of her powers; and while it is never entirely denied 
as part of Eriel’s motivation, it is discredited as a justification for Eriel’s actions by the 
High One’s authoritative statement that Eriel is motivated by the desire to use power 
derived from the natural world as she chooses, without restriction, despite the fact that 
doing so will destroy the source of her power (McKillip, Game 593).  The High One’s 
statement clarifies what Raederle’s engagement with her shape-changer’s abilities implies: 
in The Riddle-Master’s Game, the transcendent ethic is a self-serving half-truth.   
 
Having discredited the transcendent ethic, Tolkien, Le Guin and McKillip go on to reveal 
the individual who adheres to it as a danger to the Secondary World.  In each fantasy, 
because the major antagonist is exiled to the periphery of the narrative, his or her place in 
the focal narrative must be filled by other things.  Disembodied and confined to the tower 
of Barad-dûr, Sauron cannot act against Frodo or Aragorn (Spivack, ‘Images’ 30); his role 
in the narrative is filled by other characters.  These include the Nazgûl, the human Kings 
reduced to shadows or wraiths by the influence of the Rings they wear, and the Orcs made 
‘in mockery of Elves’ (Tolkien, II:77).  They include the corrupt counsellor Gríma   81 
Wormtongue, whose influence reduces the warrior King Théoden of Rohan to ‘a man so 
bent with age that he [seems] almost a dwarf’ (Tolkien, II:102), paralysed by bitterness and 
grief to the point that he is unable to contribute to the defence of the Western Lands.  They 
include Saruman with his corruption and treachery, the mad and despairing Denethor, the 
degraded and barren landscape of Mordor, and Frodo’s increasing mental and physical 
deterioration.  Above all, there is Gollum, the degraded hobbit, the character who, as a 
close and constant threat to Frodo and Sam for two books, most consistently plays the 
antagonist’s role in the narrative.  What all of these minor antagonists have in common is 
that their current state is either a direct or an indirect product of Sauron’s attempt to gain 
dominion over Middle-earth; they have all been corrupted, degraded or destroyed to serve 
Sauron’s ends.  Their presence in the narrative focusses attention on Sauron’s effect on the 
world—the damage he has already done, and the greater damage he will do if not checked.   
 
Le Guin uses the same tactic in The Farthest Shore.  Cob’s place in the narrative, left 
empty by his exile to the periphery of the Secondary World, is taken by images of the 
effect his return from death has had on Earthsea; these function as clues leading Ged and 
Arren to the ‘Anti-King’.  These images begin in the large scale and narrow down to 
individuals, and become more detailed and revelatory as the narrative progresses.  The first 
such image occurs when Arren, arriving on Roke, tells Ged about the failure of magic in 
Enlad and the sudden, inexplicable inability of public figures, including his father the 
Prince, to do their jobs (Le Guin, Shore 11-12).  This initial, vague picture of failure and 
disorder develops, later in the narrative, into two strong ones.  The first is of Hort Town 
and its hazia addicts: 
 
There was no centre left to the city.  The people, for all their restless activity, seemed 
purposeless.  Craftsmen seemed to lack the will to work well; even the robbers robbed   82 
because it was all they knew how to do.  All the brawl and bustle of a great port-city was 
there, on the surface, but all about the edges of it sat the hazia-eaters, motionless.  And 
under the surface things did not seem quite real . . .  
(Le Guin, Shore 60) 
 
Later again, there are the silk-weavers of Lorbanery, who have lost their ability and no 
longer care about their craft, leaving the silkworms to die on the trees (Le Guin, Shore 94).  
After this point the images of the damage done by the ‘Anti-King’ become focussed and 
specific.  There is Akaren, the old woman who loses her name and her sanity in an attempt 
to gain eternal life; her son Sopli, the dyer who ‘can’t dye’ (Le Guin, Shore 160) and who 
commits suicide to escape his fear of death; the singer of the raft-people, who forgets the 
words of a chant as he sings it.  Finally, there is the image of the dragon Orm Embar 
stripped of speech—in a world in which ‘the dragon and the speech of the dragon are one’ 
(Le Guin, Tales 271)—by Cob’s spells.  All of these instances of loss of purpose and loss 
of self occur as a direct result of Cob’s opening the door between the living world and the 
Dry Land; they foreground the consequences of Cob’s attempt to prevent his own death, 
and thus construct him as a threat to the Secondary World. 
 
Even before Eriel appears in The Riddle-Master of Hed and reveals herself as the major 
antagonist of The Riddle-Master’s Game, her presence in the world is indicated by images 
of inexplicable destruction.  These include the grief of Morgon and his brother and sister 
for their drowned parents (McKillip, Game 10), the inexplicably crewless ship that breaks 
apart around Morgon and Deth as they sail to Anuin (McKillip, Game 36), and the ancient 
ruined city in Ymris, inhabited by an exile (Astrin Ymris) and an amnesiac (Morgon). 
Later appear the dead children of the Earth-Masters, turned to stone and buried under Isig 
Mountain (McKillip, Game 178-80).  By the end of the narrative, all of these riddles of   83 
destruction are answered, and all of them can be traced to Eriel’s agency.  Athol and 
Spring of Hed are drowned to stop them taking Yrth’s three-starred harp to its intended 
owner, Morgon.  The crewless ship is intended to kill Morgon before he can come into his 
power, thus leaving the High One without a land-heir.  The city is ruined because of the 
shape-changers’ past attempts to access the power of the Earth-Masters who died there 
(McKillip, Game 607); the children, including the High One’s son and possibly Eriel’s 
daughter, were killed for the power they possessed.  After Eriel appears, she is surrounded 
by even more images of destruction: her attempts on Morgon’s life, the destruction of the 
city of Lungold, the attempted drowning of Hed, the battle on Wind Plain in Ymris, the 
death of the High One.  By removing Eriel from the centre of the narrative, McKillip 
focusses attention on the destruction she perpetrates in pursuit of her goal; thus, like 
Tolkien and Le Guin, she positions the tragic actor as a danger to the Secondary World.   
 
In tragedy, the devastation that surrounds the tragic hero is constructed as an unavoidable, 
but also unintended, by-product of the struggle for transcendence: ‘Fire may destroy or 
cleanse; no matter.  Tragedy must play with it.  The possible must be investigated’ (Kerr 
126).  The tragic hero is so focussed on attaining the ideal that she or he fails to register the 
consequences that her or his actions have for others; she or he is absolved of responsibility 
for the destruction caused by the transcendent struggle precisely because that destruction is 
unintentional.  But The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s 
Game all suggest an alternative interpretation of the tragic hero’s destructiveness, and by 
doing so reveal why the transcendent actor is a danger to the Secondary World.  Sauron, 
Eriel and Cob are all not only aware of their capacity to do damage to their Secondary 
Worlds, but are prepared to do whatever damage they must to achieve their ends.  Sauron 
is directly responsible for the destruction of Mordor’s landscape: it is a wasteland because 
he has made it into one in order to provide for his armies.  Although Cob does not set out   84 
to destroy Earthsea, having opened the door between the living world and the Dry Land he 
takes a malicious pleasure in exercising the power it gives him over both the living and the 
dead:  
 
‘ . . . The door I opened is not only here, but in the minds of the living, in the depths and 
unknown places of their being, where we are all one in the darkness.  They know it, and 
they come to me.  And the dead too must come to me . . . they must climb over the wall of 
stones when I bid them, all the souls, the lords, the mages, the proud women; back and 
forth from life to death, at my command . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Shore 195-6) 
 
Eriel is, from the beginning of The Riddle-Master’s Game, both quite aware of and entirely 
in control of her destructive capacity.  She acts as she must in order to achieve her goals, 
and openly states to Raederle her indifference to the damage she causes: ‘ “Your lives 
mean nothing to me . . . The Star-Bearer and I are looking for answers to the same 
questions: he kills when he needs to; our methods are no different. . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 
299).  Sauron, Cob and Eriel all privilege their own desire for transcendence above the 
well-being of the world of which they are part: in pursuit of a goal that cannot be achieved, 
they act without regard for the consequences of their actions for others.  This is why they 
are a danger to the Secondary World. 
 
Through their common handling of their major antagonists—their reversal of the 
conventions of tragedy to remove the transcendent actor from the focus of attention— 
Tolkien, Le Guin and McKillip systematically discredit the transcendent worldview that 
has dominated the history of the Secondary World, and reveal it as an immediate danger to 
that world.  They also offer an explanation for why the individual who adheres to the   85 
tragedic worldview is a danger to the Secondary World.  However, in each fantasy, the 
treatment of the antagonist figure itself is different.  The danger posed to Middle-earth, 
Earthsea and the High One’s realm by the antagonists has two aspects.  Not only is there 
the evident danger of the physical damage that results from the antagonist’s tragedic 
struggle; there is also the source of that danger, the impulse that drives the antagonist to 
undertake her or his transcendent struggle in the first place, and to ignore the effects of that 
struggle on the world around them.  The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The 
Riddle-Master’s Game not only use their antagonist figures to construct the transcendent 
actor as a danger to the Secondary World, but also to expose the source of that danger, the 
transcendent impulse.   
 
The tragic form considers the source of transcendent behaviour to be the individual’s desire 
for ‘a state of affairs more perfect than any that now exists’ (Kerr 107).  Through their 
construction of Eriel, Cob and Sauron, and the minor antagonists that surround them, 
McKillip, Le Guin and Tolkien all reject the idea that transcendent behaviour stems from a 
desire for perfection per se.  However, The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The 
Riddle-Master’s Game put forward three different interpretations of the source of the 
antagonist’s transcendent ambition; in each fantasy, the representation of the transcendent 
impulse is dependent on the author’s construction of the Secondary World the antagonist is 
trying to transcend.   
 
In The Lord of the Rings, as discussed in Chapter One, Tolkien presents the Secondary 
World of Middle-earth as the focal point of an open system, in which a beneficent external 
presence invests the landscape with a cosmic order.  Within this framework, Tolkien 
explicates the source of transcendent behaviour using two devices: Sauron and the Ring.    86 
Many commentators, aware of the influence of Tolkien’s Catholic faith upon his work, 
identify Sauron as the Devil of Middle-earth, or as a figure intended to represent the Devil: 
 
J. R. R. Tolkien (1892-1973) cast the struggle between transcendent good and evil in the 
fantasy world of Middle Earth [sic].  The Lord of the Rings is, like Beowulf, implicitly 
Christian . . . Tolkien’s Sauron, the dark lord of Mordor, is associated with the Devil 
through the serpent or dragon (Greek Sauros) . . . 
(Russell, Mephistopheles 271) 
 
Tolkien certainly draws on historical concepts of the Devil to create the figure of Sauron in 
The Lord of the Rings.  Sauron is an intruder in Middle-earth as the Devil is on the earth.  
He is initially—as shown in The Silmarillion and the Appendices of The Lord of the 
Rings—an embodied individual, able to move physically within the world.  He is 
vulnerable to capture, imprisonment and injury, but is also able to directly tempt 
individuals such as the Numenoréan King Ar-Pharazôn into transcendent acts (Tolkien, 
III:280).  This reflects the medieval concept of the Devil as a physical entity able to 
interact with individuals in the world personally, and on equal terms (Oldridge 16).  As he 
appears in The Lord of the Rings proper, however, Sauron recalls a more modern concept 
of the Devil as a nonhuman, nonphysical entity or force whose effects are mental rather 
than physical and whose main tool is deception (Oldridge 26).  Sauron is a bodiless ‘Dark 
Power’, located in a separate place (Mordor).  He affects the world through mental assault 
and deception, as when he manipulates Denethor’s visions in the palantír and provokes 
Denethor’s ‘pessimistic conclusions, despair and eventual suicide’ (Kocher 79).  For 
anything else, he must rely on those he has corrupted: the Nazgûl, his Orcs and his armies.  
Characters who have contact with Sauron—Denethor, Saruman, Wormtongue—are 
corrupted.  The obvious conclusion to draw is that transcendent behaviour in Middle-earth   87 
occurs because individuals are either manipulated or tempted into it by a malevolent entity 
that is using them to serve its own ends.   
 
However, this is not borne out by the text.  Sauron’s passivity extends beyond his physical 
confinement in Barad-dûr to encompass his interactions with the main characters.  At no 
point in the narrative does Sauron tempt or influence any character toward transcendent 
action.  The most he does is pressure Frodo to claim the Ring, and the choice of whether to 
do so, or whether to take it off, remains with Frodo:  
 
Suddenly he was aware of himself again: Frodo, neither the Voice nor the Eye: free to 
choose and with one remaining instant in which to do so.  He took the Ring off his finger. 
(Tolkien, I:380) 
 
Boromir talks himself into trying to steal the Ring from Frodo.  Saruman slides into desire 
for the Ring and service of Mordor entirely of his own accord: as Rose A. Zimbardo puts 
it, he is ‘self-tempted’ (103).  Frodo chooses to use the Ring to manipulate Gollum.  
Sauron does not even manipulate Denethor directly.  It is Denethor’s tragedic action (his 
use of the palantír to see beyond his range, ‘locking wills with the indomitable Eye of 
Sauron, which no Man may best’: Chance, Power 103) that brings him into contact with 
Sauron in the first place, and while Sauron’s manipulation is certainly intended to have a 
demoralising effect, Denethor’s reactions at all times remain within his own control.  
Sauron exploits resources that come within his range in order to achieve his ends, but he 
does not inspire transcendent action in any character.  External malevolent influence is not 
the source of transcendent behaviour in Middle-earth.   
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The Ring appears to be the opposite of Sauron.  It is a thing rather than an entity, a tool not 
an agent; it offers characters access to power rather than being a power itself. It both 
represents and offers ‘a power over nature so immense that even the desire to use it will 
inevitably corrupt [the] soul’ (Helms 67).  But it is not a neutral power source, or a passive 
one.  The Ring is literally infused with Sauron’s self: Gandalf states that Sauron  
‘ “ . . . made that Ring himself, it is his, and he let a great deal of his own former power 
pass into it, so that he could rule all the others. . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, I:58).  Because of this, the 
Ring is an extension of Sauron, and the power it offers is inherently evil.  Like all the Great 
Rings, it is designed to bring those who use it under Sauron’s control (Tolkien, I:53).  It 
manipulates characters by making them want to take it for themselves and use it.  This 
seems to suggest that transcendent behaviour stems from the individual having access to 
the power to change the world—and that such power is evil by nature.  
 
However, this reading is once again not supported by the narrative.  Because the Ring 
offers power to its user, it offers the means for an individual to impose his or her subjective 
ideal on the world.  The Ring makes it possible for Galadriel to rule Middle-earth, for 
Boromir to save Minas Tirith and become a King of Gondor rather than a Steward, for 
Saruman to supplant Sauron.  Sauron needs the Ring and its power of command to achieve 
dominion over Middle-earth: ‘ “ . . . He only needs the One . . . If he recovers it, then he 
will command them [all of the Rings] again, even the Three . . . and he will be stronger 
than ever” ’ (Tolkien, I:58).  The Ring offers these characters a temptation to indulge the 
desire to transcend the world’s limitations; and it is shown repeatedly to have this effect.  
Gollum murders Déagol to obtain the Ring (Tolkien, I:59).  Saruman betrays Gandalf and 
the White Council, and even Sauron, for the power over the world that it offers (Tolkien, 
I:249).  Boromir attempts to steal the Ring so he can to use it to defend, and then rule, 
Gondor.  But as Shippey points out, the narrative also shows that it is possible for   89 
characters to reject the Ring’s influence (Road 125).  Legolas, Gimli and Celeborn, Merry, 
Pippin and Sam all appear to be entirely unaffected by it.  Gandalf, Elrond, Aragorn and 
Galadriel turn it away.  Faramir refuses to take it by force.  Sam refuses to put it on at all.  
Furthermore, the Ring does not at any point prompt uncharacteristic actions from any 
character it influences.  Rather, it acts to exacerbate certain defining aspects of their 
characters, whether negative or positive: Gollum’s greed, Boromir’s pride and patriotism 
(Shippey, Road 129), Saruman’s desire for order and knowledge (Kocher 68), Frodo’s 
commitment and determination.  Through this fact, Tolkien reveals the true source of the 
transcendent impulse in Middle-earth: the desire for control. 
 
Although all of the characters who respond to the Ring do so differently, their responses 
contain one common element.  Craig Clark suggests that it is ‘the desire to wield power’ 
(16), but power is only part of it, a means to an end.  What all the transcendent actors of 
The Lord of the Rings have in common is a desire or need to control their immediate 
situation.  Sauron wants ‘to order all things’ in Middle-earth ‘according to his wisdom’ 
(Tolkien, Letters 243).  Denethor needs knowledge to defend Gondor against Sauron’s 
armies (Kocher 68).  Saruman wants ‘Knowledge, Rule, Order’ in Middle-earth (Tolkien, 
I:249).  Boromir needs to turn back Sauron and save Minas Tirith.  Frodo needs to destroy 
the Ring.  Gollum wants the security he lost along with the Ring, and revenge for past ill-
treatment.  All of these characters attempt to exert a measure of control over events in 
Middle-earth, either because they want to or because circumstances seem to demand it.  
This desire is problematic because Middle-earth is already ordered in accordance with the 
much wider vision of the external power, and events are interlinked so that they will lead to 
a right end.  Tolkien’s construction of the source of transcendent behaviour reflects 
orthodox Christian theology, in which evil in the world comes about because the individual 
resists or rejects God’s will (Olszański 298).  The characters’ attempts to assert control   90 
over their immediate circumstances work against the pre-existent order with which Middle-
earth is invested, and in doing so they endanger the right outcome of events, and thus the 
Secondary World (Olszański 300).   
 
In Le Guin’s Earthsea cycle, there is no external force ordering Earthsea against which the 
antagonist figures can wilfully oppose themselves.  The only order is the Equilibrium, the 
balance inherent in the landscape itself.  The Earthsea cycle is an expanded and reoriented 
retake on the structure of The Lord of the Rings.  A Wizard of Earthsea and The Tombs of 
Atuan deal with, among other things, the formation of Earthsea's orchestrator character, the 
wizard Ged; The Farthest Shore presents Le Guin’s version of the high fantasy focal 
narrative, the story of the defeat of a power out of the past and the healing of the Secondary 
World.  The continuation volumes, Tehanu, ‘Dragonfly’ and The Other Wind, write past 
the ending of Tolkien’s structure, and explore the problems and consequences obscured by 
the formal eucatastrophe of The Farthest Shore.  In these books, Le Guin takes up the 
construction of the transcendent impulse that Tolkien uses in The Lord of the Rings, and 
reconfigures it to suggest an alternative source for tragedic action: psychology. 
 
In A Wizard of Earthsea, Ged is both protagonist and antagonist, and in the early part of his 
narrative he plays out the paradigm of the tragic hero almost exactly.  He displays a distinct 
tendency toward transcendent acts motivated by pride and the desire to manipulate the 
world.  Ged learns magic from his aunt to gain ‘power over beast and bird’ (Le Guin, 
Wizard 16).  To impress Serret, he tries to work a spell that is beyond his ability (Molson 
136).  And in an attempt to outdo a rival student of magic, he deliberately breaches the 
barrier that separates the living world from the Dry Land of the Dead and summons the 
spirit of Elfarran the Fair to Roke Knoll (Le Guin, Wizard 73-4).  Ged is only saved from   91 
the unintentional self-destruction of the tragic hero at this point by the intervention of the 
Archmage Nemmerle. 
 
Ged’s actions cause considerable damage to the Secondary World.  He creates a tear in the 
fabric of the living world that the Archmage must give up his life to repair.  He also 
releases into Earthsea his Shadow, which has the capacity to turn him and others into 
gebbeths (soulless puppets).  Ged’s attempt to manipulate his environment for his own 
satisfaction is constructed as inevitable, a manifestation of his pride and his tendency to 
overreach himself (Slusser 35).  Through Ged’s actions in A Wizard of Earthsea, Le Guin 
introduces Tolkien’s theory that tragedic behaviour stems from the individual’s desire to 
control the world for his or her own benefit. 
 
In The Tombs of Atuan, however, Le Guin develops away from Tolkien’s idea, through the 
story of the Kargish Godkings and the house of Hupun.  The Nameless Ones, the Old 
Powers of the Earth worshipped in the Kargish Empire as gods of ‘the dark, of ruin, of 
madness’ (Le Guin, Tombs 114), are presented as the book’s major antagonists, forces of 
evil from which their Priestess Arha must escape.  But the Nameless Ones are part of the 
natural order, a necessary element of the environment:  
 
‘ . . . The earth is beautiful, and bright, and kindly, but that is not all.  The earth is also 
terrible, and dark, and cruel.  The rabbit shrieks dying in the green meadows.  The 
mountains clench their great hands full of hidden fire.  There are sharks in the sea, and 
there is cruelty in men’s eyes . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Tombs 113) 
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The Nameless Ones are what Jeffrey Burton Russell calls a natural evil—an element of the 
natural world which, when experienced by human individuals, causes suffering and harm 
(Prince 1).  They do not encourage transcendence of the world; rather, they deny change, 
and encourage limitation to the point of stagnation (Spivack, Le Guin 33).  When the 
transcendent ethic appears in The Tomb of Atuan, it is associated with other, minor figures: 
the Godkings of the Kargish Empire.   
 
The title ‘Godking’ in itself suggests a desire to transcend the limitations of humanity both 
literally (by becoming a god), and by exerting power over the physical and social 
environment (as king): Manan and Thar’s brief comments on how the descendents of the 
High Priest Intathin became Priest-Kings and then Godkings implicitly confirm this 
reading.  The story of one Godking in particular revolves around an attempt to deny fact in 
order to achieve a desired ideal.  Faced with a prophecy that ‘one of the descendents of 
Thoreg of Hupun would bring about the fall of the Empire in the end’ (Le Guin, Tombs 
151), the Godking attempts to circumvent the inevitable.  He destroys the family that 
threatens him (Le Guin, Tombs 57), and exiles its last members, two young children, to a 
tiny deserted islet.  The Godking’s attempt to outwit prophecy fails: in A Wizard of 
Earthsea, Ged lands on the islet while chasing his Shadow, and one of the exiled children, 
now an old woman, gives him half of the Ring of Erreth-Akbe as a gift; Ged and Arha 
rejoin the ring in The Tombs of Atuan and return it to Havnor.  A tentative peace develops 
between the Archipelago and the Kargish Empire.  Eventually, the last of the Godkings is 
overthrown (Le Guin, Wind 66-7).  But that is not the point. 
 
Despite the apparent difference between the Nameless Ones’ passivity and the Godkings’ 
transcendent action, the two evils of The Tombs of Atuan have one thing in common.  
Whereas Ged in A Wizard of Earthsea simply attempts to control the world because he can,   93 
the Godking attempts to control it to achieve a particular end.  Like the Nameless Ones, 
when the Godking tries to prevent the fulfilment of the prophecy, he is attempting to 
prevent change in the world—specifically, a personally disempowering change.  The 
source of his desire to prevent change is not unpacked in The Tombs of Atuan, however.  
That occurs in The Farthest Shore. 
  
The Farthest Shore is the only volume of the original Earthsea trilogy to feature a 
traditional antagonist.  Cob performs in full the tragic hero’s paradigm gestured to by Ged 
and the Kargish Godking in the earlier narratives; through Cob’s story, Le Guin constructs 
her final explanation of the transcendent impulse, the source of the need to deny change.  
Ged forces Cob to journey into the Dry Land of the Dead as a punishment for raising the 
dead for profit.  Cob’s response to that punishment reveals the motive that drives his 
transcendent action.  Cob is afraid of death—both death in the abstract, and specifically his 
own death.  He uses the spells of the Grey Mage of Paln to attain what he believes is 
eternal life as a defence against the death he fears (Le Guin, Shore 195).  Death is both the 
greatest limitation and the greatest change the world imposes on the individual; Cob’s 
transcendent struggle is an absolute denial of this change.  However, Cob’s desire to 
transcend his mortality is not presented as unique to him, as incomprehensible or unnatural. 
Rather, it is constructed as universal, and normal.  Ged, the narrative’s voice of authority, 
says of it, ‘ “Life without end . . . Life without death.  Immortality.  Every soul desires it, 
and its health is the strength of its desire. . . . ” ’ (Le Guin, Shore 150).  Only when Cob 
takes action to achieve the endless life he desires does the desire itself becomes a problem.  
Through Cob, Le Guin suggests that the transcendent impulse is grounded in the individual 
consciousness; it is the product of human awareness of the ultimate limitation—imminent 
death—and the fear that awareness generates (Crow and Erlich 207).   
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The continuation volumes of the Earthsea cycle, Tehanu, ‘Dragonfly’ and The Other Wind, 
reiterate this construction of the transcendent impulse. In these volumes, the desire to 
overcome death and the desire to prevent change are linked, and manifest simultaneously.  
Aspen (the antagonist of Tehanu) and the Master Summoner Thorion (the antagonist of 
‘Dragonfly’) display both a desire to deny change and a refusal to accept death.  Aspen 
uses his wizardry to hold off the old Lord of Re Albi’s death, and uses the status that gives 
him to oppose a change in the power structure of the Archipelago (i.e. the restoration of the 
Crown: Le Guin, Tehanu 241).  Thorion summons himself out of the Dry Land into the 
living world to oppose the power shift from Roke to Havnor that occurs in the aftermath of 
the eucatastrophe of The Farthest Shore (Le Guin, Tales 260).  The individual’s need to 
deny change and death is what drives the ancient mages to create the Dry Land of the Dead 
and ensure the eternal survival of the spirit: 
 
‘Men fear death as dragons do not.  Men want to own life, possess it, as if it were a jewel in 
a box.  Those ancient mages craved everlasting life.  They learned to use true names to 
keep men from dying. . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Wind 225-6) 
 
In the Earthsea cycle, Le Guin remodels Tolkien’s presentation of the transcendent 
impulse, and transforms it from a personal flaw that manifests under the stress of 
circumstances, into an aspect of her characters’ psychology.  In Earthsea, the antagonist’s 
transcendent desire is the inevitable result of human consciousness: this reflects the Taoist 
philosophy of yin/yang which informs Le Guin’s work, in which ‘all opposites are 
presented as part of a continuum or circle and therefore not really opposite’ and in which 
each thing contains its opposite as an integral part of itself (Wytenbroek 174).  In Earthsea, 
each individual consciousness contains the possibility of its own self-destruction.     95 
 
McKillip’s theory of the source of danger to the Secondary World in The Riddle-Master’s 
Game is different from both Tolkien’s and Le Guin’s.  McKillip strips away even the 
inherent order that maintains Earthsea’s Equilibrium, and presents the Secondary World as 
a completely closed system, impervious to outside influence and unconnected to anything 
beyond its limits, which is held in balance only by an artificial order constructed by a 
character within it.  Through her antagonist, and her two protagonists, McKillip explicitly 
rejects both Tolkien’s and Le Guin’s constructions of transcendent behaviour in the world, 
and constructs an alternative explanation.     
 
McKillip’s primary antagonist, the shape-changer Eriel, initially appears to be an external 
malevolent power, somewhat like Sauron.  Although she first appears in disguise, as the 
wife of the Ymris King, Astrin Ymris reveals her false face when he tells Morgon and Deth 
the story of Eriel Meremont’s death.  Immediately afterward, Eriel reveals herself to be the 
narrative’s primary antagonist when she tries to kill Morgon for unspecified reasons: 
 
‘ . . . you shouldn’t have left your land to begin weaving riddles at Caithnard.  The wise 
man knows his own name.  You don’t know my name; you don’t know your own.  It’s 
better for me if you die that way, in ignorance.’ 
(McKillip, Game 65) 
 
Through Astrin’s revelations and her own, Eriel is positioned as a malevolent force 
intruding from beyond the limits of the natural.  She comes from the sea, she can change 
her shape, she appears in no riddles and she cannot be named: she is outside the limits of 
human knowledge (McKillip, Game 65).  Like Sauron, Eriel threatens the integrity of the 
High One’s realm both magically, through her attempt to disrupt the land-rule of Ymris,   96 
and physically through the shape-changers’ influence on the politics of the realm 
(McKillip, Game 62).  But as the narrative progresses, Eriel is revealed to be not an 
external, unknowable force, but a renegade Earth-Master—part of the history of the High 
One’s realm.  Unlike Sauron, Eriel has no apparent desire for dominion, and no need to 
control her environment.  Christine Mains suggests that Eriel wants to gain ‘power-over … 
mastery over all things’ (67).  However, while it is clear that Eriel wants power, it is never 
clearly stated what for.  Her conversation with Raederle in Heir of Sea and Fire suggests 
that she wants power simply so that she can be as much herself as possible.   
 
This is also the case with Ghisteslwchlohm, whose aim is to control the Star-Bearer 
(Morgon) and thus gain the power of an Earth-Master upon the death of the High One 
(McKillip, Game 594).  Like Eriel, Ghisteslwchlohm begins his narrative in disguise as 
Master Ohm of the college of Riddle-Masters; in that role, he destroys any information that 
might give Morgon explanations of the three stars on his face.  Despite the similarity of 
their methods, however, there is no connection between Ghisteslwchlohm and Eriel, or any 
of the shape-changers.  Ghistelswchlohm knows nothing about the shape-changers: 
confronted by them in Harpist in the Wind, he unwisely dismisses them as irrelevancies 
(‘ “ . . . You take your shapes out of dead men and seaweed, you breathe, you harp and you 
die—that is all I know or care to know about you . . . ” ’ McKillip, Game 451-2).  
Ghisteslwchlohm’s desire for the Star-Bearer’s power is self-generated, and in fact poses a 
threat to Eriel’s plans, so that she eventually binds his mind to prevent him from interfering 
in them further.  As a wizard, Ghisteslwchlohm already has many of the same powers as 
the shape-changers.  He does not seem particularly interested in using that power, only in 
having it: during his time as the false High One, he does not attempt to expand the High 
One’s temporal power, the only aspect of the role he has access to.  As the High One 
eventually explains, Ghisteslwchlohm’s usurpation of the High One’s role is a means to an   97 
end, not an end in itself: ‘ “ He thought that if he controlled the Star-Bearer, he could 
assimilate the power the Star-Bearer would inherit and become the High One in more than 
name” ’ (McKillip, Game 594).  Ghisteslwchlohm, like Eriel, seems simply to want to be 
as powerful as possible—to exist in an empowered state.  McKillip thus rejects Tolkien’s 
construction of the transcendent impulse as the individual’s need to control a situation. 
 
McKillip also uses Eriel and Ghisteslwchlohm to reject, obliquely, Le Guin’s idea that the 
source of the transcendent impulse is the fear of death.  In contrast to Cob, who before his 
tragic action has an ordinary human lifespan, neither Ghisteslwchlohm nor Eriel appears to 
face the human limitation of certain mortality.  Ghisteslwchlohm, as a wizard, has the 
longevity of all wizards in McKillip’s Secondary World: he is something over a thousand 
years old.  Eriel, like the High One, has a lifespan of several millennia, but unlike the High 
One, there is no suggestion that she is nearing the end of her lifespan.  Furthermore, their 
lifespans are natural, not artificially extended: a long life seems to be an automatic 
consequence of holding power in the High One’s realm, for as soon as Morgon and 
Raederle recognise their true natures as High One and shape-changer, they take it for 
granted that they will also live for several millennia, without having to do anything to 
ensure it (McKillip, Game 614).  Because of this, neither Eriel’s desire for power drawn 
from the landscape, nor Ghisteslwchlohm’s desire for the power of land-law, can be 
reduced to the desire to escape death.  It must be taken at face value.  Eriel, in the pre-
history of the High One’s realm, chooses to gather power because she can do so and wants 
to do so (McKillip, Game 593).  Ghisteslwchlohm takes on the name and temporal power 
of the High One because he can, and because it will get him what he wants: when Morgon 
asks him, ‘ “ . . . Where did you find the courage to assume the name of the High One?” ’ 
his answer is simply that ‘ “No one else claimed it” ’ (McKillip, Game 491).  In McKillip’s 
Secondary World, the source of the tragedic behaviour that endangers the Secondary   98 
World is not a need for control or a response to inescapable fear, but the antagonist’s 
deliberate choice of a course of action, to achieve a particular end.   
 
McKillip reinforces this reading of the source of transcendent behaviour through the 
narrative of her protagonists, Morgon and Raederle.  Morgon is exposed to the tragedic 
worldview during his year-long imprisonment in Erlenstar Mountain between the end of 
The Riddle-Master of Hed and the beginning of Heir of Sea and Fire.  However, he is not 
tempted or corrupted into taking up tragedic action by Ghisteslwchlohm.  Rather, he 
chooses to do so, deliberately taking on Ghisteslwchlohm’s power of wizardry first to free 
himself (McKillip, Game 292), and then to pursue his course of vengeance against Deth.  
Raederle is exposed to the tragedic worldview through her knowledge of the history of An 
and her conversation with Eriel.  However, she is not tempted into transcendent behaviour 
any more than Morgon is.  Nor does she slide into it unaware.  Although she rejects Eriel’s 
mentorship (Haunert 149), Raederle later makes a conscious choice to take up her inherited 
shape-changer’s power:  ‘ “ . . . No one forced me.  I simply reached out and gathered [the 
fire] in my hand.  I knew I could do it, so I did it” ’ (McKillip, Game 319).  She chooses to 
act transcendently when she raises the wraiths of the Kings of Hel to protect Morgon, and 
again when she faces down the wraith of Oen of An in her father’s house (McKillip, Game 
369).   Both Morgon and Raederle then make another choice not to continue in the 
transcendent course of action.  Morgon drops his three-starred sword and lets Deth walk 
away from Anuin unharmed.  Raederle chooses not to destroy Oen: 
 
. . . she was bound, as Oen had bound Ylon, by hatred, by compassionlessness, and by 
misunderstanding.  She realized, before she destroyed Oen, before she loosed something 
alien to the very land-law of An into the house of its kings, that she had to force the wraith   99 
of Ylon, roused in her, to see clearly for the first time, the heritage they both shared and the 
King who had simply been a man bound to its patterns. 
(McKillip, Game 370) 
 
In the High One’s realm, the danger to the landscape’s integrity comes from neither the 
need to control circumstances nor the awareness and fear of death.  It comes, quite simply, 
from the individual’s choice to act irresponsibly with regard to her or his context. 
 
As the construction of the Secondary World changes, from The Lord of the Rings to the 
Earthsea cycle to The Riddle-Master’s Game, the construction of the source of the threat to 
its integrity changes in response, from the need to control immediate circumstances, to the 
fear of death, to simple irresponsible choice.  However, one element of transcendent 
behaviour and the danger it poses stays the same in all three cases.  That is the element of 
responsibility.  Tolkien argues that as the Secondary World is already ordered in 
accordance with a greater wisdom, the individuals who attempt to control their particular 
circumstances disrupt that order and imperil its fulfilment.  Whether these characters have 
full knowledge of the order they reject (as Sauron and Saruman do), partial knowledge 
(Denethor and Boromir) or none at all (Gollum), they act in despite of it.  Being in control 
of their actions, characters within the Secondary World are entirely responsible for any 
damage they do to it.  In Earthsea, the desire to escape death is not in itself problematic; in 
fact, it is part of the Equilibrium, harmless until it is acted on.  However, when an 
individual acts on that desire, the result is damage to the self and to the world.  
Responsibility lies with the individual who chooses to act.  And in the High One’s realm, 
as the threat to the Secondary World springs directly from characters’ choice to disregard 
the wellbeing of the landscape in their quest for power, responsibility for damage to the 
landscape lies with those who choose to act so.     100 
 
No matter what the nature of the world, and no matter what the source of the threat to its 
integrity, in the end, responsibility for that threat rests firmly with those characters within 
the Secondary Worlds who choose to disregard its limits.  The solutions Tolkien, Le Guin 
and McKillip generate to the problem caused by the antagonist’s actions must take account 
of not only the damage or potential damage to the Secondary World, but the cause of that 
damage.  They must involve not only action in the public sphere, that will negate the 
damage inflicted on the landscape, but also action in the private sphere, to negate the 
transcendent impulse itself—the source of the threat to the Secondary World. 
 
Through their major and minor antagonists, and even their protagonists, The Lord of the 
Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game examine the threat to the 
integrity of the Secondary World.  They explore its nature, its source, and who is 
responsible for it.  In each case, Tolkien, Le Guin and McKillip argue that what endangers 
the Secondary World is the major antagonist’s self-serving determination to overcome the 
limits imposed by his or her environment, and achieve an ideal state—whether that state is 
dominion, immortality or empowerment.  The antagonist’s commitment to transcendence 
endangers the Secondary World because it leads him or her to act without care for any 
consequences.  As the construction of the Secondary World changes, from cosmically-
ordered system to balanced ecology to artificially-sustained landscape, so each fantasy’s 
interpretation of the source of transcendent behaviour also alters, from the desire or need to 
control the world, to the fear of change and death, to conscious choice.  However, no 
matter what the source of transcendent behaviour, within their Secondary Worlds Tolkien, 
Le Guin and McKillip consistently locate responsibility for the threat to the landscape’s 
wellbeing with the individual who ignores limitation and consequences in pursuit of a self-
serving goal.     101 
4  ‘A SILVER-HAIRED STRANGER’: THE ORCHESTRATOR AND 
THE ETHICAL TRANSITION 
In the penultimate paragraph of The Riddle-Master’s Game, McKillip describes the 
movement of dusk across the landscape of the High One’s realm as ‘a silver-haired 
stranger with night at his back, his face always toward the dawn’ (616).  The phrase recalls 
her early description of one of the most important characters in the trilogy, the High One’s 
harpist Deth: 
 
He was quietly dressed; the fine cloth and color of his blue-black tunic, the heavy chain of 
linked, stamped squares of silver on his breast were bewildering.  His face was lean, fine-
boned, neither young nor old; his hair was a loose cap of silver. 
(McKillip, Game 15) 
 
The image of dusk also encapsulates the role that Deth plays in the narrative: he brings 
about the end of the age of the High One, the age characterised by war between the High 
One and the shape-changers (the night at his back), and the beginning of the age of peace 
with Morgon’s accession to the role (the dawn).  Deth is part of the old order of the High 
One’s realm—indeed, he is the old order—but he is also instrumental in creating the new 
(Spivack, Daughters 123). 
 
Deth (properly, the High One) is not a character type unique to McKillip’s trilogy.  There 
is a character who is part of the old ethical order, but who brings about the creation and 
success of the new—who both models, and creates, the transition between ethical systems 
necessary to save the world—in The Lord of the Rings and the Earthsea cycle also.  In this 
chapter I will identify these characters and examine how each author constructs them 
relative to the antagonists, to elucidate the solution they model to the problem of the   102 
transcendent presence in the Secondary World.  I will also examine how these characters 
are presented in the narratives, and what source for the idea of ethical transition is revealed 
through them: that is, where, in each fantasy, responsibility for generating the solution to 
the threat of the transcendent actor lies. 
 
In each of the Secondary Worlds of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The 
Riddle-Master’s Game, there is a character who is responsible for the integrity of that 
Secondary World.  In The Lord of the Rings this character is Gandalf, who describes 
himself to Denethor as the caretaker of Middle-earth: 
 
‘ . . . I will say this: the rule of no realm is mine, neither of Gondor nor any other, great or 
small.  But all worthy things that are in peril as the world now stands, those are my care.  
And for my part, I shall not wholly fail of my task, though Gondor should perish, if 
anything passes through this night that can still grow fair or bear fruit or flower again in 
days to come.  For I also am a steward.  Did you not know?’ 
(Tolkien, III:25) 
 
Gandalf is supported in this role by Elrond and Galadriel, the other bearers of the Elven-
rings (the function of which is to preserve the landscape).  In the Earthsea cycle, the 
‘steward’ character is not a constant presence; however, in The Farthest Shore, Ged fulfils 
the role (Crowe 74).  As the Archmage of the Archipelago, Ged’s job is to ‘sit on Roke and 
watch the Equilibrium’ (Le Guin, Shore 23)—that is, to protect the balance of nature in 
Earthsea.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, the High One fills the role of caretaker.  He is the 
creator and holder of the land-law, the physical awareness of the nature and needs of the 
landscape that binds rulers to their realms: 
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[The High One’s] sole law was land-law, the law that passed like a breath of life from land-
heir to land-heir; if the High One died, or withdrew his immense and intricate power, he 
could turn his realm into a wasteland . . . His one concern was the land; his one law, the 
law instilled deeper than thought, deeper than dreaming, in his land-rulers. 
(McKillip, Game 117) 
 
Through the land-law, the High One is also the protector of the land.  As protectors of their 
Secondary Worlds, Gandalf, Ged and the High One all have the same purpose—to prevent 
the antagonist’s transcendent striving from harming the landscape.  Gandalf describes 
himself as the ‘Enemy of Sauron’ (Tolkien, III:220) and states that his task in Middle-earth 
is ‘ “ . . . to set things to rights, [and] . . . to help folk to do so . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, III:242).  In 
the original Earthsea trilogy, Ged, as proxy for the absent King of All the Isles, has an 
obligation to the Archipelago to act against the Anti-King Cob.  In The Riddle-Master’s 
Game, the High One’s understanding of ‘the implications of power’ obliges him to oppose 
Eriel’s destructive search for power (593).   
 
Each of these characters goes about achieving his purpose in the same way.  In none of the 
three fantasies do the primary protagonists act against the antagonist of their own accord 
(with the exception of the later Earthsea books, which have no orchestrator).  Rather, the 
‘caretaker’ character responds to the antagonist’s bid for transcendence by organising the 
protagonists to act against the antagonist.  Sauron’s rise to prominence prompts Gandalf to 
investigate the nature of Bilbo’s ring, and then to send Frodo to Rivendell.  Cob’s 
disruption of magic in Earthsea sends Ged out from Roke with Arren in tow, to search him 
out.  When the shape-changers drown Morgon’s parents to stop them from giving him 
Yrth’s three-starred harp and thus waking his power as Star-Bearer, the High One (in the 
shape of the harpist Deth) begins to manipulate Morgon into solving the riddle of three   104 
stars.  Because they deliberately construct the many layers of response to the primary 
antagonist’s transcendent striving, these caretaker characters can be described as the 
orchestrators of the focal narratives of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea trilogy and The 
Riddle-Master’s Game.  This is the term I use to refer to them collectively in this thesis.   
 
Gandalf, Ged and the High One have more in common than the fact that they are all 
responsible for their Secondary Worlds and opposed to their antagonists.  Each character 
also models the change he is attempting to effect in the Secondary World.  The nature of 
that change is visible in the relationship of orchestrators to antagonists.  In each text, the 
orchestrator is constructed as not only the antagonist’s opponent, but also her or his 
complement; William Senior comments of Gandalf that ‘he has no equals or peers except 
in his enemies’ (39), and this is true of Ged and the High One also.  In The Lord of the 
Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game, orchestrator and antagonist are 
both opposite and equal. 
 
In The Lord of the Rings, the oppositional relationship between Gandalf and Sauron is 
signalled by imagery of darkness and light.  Sauron, the primary antagonist of The Lord of 
the Rings, is associated with cloud and darkness (Spivack, ‘Images’ 28).  The Nazgûl are 
shadowy figures that first appear at night; the landscape of Mordor is smothered in polluted 
clouds; when Sauron besieges Minas Tirith, he sends cloud to cover Gondor in darkness.  
Sauron is nonphysical, disembodied; his sole appearance in the narrative is as ‘a huge 
shape of shadow’ (Tolkien, III:200).  In contrast, Gandalf is associated with fire, through 
the fireworks he makes for hobbit parties, his ability to conjure fire and his use of it as a 
weapon.  After his fall to the Balrog and return as the more powerful Gandalf the White, he 
is also associated with white light (Zimbardo 101), which he can use as both a weapon and 
a tool (Tolkien, II:104).  In contrast to Sauron, Gandalf is tied firmly into a physical body;   105 
even after his return from death in Moria he remains incarnate.  However, there is also a 
similarity linking Gandalf and Sauron.  Gandalf describes Sauron as being a ‘servant or 
emissary’ of a greater evil located beyond the borders of Middle-earth (Tolkien, III:137).  
He also implies, though does not state outright, that he too is an emissary of a similar, 




In the Earthsea cycle, Ged displays a similar equal-and-opposite relationship to Cob, the 
antagonist of The Farthest Shore, although Le Guin does not use clear contrasting imagery 
to make the point as Tolkien does.  Cob is a sorcerer who uses the Pelnish Lore rejected by 
the wizards of Roke (Le Guin, Shore 85-6).  During his life Cob moves from the literal 
centre of his world, Havnor, to its margins: after his return from death he is trapped at the 
westernmost edge of the Archipelago, the island of Selidor, and the Dry Land of the Dead 
in the west beyond the west.   Cob is the ‘Anti-King’ who breaks down the natural balance 
of Earthsea (Esmonde 33); and he is dead.  Ged, in contrast, moves from the margins of the 
Secondary World (his home island of Gont is toward the outer edge of the Archipelago) 
toward the centre.  Ged is a wizard of Roke, and as the Archmage he functions magically 
and socially as proxy for the absent centre of authority in the Archipelago, the King in 
Havnor.
8
                                                 
7 In the wider scheme of Tolkien’s cosmology Gandalf and Sauron are precisely equal; they are of course 
both Maia spirits, and servants of the Valar (Tolkien, Silmarillion 22-3).  This, however, is not stated at any 
point in The Lord of the Rings. 
  Despite his spirit journeys into the Dry Land throughout the original trilogy, Ged 
is quite alive.  Yet in some ways Ged and Cob are very similar.  They are both men and 
mages of the Archipelago, products of the same culture and time.  Cob has the same traits 
of pride and power in The Farthest Shore as Ged does when he first arrives at the school of 
Roke in A Wizard of Earthsea (Crow and Erlich 213).  And, like Cob, Ged has 
 
8 This is shown by the fact that his staff of office is marked with ‘the Lost Rune of the Kings’, the sign of 
dominion and peace (Le Guin, Shore 16).   106 
experimented with the Pelnish Lore and the summoning of the dead, for much the same 
reasons as Cob does (Galbreath 263). 
 
The antagonist and orchestrator of The Riddle-Master’s Game, Eriel and the High One, 
also display a clear equal-and-opposite relationship.  The shape-changer Eriel appears 
throughout the narrative as a woman, and the High One eventually confirms that this is her 
original sex (McKillip, Game 593).  Eriel is initially associated with water: Astrin Ymris’ 
story of the death of Eriel Meremont establishes that Eriel, like the other shape-changers, 
comes out of the sea (McKillip, Game 62).  In Heir of Sea and Fire, she also reveals an 
affinity with fire when she handles it during her conversation with Raederle (McKillip, 
Game 300).  She is repeatedly described as lawless.  Her original name remains unknown.  
In contrast, the High One is throughout the narrative referred to as male, and evidence 
scattered throughout the text confirms that this is his original sex (McKillip, Game 179, 
590).  As the holder of the land-law, the High One is associated with earth (the opposite of 
fire in the neopagan circular schema of the elements), and when he is revealed to be the 
‘Master of the Winds’ mentioned in the stone children’s riddle, he is also associated with 
air, the opposite of water (Greenwood 84-5).  While the High One’s original name is never 
stated, it can be reconstructed from clues within the text.
9
 
  Finally, the High One is 
identified with the land-law.  Despite their differences, however, the narrative eventually 
reveals that Eriel and the High One are fundamentally the same.  As Eriel wears the face of 
a dead woman, for most of the narrative the High One wears the face of a dead man, ‘a 
harpist who died during the destruction’ of Lungold (McKillip, Game 594).  And they are 
both Earth-Masters (Mains 67). 
                                                 
9 The stone child Tirnon, who gives Morgon his three-starred sword, gives the name of his father, the ‘Master 
of Earth and Wind’, as Tir; the High One later implies that Tirnon was his son (McKillip, Game 590).  The 
full form of the Herun name Deth, the High One’s alias for most of the text, is Tirunedeth (McKillip, Game 
21). The implication of this is that ‘Tir’ and ‘Deth’ are ‘one’.   107 
Gandalf, Ged and the High One share not only their origins, but a perspective and a mode 
of action, with Sauron, Cob and Eriel.  As mentioned in Chapter Two, in each fantasy the 
orchestrator character knows the antagonist’s mind and character so completely that he 
speaks for the silenced antagonist.  Gandalf knows Sauron’s habits of thoughts and his 
weaknesses, and can accurately predict his actions (Tolkien, I:258).  Ged identifies the 
Anti-King’s motivation as the fear of death before he knows that the Anti-King is Cob, the 
man who feared dying (Le Guin, Shore 150).  The High One can explain Eriel’s desire for 
limitless power to Morgon despite the lack of any contact between them in the narrative to 
explain his knowledge (McKillip, Game 593).  This implies that the orchestrator character 
can access the antagonist’s tragedic patterns of thought. 
 
This suggestion is supported by the fact that throughout their narratives, the actions of 
Gandalf, Ged and the High One are remarkably similar in kind to those of the antagonists.  
In The Lord of the Rings Gandalf has three main functions: he is a giver of information and 
advice (Brooke-Rose 237), an organiser of events (Curry, ‘Noise’ 131) and a leader of 
warriors (Burns 222).  Gandalf organises Frodo’s journey to Rivendell and beyond, 
musters the Rohirrim, commands the defence of Minas Tirith and oversees the restoration 
of its King, and finally commands the assault upon the Black Gate that distracts Sauron’s 
attention at the crucial moment of Frodo’s journey (Tolkien, III:122).  As Elgin states, 
although Gandalf actively opposes ‘the destruction of nature and nature’s creatures’, in 
order to achieve his goals he, Elrond and Galadriel must nevertheless ‘seek to bend all 
things to their will’ (43)—the defining characteristic of a tragic hero.   
 
The same is true of Ged in The Farthest Shore.  Ged’s manipulation of events works on 
two levels, one positive and one less so.  Like every wizard and student at the school on 
Roke, Ged is aware of the prophecy of Maharion, the last Archipeligan King, regarding his   108 
eventual successor: ‘ “ . . . He shall inherit my throne who has crossed the dark land living 
and come to the far shores of the day” ’ (Le Guin, Shore 25: original emphasis).  As  
Edith L. Crowe points out (74), Ged asks Arren to accompany him on his journey to 
discover the cause of magic’s failure because, as his language shows, he has already 
recognised Arren’s potential to fulfil that prophecy:  
 
‘ . . . To deny the past is to deny the future.  A man does not make his destiny: he accepts it, 
or denies it.  If the rowan’s roots are shallow it bears no crown.’  At this, Arren looked up 
startled, for his true name, Lebannen, meant the rowan tree. 
  (Le Guin, Shore 36) 
 
Ged uses the journey to Selidor to shape Arren into the King he knows the Archipelago 
needs (Crowe 74-5), both by modelling the doctrine of Equilibrium in his own actions (or 
lack thereof) and by explicitly teaching it (Le Guin, Shore 150).  At the same time, 
however, Ged uses Arren and his fear of dying, without Arren’s knowledge, to first 
discover the nature of the ‘Anti-King’, and then locate him.   
 
When the High One finally reveals his identity to Morgon, just before the climax of The 
Riddle-Master’s Game, it becomes evident that as the magister ludi of the riddle-game of 
three stars, he shares with Ged and Gandalf a distinct tendency to use others to serve his 
ends and the interests of his Secondary World.  The High One uses the wizard 
Ghisteslwchlohm, his apparent usurper, to shield himself from the shape-changers’ notice. 
He uses Ghisteslwchlohm’s hunger for power to develop Morgon’s capacity for wizardry, 
literally arranging for Morgon to be tortured into learning wizardry. 
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‘ . . . I found you in Hed, innocent, ignorant, oblivious of your own destiny.  You couldn’t 
even harp.  Who in this realm was there to wake you to power? . . . You wanted a choice.  I 
gave it to you.  You could have taken the shape of power you learned from 
Ghisteslwchlohm: lawless, destructive, loveless.  Or you could have swallowed darkness 
until you shaped it, understood it, and still cried out for something more . . . ’ 
(McKillip, Game 589-90) 
 
The High One manipulates Morgon into taking up the challenge of the riddle of three stars, 
then uses Morgon’s quest to hide himself from the shape-changers who are hunting him 
after Ghisteslwchlohm’s illusion is destroyed (McKillip, Game 592).  The only 
consideration that shapes the High One’s decisions is necessity.  Despite his love for 
Morgon, he is prepared to harm him as much as is necessary to achieve his goals: ‘ “ . . . I 
wanted no harm to come to you without my consent. . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 594).  The 
High One also reveals that in the prehistory of his realm, before the establishment of the 
land-law, he was as irresponsible in his use of power as Eriel (Mains 67). 
 
While antagonist and orchestrator share their origins and a pattern of behaviour, however, 
Gandalf’s actions, Ged’s and the High One’s are the product of a different guiding ethic 
from Sauron’s, Cob’s and Eriel’s.  As discussed in Chapter Two, tragic heroes develop 
self-awareness over the course of their narratives, a development that becomes complete 
just before their self-destruction.  But Gandalf, Ged and the High One begin their 
narratives already self-aware: as Basney says of Elrond and Galadriel, the secondary 
orchestrators of The Lord of the Rings, ‘the “action” of these characters is really the gesture 
of a pre-established ethical identity’ (‘Escape’ 34).  Each orchestrator is well aware of his 
own capacity to act on the transcendent impulse.  Gandalf knows without needing to test it 
what quality makes him vulnerable to the Ring:   110 
 
‘ . . . the way of the Ring to my heart is pity, pity for weakness and the desire of strength to 
do good.  Do not tempt me!  I dare not take it . . . The wish to wield it would be too great 
for my strength . . . ’ 
(Tolkien, I:67) 
 
By the time Cob makes his attempt at immortality in The Farthest Shore, Ged knows, 
thanks to his experiences in A Wizard of Earthsea and The Tombs of Atuan, exactly which 
trait could lead him to act as Cob does: ‘ “I know how much evil one man can do . . . I 
know it because I have done it.  I have done the same evil, moved by the same pride . . . ” ’  
(Le Guin, Shore 151).  In The Farthest Shore Ged is noticeably careful not to let his pride 
control his actions.  The High One is equally well aware of his own potential to turn ‘into 
stone’—that is, to become as compassionless and disengaged from the world he lives in as 
the shape-changers are (McKillip, Game 592).  However, the orchestrator characters 
choose not to indulge their transcendent potential.  In other words, they consciously limit 
their own actions and prominence within the Secondary World in order to promote its 
survival: they live by one of the defining characteristics of the comedic ethic. 
 
This can be seen in two ways.  In each fantasy, there are factors that prevent the 
orchestrator from opposing the antagonist directly.  Gandalf’s ability to oppose Sauron is 
limited by his incarnation within a physical body, his inability to use the Elven-ring he 
carries, and the fact that he is ‘forbidden’ to confront Sauron directly (Tolkien, III:332).  
As Archmage, Ged must act in accordance with the central principle of Roke wizardry, 
which is, ‘ “ . . . Do what is needful.  And no more!” ’ (Le Guin, Shore 147).  The High 
One is unable to oppose Eriel because he is no longer strong enough to maintain his 
bindings over the shape-changers (McKillip, Game 594), and because if he confronts Eriel   111 
before his land-heir Morgon is prepared to take on the land-law, his own premature death 
will destroy the realm.  None of the three orchestrators makes any attempt to defy these 
limitations.  Instead, each works within them to find other ways to block the antagonist’s 
threat. 
 
More significantly, because the orchestrator’s purpose is to oppose the antagonist, his 
presence within the Secondary World is dependent on the antagonist’s presence there; in 
organising the downfall of the antagonist, Gandalf, Ged and the High One also organise 
their own irrelevance to the Secondary Worlds they protect.  Each of the three characters 
not only accepts this fact, but actively works to further his own obsolescence, and accepts 
it when it finally occurs.  In The Lord of the Rings, after the fall of Sauron, Gandalf tells 
Aragorn, ‘ “ . . . The Third Age was my age.  I was the Enemy of Sauron: and my work is 
finished.  I shall go soon . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, III:220).  Gandalf withdraws from the politics 
and organisation of Middle-earth at the moment of eucatastrophe (Tolkien, III:200), and 
his coronation of Aragorn signals a formal transfer of authority from himself to the King; 
although after it Gandalf remains in Middle-earth for two and a half years, he is no longer 
an active force in the shaping of the world.  Eventually he ‘retires from the world’ (Crowe 
76), literally, when he sails to the Undying Lands with his fellow Ring-Bearers.  
 
Ged enters his confrontation with Cob having already reached the understanding that once 
this task is finished it will be time for him ‘ “ . . . to be done with power . . . ” ’ (Le Guin, 
Shore 171) and for Arren to take it up instead.  As soon as the damage Cob has inflicted on 
the world is repaired and the conditions of Maharion’s prophecy are met, Ged, like 
Gandalf, formally and publicly transfers his authority in the Archipelago to Arren: 
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In the sight of them all there Ged knelt to [Arren], down on both knees, and bowed his grey 
head. 
 
Then he stood up and kissed the young man on the cheek, saying, ‘When you come to your 
throne in Havnor, my lord and dear companion, rule long, and well.’ 
 (Le Guin, Shore 213) 
 
As Crowe states (73), Ged then retires from not only the role of Archmage but also the 
whole of public life in the Archipelago, by returning to live in deliberate obscurity on Gont 
(Le Guin, Wind 78).   
 
The High One’s case is slightly different.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, land-rule passes 
from holder to heir upon the death of the holder; thus, in order to secure the eucatastrophe, 
the High One must therefore organise not just his own irrelevance, but his own destruction.  
Unlike the tragic hero, however, the High One goes to considerable lengths to ensure that 
his self-destruction has no negative consequences for the landscape for which he is 
responsible.  While the chain of connections is never fully unpacked in the narrative, there 
are several clues that suggest that when the High One (in the shape of the wizard Yrth) 
forges the sword marked with three stars, he means the Star-Bearer to use it to kill him, 
under controlled circumstances, after he has developed the ability to hold the land-law.  
The stone children, describing the sword as being for ‘death’ (McKillip, Game 179), 
invoke the death/Deth pun emphasised by various riddles and stories throughout the 
narrative; Deth himself tells Morgon, earlier in the narrative, ‘ “ . . . If you finish this harsh 
journey to Erlenstar Mountain, I will give you anything you ask of me.  I will give you my 
life . . . Because you bear three stars” ’ (McKillip, Game 92).  While it is eventually 
Ghisteslwchlohm who uses the sword to kill the High One, under circumstances that are   113 
not controlled at all, the High One’s death nevertheless enables the transfer of power and 
authority from himself to Morgon.  The act is witnessed as it occurs by the land-rulers and 
wizards, through their awareness of changes in the land-law (McKillip, Game 609).  The 
High One’s death serves the same narrative function as Gandalf’s and Ged’s withdrawal 
from their public roles. 
 
Because it is anticipated and planned for, the orchestrator’s movement into obsolescence 
causes comparatively little damage to the Secondary World within which it occurs.  
Gandalf’s departure from Middle-earth forms part of the landscape’s change from magical 
to mundane, but causes no harm.  Ged’s withdrawal from the position of Archmage leads 
to some political and magical disruption in Tehanu and ‘Dragonfly’, as the wizards who 
remain are forced to adjust to the new sociopolitical configuration of the Archipelago.  The 
High One’s self-destruction, because it does not occur under the controlled circumstances 
he planned for, is followed by a period of chaos and damage to the Secondary World.  
However, it also permits Morgon to re-establish the land-law and rebind the shape-
changers in Erlenstar Mountain.  In each case, the ability to accept limitation that 
differentiates the orchestrator character from the antagonist allows him to achieve his goal 
of preserving the integrity of the Secondary World. 
 
Through their similarities to Sauron, Cob and Eriel in their origins and their behaviour, and 
their differences from them in the orientation of their actions, their recognition of 
limitation, their ends and the results they achieve, Gandalf, Ged and the High One model a 
general solution to the problem of the transcendent presence in the Secondary World.  This 
is the conscious adoption of and adherence to the integrative ethic of comedy as a guide to 
responsible action in the world. Gandalf, Ged and the High One function as bridges 
between the transcendent worldview of the antagonist and the integrative action necessary   114 
in the present: by inspiring others to act, they create the ethical transition and bring about 
the eucatastrophe, the metamorphosis that saves the Secondary World. 
 
As the orchestrator’s function is to both model and bring about the transition from 
transcendent to integrative ethical dominance within the Secondary World, each author’s 
treatment of the orchestrator figure reveals her or his interpretation of that ethical 
transition.  As with the antagonists, the common presence of an orchestrator figure in the 
three fantasies does not mean that each fantasy presents the same construction of the 
ethical transition.  Rather, the construction of the orchestrator figure and thus of the ethical 
transition—and the allocation of responsibility for the development of the solution to the 
transcendent problem—change from The Lord of the Rings to the Earthsea cycle to The 
Riddle-Master’s Game.      
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Tolkien constructs the transcendent impulse as the 
individual’s desire or need to control her or his immediate environment, in despite of the 
cosmic design that orders events in Middle-earth.  Tolkien’s version of the ethical 
transition is designed to block this specific problem; he articulates his interpretation of the 
ethical transition through Gandalf.  Senior, in his comparison of Tolkien’s Secondary 
World with Stephen Donaldson’s in the First Chronicles of Thomas Covenant the 
Unbeliever, states that ‘Gandalf, despite his easy laughter and flashing anger, remains a 
distant figure whose comings and goings are suspect to many and whose nature and 
purpose are hidden’ (38).  This statement is partially accurate; Gandalf is always presented 
as somewhat distanced from both the reader and the Secondary World he inhabits 
(Mathews 901).  However, the degree to which Gandalf is distanced, and the reasons why 
he is distanced, change across the course of the narrative.  At the beginning of The Lord of 
the Rings, Gandalf the Grey appears to be both human and indigenous to the Secondary   115 
World.  He is slightly distanced even at the outset; he is seen from a Hobbit viewpoint, 
which, as the authoritative narrative voice immediately informs us, is limited: 
 
. . . the old man was Gandalf the Wizard, whose fame in the Shire was due mainly to his 
skill with fires, smokes, and lights.  His real business was far more difficult and dangerous, 
but the Shire-folk knew nothing about it. 
(Tolkien, I:33) 
 
While the hobbit perspective may be limited, it is also very close.  Although little is 
actually known about him, Gandalf appears in the Shire as a relatively knowable figure.  
Hobbit children chase after his cart hoping for fireworks; he plots jokes with Bilbo and 
supplies entertainment at his party, expresses affection and loses his temper.  The distance 
comes only from the fact that he is one of the Big People, and therefore knows more about 
the Secondary World and Bilbo’s ring than the reader and the hobbits do, and is more 
involved with both Ring and world.   
 
When the narrative moves out of the Shire and into the wider world, Gandalf gains in 
stature.  He is revealed to be a friend of the Ranger Strider and the equal of the half-elven 
loremaster Elrond; he is not just a wandering conjuror, but a scholar, a wizard and a 
member of the powerful White Council.  The Council of Elrond reveals Gandalf to be a 
voice of authority on matters within the world, and at the same time, he begins to show a 
knowledge of things that lie beyond the limits of Middle-earth.  There is a suggestion that 
Gandalf has a specific role to fulfil in Middle-earth: ‘ “There are many powers in the 
world, for good or for evil.  Some are greater than I am.  Against some I have not yet been 
measured.  But my time is coming . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, I:212). 
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However, Gandalf remains a human figure.  He is subject to the human limitations of 
physicality and mortality.  He gets cold, hungry, tired and grumpy, forgets things, and has 
a tobacco addiction (Tolkien, I:299).  As Ellison points out, in the early parts of The Lord 
of the Rings Gandalf makes frequent mistakes: he delays researching the Ring; he lets 
Gollum go after meeting him in Mirkwood, allowing Gollum to make his way to Mordor 
and Sauron to learn the location of the Ring; he is deceived and trapped by Saruman 
(Ellison 27).  Gandalf attempts to avoid Moria and the possibility of danger, and endangers 
the whole Fellowship by doing so.  And despite his first real display of power against the 
Balrog in Moria, Gandalf dies, largely because of a combination of weariness, inattention 
and bad luck on his part (Tolkien, I:314). 
 
Gandalf’s apparent humanity, and the emphasis placed on his knowledge and scholarship, 
initially imply that the ethical transition toward which he works is an informed human 
response to the threat of the transcendent ethic, which is generated within the Secondary 
World, by the limited resources available there.  The secondary orchestrators Elrond and 
Galadriel, supporting Gandalf’s endeavours, suggest that there is a larger context within 
which that informed human action fits, but that context is not articulated.  Elrond supplies 
history and Galadriel direction; both suggest that larger forces approve of the direction in 
which events are going, but nothing more (Kocher 44).  However, Gandalf’s death in 
Moria and his subsequent return as Gandalf the White reveal that this interpretation is 
inaccurate, and that even an informed human response to the threat posed by the 
transcendent presence is an inadequate one. 
 
Before Gandalf returns to Middle-earth in The Two Towers, Treebeard establishes that the 
wizard originally came into Middle-earth from beyond its limits (Tolkien, II:66).  
Gandalf’s return from Moria intensifies this suggestion that he is not human: his   117 
description of his return implies that his literal humanity has been burned away and that 
now his true nature is revealed (Senior 39).  Furthermore, in the immediate wake of his 
return, Gandalf states openly for the first time that he has a purpose to accomplish in and 
for Middle-earth, and one that is impressed on him by an external power: ‘ “Naked I was 
sent back, for a brief time—until my task is done . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, II:92).   
 
After his return, Gandalf loses the human limitations that characterise Gandalf the Grey.  
He makes no more mistakes that imperil the achievement of eucatastrophe.  He is not 
vulnerable to Saruman’s voice (Tolkien, II:165) or Sauron’s deceptions (Tolkien, III:148).  
He is not infected by Denethor’s despair, or the terror brought by the Nazgûl at Minas 
Tirith.  And his physical limitations vanish after his return.  There is no reference to 
Gandalf the White smoking (or needing to smoke), or to his being weary, cold or hungry, 
after his return from Moria.  He walks and rides great distances without apparent 
discomfort or fatigue.  His general irritability becomes precisely directed anger, that 
achieves physical results, as in his confrontation with Gríma Wormtongue (Tolkien, 
II:104).  And he is capable of acts that belie the apparent age and frailty of his body: 
 
. . . they found Faramir, still dreaming in his fever, lying upon the table.  Wood was piled 
under it, and high all about it, and all was drenched with oil . . . Then Gandalf revealed the 
strength that lay hid in him, even as the light of his power was hidden under his grey 
mantle.  He leaped up on to the faggots, and raising the sick man lightly he sprang down 
again, and bore him towards the door. 
(Tolkien, III:113) 
 
As Merry notes in The Two Towers (173), Gandalf the White has more power than Gandalf 
the Grey.  He also uses it more freely—to throw down Gríma Wormtongue and restore   118 
Théoden’s strength, to fight off the Nazgûl at the siege of Gondor (Lakowski 33) and to 
drive back the Mouth of Sauron at the Morannon.  And Gandalf the White has more 
knowledge than Gandalf the Grey.  But as he becomes more powerful and more 
knowledgeable, Gandalf also becomes ‘closer than ever’ (Tolkien, II:173)—that is, more 
close-mouthed.  Thus he is even more of a distanced figure than before; by the time he 
confronts Denethor in Return of the King, this distance and difference are so great as to 
make it plain that Gandalf is not human, and not of Middle-earth:  
 
Denethor looked indeed much more like a great wizard than Gandalf did . . . Yet by a sense 
other than sight Pippin perceived that Gandalf had the greater power and the deeper 
wisdom, and a majesty that was veiled. And he was older, far older . . . What was Gandalf?  
In what far time and place did he come into the world, and when would he leave it? 
(Tolkien, III:24) 
 
Immediately after the idea that Gandalf is a power from outside Middle-earth is explicitly 
introduced, Gandalf reveals his specific relationship to the landscape of Middle-earth, and 
his task, when he describes himself as Middle-earth’s ‘steward’ in the speech to Denethor 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter.  This statement confirms the earlier suggestion that 
Gandalf’s task is laid on him by an external power analogous to a ruler.  After this 
revelation, Gandalf goes from merely organising events to actively commanding them. 
 
At no point, however, does Gandalf become completely distanced from the Secondary 
World.  As Senior points out, Tolkien regularly reveals an ‘intimate’ side of Gandalf 
through ‘glimpses of [his] friendships with the hobbits and Aragorn’ (38), and this leads to 
the revelation of Gandalf’s larger affection for the whole Secondary World.  Immediately 
after the confrontation with Denethor in which he reveals his true role in the world, for   119 
example, Gandalf takes the time to reassure Pippin that he did right to offer Denethor his 
service in reparation for Boromir’s death.  In doing so, he reveals the nature of his 
attachment to the whole of Middle-earth: 
 
[Gandalf] came and stood beside Pippin, putting his arm around the hobbit’s shoulders, and 
gazing out of the window.  Pippin glanced in some wonder at the face now close beside his 
own, for, [sic] the sound of that laugh had been gay and merry.  Yet in the wizard’s face he 
saw at first only lines of care and sorrow; though as he looked more intently he perceived 
that under all there was a great joy: a fountain of mirth enough to set a kingdom laughing, 
were it to gush forth. 
(Tolkien, III:26) 
 
Despite his distance from the Secondary World, Gandalf has a loving connection to it.  
This, combined with the slow revelation of his true nature and role after his return from 
Moria, makes clear the source of the ethical transition he is engaged in effecting.  Gandalf 
is a ‘messenger’ (Tolkien, Letters 202) of the beneficent external power that invests 
Middle-earth with order and cosmic significance; he is the conscious enactor of this benign 
power’s design for the world.  Gandalf’s presence in the narrative constructs the ethical 
transition as the fulfilment of the cosmic order.  This interpretation is confirmed by his 
final appearance in the narrative, waiting for the other ring-bearers at the Grey Havens 
(Tolkien, III:274) to sail with them to the Undying Lands, as their guide.  Throughout the 
narrative, Gandalf performs the role of guide, shaping the world in accordance with the 
imperatives of the external power’s design; his presence constructs the ethical transition as 
a solution generated outside the Secondary World, a movement towards a predetermined 
right end.    
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Le Guin’s construction of the ethical transition is very different from Tolkien’s.  The three 
separate but linked narratives of the original Earthsea trilogy can be read as charting Ged’s 
development toward, and eventual fulfilment of, the role of orchestrator for his Secondary 
World.  The continuation volumes deal with the aftermath of the eucatastrophe, and lack an 
orchestrator figure; it is through Ged, and particularly through Ged’s actions in The 
Farthest Shore, that Le Guin articulates her construction of the ethical transition. 
 
Le Guin constructs the transcendent impulse as a reaction to the awareness and fear of 
mortality, as discussed in Chapter Three.  There is no external power or force ordering 
events in the Earthsea cycle, against which this impulse works; but there is a physical 
imperative that governs both the Secondary World and the actions of individuals within it.  
This is the Equilibrium, the balance of the world (Le Guin, Wizard 56) that must be 
maintained above all other considerations.  The principle of Equilibrium is not just an 
intellectual construct developed to explain the workings of the world; it is a physical and 
magical fact, as the consequences of Ged’s and Cob’s disruption of the boundary between 
life and death prove.   
 
A Wizard of Earthsea focusses on Ged’s education in the art magic—on his learning to 
first understand, and then internalise, the doctrine of Equilibrium.  The story turns on 
Ged’s attempt to prove his superiority to another student wizard, to prove that he is 
‘stronger than death itself’ (Le Guin, Shore 151), by summoning the spirit of Elfarran the 
Fair out of the Dry Land of the Dead into the living world.  Ged’s transcendent act has a 
dangerous consequence: it releases into the world Ged’s Shadow, a malevolent force that 
can devour minds and turn people into gebbeths, puppets without souls.  The narrative 
follows Ged’s slow development of understanding that in order to neutralise the threat the 
Shadow presents to the world, he must not defeat it, but assimilate it (Spivack, Le Guin   121 
30); Ged’s dealings with his Shadow constitute his informal, true education in the reality 
and nature of Equilibrium.  A Wizard of Earthsea is, as George Slusser states, a narrative 
about Ged taking on responsibility for his actions and their consequences in the world (36).  
Ged is a ‘sorcerer’s apprentice’ type of character—‘he does before he learns, and his first 
deed is misbegotten’ (Slusser 36-7)—and his narrative in A Wizard of Earthsea is not so 
much one of learning as one of learning better, of rejecting the easiest course of action and 
consciously adapting his worldview and behaviour to align with the pre-existing fact of 
Equilibrium. 
 
The theme of learning better recurs in the second volume of the cycle, The Tombs of Atuan.  
The narrative of The Tombs of Atuan focusses not on Ged, but on Arha, the Kargish 
priestess of the Nameless Ones; Ged’s story is inset into hers.  However, his actions in this 
inset story can be seen to follow the same pattern as in A Wizard of Earthsea.  Ged enters 
the narrative as a thief and an intruder into a place where he has no right to be, and is 
trapped in the Labyrinth by Arha and the Nameless Ones whose territory he has 
encroached upon.  In order to first survive, and then escape, Ged must let go of his desire 
to manipulate the world (by stealing the lost half of the Ring of Erreth-Akbe from the 
Labyrinth), accept his powerlessness (Le Guin, Revisioned 9), and wait for Arha to give 
him her half of the Ring as a free gift—as the first half of the Ring was given to him in A 
Wizard of Earthsea.  This is another movement closer to a full acceptance of the principle 
of Equilibrium (Slusser 41). 
 
The Farthest Shore is the only book of the cycle in which Ged functions as orchestrator for 
Earthsea.  At the beginning of The Farthest Shore, which occurs approximately twenty   122 
years after The Tombs of Atuan,
10
 
 Ged is the Archmage, the highest extant authority in the 
Archipelago.  He stands in the place of the absent King, as ‘a strong centralising, 
normalising, pacific element in Archipeligan society’ (Le Guin, Tales 294).  Despite the 
opinion of one of his students (Le Guin, Shore 23), Ged is not Archmage because of the 
things he has done; he is Archmage because through doing, he has developed a clear 
understanding of the nature, function and consequences of action in the world, and has 
brought himself and his actions as closely as possible into line with the principle of 
Equilibrium.  The narrative voice shows Ged from the perspective of the young prince 
Arren, which initially positions Ged as an icon of authority, ability and wisdom.  Ged 
recognises the cause of the failure of magic in Earthsea where the nine Masters of Roke do 
not (Le Guin, Shore 31), and where they can only see part of the solution (the restoration 
of the true king), he is aware of the whole.  He is ‘not vulnerable to temptation’ (Cummins 
61).  Ged appears to have grown beyond making mistakes—to have learned better.  At this 
point of the narrative, Ged in fact appears much as Gandalf does at the close of The Lord of 
the Rings.  He is the voice of a principle that dictates the way events should go for the good 
of the Secondary World, but despite his care for that world he is detached from it, isolated 
and inactive on Roke Island.  
Having set up this Gandalf-like image, Le Guin immediately proceeds to deconstruct it.  
When Ged leaves Roke to find the source of the disruption to the Secondary World, Arren 
learns that he must rely on luck, chance and his own efforts to find out what he needs to 
know.  Despite his adherence to the doctrine of Equilibrium, Ged is still capable of making 
mistakes, on both small and large scales, as he does after Arren is kidnapped by slave-
traders (Le Guin, Shore 73).  Where Gandalf grows more distanced as the narrative of The 
Lord of the Rings progresses, Ged becomes closer to the reader during his journey with 
                                                 
10 The Farthest Shore suggests eighteen (24), Tehanu about twenty-five (211); the difference is never 
resolved.   123 
Arren, shifting from icon to back to the character of the previous volumes, complete with a 
sense of humour, a bad temper, and a capacity to make serious mistakes which is shown 
most clearly through the story of his humiliation of the sorcerer Cob: 
 
‘ . . . I saw [Cob] summon from the Dry Land my own old master who was Archmage in 
my youth, Nemmerle . . . I was angry, and challenged him.  I was not Archmage then.  I 
said, “You compel the dead to come into your house.  Will you come with me to theirs?”  
And I made him come . . . He was afraid.  He who summoned up the dead so easily was 
more afraid of death—his own death—than any man I ever knew . . . His fear made me 
sick and angry.  I should have known by that that I did wrong.  He was strong, and I was 
eager to prove that I was stronger.’ 
(Le Guin, Shore 86) 
 
The narrative eventually reveals that Ged’s past mistake is, as Slusser (42) and Cob both 
point out, partially responsible for the threat to Earthsea’s integrity.  Cob’s response to 
Ged’s punishment is to attempt to defeat the death that he fears (Galbreath 265).  His 
efforts create a breach between the living world and the Dry Land of the Dead, and magic 
and life begin to bleed out of Earthsea through it—which is the trouble that sends Arren to 
Roke in the first place.  When Ged undertakes his journey to discover the source of the 
trouble and restore the integrity of his Secondary World, he is acting to correct his own 
mistake.  Once again, he is learning better.   
 
Ged’s closure of the door between the worlds opened by Cob, and Arren’s simultaneous 
journey to kingship, between them effect the transition from transcendent to integrative 
ethical dominance in Earthsea—symbolically, at least.  Both of these narratives are equally 
necessary for the preservation of Equilibrium; they restore not only physical and magical,   124 
but political and social, balance to Earthsea.  Through them, Le Guin constructs the ethical 
transition itself as a process of learning better—of recognising a pre-existent fact about the 
relationship between individual and context and adjusting the self to take account of it.  
This construction of the ethical transition goes on to form one of the fundamental 
principles underpinning the radically different continuation volumes, especially The Other 
Wind, where it manifests as the recognition that Equilibrium itself as presented in the 
previous five volumes of the cycle is a distortion of the natural which can only be corrected 
by, once more, learning better.  If the transcendent impulse is a danger that arises out of the 
subconscious mind, it must be opposed by the recognition of the Equilibrium it threatens 
and the conscious adoption of behaviour that promotes the Equilibrium.   
 
McKillip’s treatment of the orchestrator figure in The Riddle-Master’s Game is more 
complex than Le Guin’s or Tolkien’s.  McKillip’s narrative both engages with and rejects 
Tolkien’s and Le Guin’s constructions of the ethical transition, and states her own 
contrasting interpretation of it, through the concepts of land-law and riddlery, and the 
characters of the High One and Deth.   
 
McKillip constructs the transcendent impulse as a deliberate choice to behave irresponsibly 
in order to gratify the self.  In the High One’s realm, there are two systems of thought that 
guide individuals’ interactions with the world away from such behaviour: land-law and 
riddlery.  However, neither of these is a physical imperative as the doctrine of Equilibrium 
is in Earthsea, or a manifestation of cosmic order against which the transcendent actor 
opposes her- or him- self.  Land-law is not an inherent part of the Secondary World, but a 
magical construct created by the High One to preserve its integrity from within (McKillip, 
Game 611).  Riddlery is an epistemology (Schuyler 111) and a philosophy; it is history, 
literature and a framework that determines what is appropriate action in the world   125 
(Nicholls 1814).  It deals solely with codifying human patterns of interaction with the 
world: ‘ “ . . . Is there a riddle on the master lists that permits the wise man to revenge?” ’ 
(McKillip, Game 332).  Riddlery is a cultural construct, developed out of a previous 
discipline (wizardry).  In McKillip’s Secondary World, the action necessary to bring about 
the ethical transition is not revealed by the system itself.  It is not a process of learning 
better. 
 
Nor is it revealed by an external force.  Within McKillip’s closed Secondary World, her 
construction of the High One and Deth gestures to Tolkien’s benign ordering power and 
orchestrator.  The High One is defined as the ‘sustainer of the land-law of the realm’ 
(McKillip, Game 619).  He is a distant and indistinct figure (Mains 61); his nature and role 
are never fully defined; he is isolated from the realm he protects, and his dealings with 
others take place at one remove, ‘generally through his harpist’ (McKillip, Game 117).  
Deth is the High One’s representative in the Secondary World, and performs a parallel 
function to the High One within the Secondary World: where the High One provides 
physical, ecological stability, Deth, who has been his harpist for six hundred years 
(McKillip, Game 77) provides political and social stability. And, like the High One, Deth 
is considered absolutely trustworthy: ‘ “ . . . There wasn’t a man, woman or child in the 
realm who didn’t trust you . . . ” ’(McKillip, Game 311).  Through her handling of these 
two figures, however, McKillip rejects Tolkien’s construction of the ethical transition, and 
advances an alternative vision.  
 
Mains characterises the High One as ‘a hidden, transcendent figure who imposes order 
from above’ (68); but despite his distance from his realm, the way in which various 
characters think and speak of him at the start of The Riddle-Master’s Game constructs the 
High One as benign, humane and essentially human.  Individuals can come ‘face to face’   126 
(McKillip, Game 257) with the High One, and can speak with him.  He has a ‘court’ 
(McKillip, Game 82), implying both physical presence and social and political interaction 
with others.  He appears to feel responsibility for and involvement with the people who 
inhabit his realm (McKillip, Game 15).  And he has, in the past, taken direct action to 
ensure the safety of the both the people and the landscape of his realm.   
 
However, as the narrative of The Riddle-Master of Hed progresses, the High One begins to 
appear not benign, but indifferent.  He is revealed to be derelict in his duty of protecting 
the realm.  The narrative emphasises his failure to act to prevent the shape-changers’ 
murder of Morgon’s parents, and Eriel’s two attempts on Morgon’s life. It reveals his 
failure to stop both the shape-changers’ attempts to disrupt the land-law of Ymris and An, 
and the gathering of an army of shape-changers on the Ymris coast.  It uncovers the High 
One’s failure to stop Ghisteslwchlohm’s destruction of the school of wizards at Lungold, 
his imprisonment of the surviving wizards and his erasure of all information about the Star-
Bearer from the realm’s common store of knowledge.  These failures reconstruct the High 
One as a dubious presence in the Secondary World.  When Deth brings Morgon to 
Erlenstar Mountain at the end of The Riddle-Master of Hed, the human, physical High One 
directing events in the Secondary World who Morgon meets there is an usurper, the power-
hungry wizard Ghisteslwchlohm (McKillip, Game 201).  The concept of a benign, humane 
organising power with the good of the Secondary World as its prime concern is 
reconstructed as a dangerous illusion.   
 
The High One is known still to exist, because the land-law of the various realms remains 
intact and functioning (McKillip, Game 310); however, in Heir of Sea and Fire and 
Harpist in the Wind, the High One’s presumed human characteristics are systematically 
stripped away.  In these volumes, the High One lacks location and physicality: he is   127 
‘ “ . . . nowhere in evidence except in the evidence of his existence . . . ” ’, as the riddler 
King Har of Osterland puts it (McKillip, Game 332).  With Deth’s involvement in 
Ghisteslwchlohm’s imposture revealed, the High One lacks even the ability to 
communicate.  His failure to aid Morgon during his year-long torture at Ghisteslwchlohm’s 
hands is taken to mean that he lacks both compassion and a sense of justice.  This 
repositions the High One as untrustworthy; eventually, even his presence in the Secondary 
World begins to be doubted (McKillip, Game 433). 
 
The High One’s apparent indifference to the events that threaten the integrity of the 
Secondary World and the lives of its inhabitants constructs him in the end as entirely 
unhuman.  Morgon says to the wizard Yrth, 
 
‘[The High One] hasn’t asked for help.  Does a mountain ask for help?  Or a river?  They 
simply exist . . . I don’t speak the language of stone.  To him, I simply exist.  He sees 
nothing but three stars rising out of countless centuries of darkness, during which 
powerless shapes called men touched the earth a little, hardly enough to disturb him.’ 
(McKillip, Game 524) 
 
With this speech, Morgon erases the possibility of a benign power as the source of the 
ethical transition from McKillip’s Secondary World; the rejection is made, as Morgon’s 
comment makes clear, because the behaviour of such an external power matches too 
closely the behaviour of the antagonists—compassionless manipulation of the world and 
its inhabitants to serve its own ends.   
 
At the beginning of The Riddle-Master of Hed, Deth is the exact opposite of the High One.  
Where the High One is the ultimate power within the Secondary World, Deth represents   128 
himself as almost entirely powerless.  As the High One’s servant, he cannot determine 
where he travels or why, and cannot act or speak in accordance with his own wishes or 
judgement.  He has, by his own admission, ‘ “ . . . no land-instinct and no gifts for 
wizardry . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 21), the two markers of power within McKillip’s 
Secondary World.  The High One is physically distant and impossible to visualise, but 
seems involved with the life of his realm.  Deth is physically close, and described in 
precise terms (McKillip, Game 15), but he is emotionally distant, so detached from the 
world through which he moves as to seem entirely imperturbable.  Deth is positioned, by 
his detachment, his age and his unknown origins, as somewhat inhuman: ‘ “I was born,” 
the harpist said tranquilly, “not long after the founding of Lungold, a thousand years ago 
. . . I gave up long ago trying to guess who my father was” ’ (McKillip, Game 21).  Despite 
the fact that he fills a role analogous to Gandalf’s in the narrative, Deth is the opposite of 
Gandalf.   
 
As the narrative of The Riddle-Master of Hed develops, however, Deth, like Ged in The 
Farthest Shore, becomes more accessible.  His journey with Morgon reveals him to be a 
person as well as a functionary, a serious musician who loves his craft, the Morgol’s lover 
and her land-heir Lyra’s friend, and a friend who cares about Morgon.  But where Ged’s 
self-revelation builds trust, Deth’s increasing accessibility allows Morgon to notice 
contradictions in Deth’s self-representation.  Speaking of Morgon’s three-starred harp, 
Deth tells Morgon, ‘ “I was there when Yrth made this harp.  I heard the first song it ever 
played. . .” ’ (McKillip, Game 74).  Later, however, the tree-king Danan Isig, who 
witnessed the making of the harp, states that Deth was not present when it was made: 
‘ “How could he have been?  Yrth made the harp about a hundred years before the 
founding of Lungold, and Lungold is where Deth was born” ’ (McKillip, Game 191).    129 
These contradictions begin to reconstruct the orchestrator under the command of a guiding 
power, into a figure as dubious as that power itself.   
 
Deth’s betrayal of Morgon at the close of The Riddle-Master of Hed rejects Tolkien’s 
construction of the orchestrator by breaking the link between Deth and the concept of the 
High One.  It casts the orchestrator as an inimical force, a self-interested figure who is 
unwilling to take on responsibility for his actions: ‘ “ . . . I needed a master, and no king 
deluded by [Ghisteslwchlohm’s] lies would suffice.  We suited one another.  He created an 
illusion; I upheld it” ’ (McKillip, Game 443-4).  But breaking the connection between Deth 
and the High One also strips Deth of his invulnerability.  After Morgon escapes from 
Erlenstar Mountain, Deth becomes an outcast, lacking home, friends, protector and even 
his trade: ‘ “I’ve played and lost to a Master; he’ll take his vengeance.  But I regret the loss 
of my harp” ’ (McKillip, Game 308). 
 
Once Tolkien’s model of benign external power and messenger-orchestrator is broken 
down, McKillip’s narrative builds up an alternative construction of the ethical transition 
through her treatment of Deth.  At the close of Heir of Sea and Fire, Deth averts Morgon’s 
attempt to kill him with an apparent non sequitur: ‘ “They were promised a man of 
peace” ’ (McKillip, Game 374).  The comment refers to the stone children of the Earth-
Masters, who give Morgon his three-starred sword in The Riddle-Master of Hed, and to 
Morgon’s heritage and identity as Prince of Hed.  By making the comment, Deth 
announces himself to be concerned with the events and problems of the High One’s realm, 
despite the fact that he is not a representative of an ordering power.  The incident forces the 
other characters to reassess Deth: Morgon says of him to Raederle, ‘ “I don’t know [who 
he is].  But I do know this: I want him named” ’ (McKillip, Game 375).  In the wake of this 
partial self-revelation, Deth’s formal position in the realm becomes increasingly   130 
unimportant, and his personality—assumed after the revelation of Ghisteslwchlohm’s 
imposture to be the deceit—is given more weight.  It becomes the most important fact 
about the character when he seemingly dies to protect two people he loves (Raederle and 
the Morgol) from Ghisteslwchlohm in Harpist in the Wind (McKillip, Game 450).  
 
After Ghisteshwchlohm (apparently) kills Deth, the harpist’s narrative functions are taken 
over by a new character, Yrth, the wizard known as the Harpist of Lungold.  Yrth appears 
to be a completely separate person from Deth.  He is physically different—‘a tall old man, 
with short grey hair and a battered, craggy face,’ who is blind, and who speaks the 
language of crows (McKillip, Game 483).  Yrth is both more powerful than Deth and more 
autonomous: he rescues Morgon and Raederle from thieves on Trader’s Road (McKillip, 
Game 473) and fights to defend the traders of Lungold when the shape-changers attack the 
city (McKillip, Game 488).  Furthermore, Yrth and Deth seem to have co-existed during 
the realm’s history; the wizard Nun comments to Morgon that ‘ “ . . . Yrth taught [the 
harpist] harp songs once . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 473).  However, it is not long before 
Raederle, hearing Yrth play the harp, recognises the possibility that Deth might have been 
Yrth in disguise (McKillip, Game 518). 
 
Raederle’s recognition that Yrth is Deth has several effects.  It reconfigures the 
orchestrator as a power in the Secondary World in his own right, isolated from any 
validating authority.  It reconstructs the orchestrator as a positive figure, by revealing 
Deth’s supposed lies to be truths (for example, if Deth was Yrth in disguise, he self-
evidently was present during the making of Morgon’s harp—as its maker).  Above all it 
positions the orchestrator as a potential magister ludi, the controlling figure at the centre of 
a godgame: 
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‘ . . . if he was a harpist named Deth who travelled with you, as Yrth did, down Trader’s 
Road, then he spun riddles so secretly, so skilfully, that he blinded even Ghisteslwchlohm 
. . . I think maybe you should name him.  Because he is playing his own silent, deadly 
game, and he may be the only one in this realm who knows exactly what he is doing.’ 
(McKillip, Game 519) 
 
The recognition that Yrth is Deth implies that there is a discoverable order underlying the 
apparent chaos overwhelming the Secondary World—an order shaped by this single 
individual, whose true nature is as yet unknown. 
 
The true nature of Yrth/Deth is the key to McKillip’s construction of the ethical transition. 
It is revealed in the last part of Harpist in the Wind.  When Morgon comes out of the 
wastelands to take up the riddle-game again, before he begins to learn the various land-
laws that make up the High One’s realm, Yrth asks him the question that allows McKillip’s 
final construction of the orchestrator and the ethical transition to cohere.  Immediately after 
Morgon identifies the High One with the indifferent landscape, Yrth says to him: ‘ “The 
Earth-Masters have taken all shapes.  What makes you so certain the High One has shaped 
himself to everything but the shape and language of men?” ’ (McKillip, Game 525).  This 
question erases the inhuman construction of the High One built up over the three books, 
and replaces it in Morgon’s mind with an image of the High One as ‘something pursued, 
vulnerable, in danger, whose silence was the single weapon he possessed’ (McKillip, 
Game 525)—an image, in fact, very like that of Deth in Heir of Sea and Fire and Harpist 
in the Wind.  The ideas of the separate external power and orchestrator are thus collapsed 
into one figure and combined with the overtones of the magister ludi surrounding Yrth.  In 
the wake of this recognition, the multiple images surrounding the orchestrator figure—
High One, Earth-Master, Yrth, Deth and falcon—finally resolve, literally, into one:   132 
 
The High One stood before [Morgon].  He had the wizard’s scarred hands, and the harpist’s 
fine, worn face.  But his eyes were neither the harpist’s nor the wizard’s.  They were the 
falcon’s eyes, fierce, vulnerable, frighteningly powerful. 
(McKillip, Game 588) 
 
This recognition reconstructs the High One as, not a force, but an individual—the person 
first revealed to Morgon and the reader in The Riddle-Master of Hed.  Once he is 
recognised as a person rather than a concept, the High One is able to speak for himself, for 
the first time in the narrative.  In doing so, he reveals his actions as solely the product of 
his own conscience, prompted by witnessing the consequences of his own transcendent 
actions and those of others. 
 
‘We did not realize, until it was too late, that the power inherent in every stone, every 
movement of water, holds both existence and destruction . . . I was the first to see the 
implications of power. . .that paradox that tempers wizardry and compelled the study of 
riddlery.  So, I made a choice, and began binding all earth-shapes to me by their own laws, 
permitting nothing to disturb that law. . . . ’   
(McKillip, Game 593: my emphasis) 
 
Through the narrative of The Riddle-Master’s Game, McKillip returns to the position 
rejected by Tolkien with Gandalf’s death in Moria.  She constructs the ethical transition as 
an informed human response to the effect of the transcendent impulse on the Secondary 
World, generated from within the world by the limited resources available there.  Despite 
his power, the High One is limited; his orchestration of events is vulnerable in ways that 
Gandalf and Ged, and their actions, are not.  The High One makes mistakes: he is unable to 
stop Morgon from abandoning the riddle-game in favour of revenge until it is nearly too   133 
late; he fails to realise the significance of Raederle’s heritage or the importance of her 
contribution to the eucatastrophe; he is unable to control the critically important moment of 
his own death, a failure that jeopardises the safety of the entire Secondary World.  Unlike 
Ged’s mistakes, however, the High One’s do not create a threat to the Secondary World.  
Unlike Gandalf’s early mistakes in The Lord of the Rings, the High One’s mistakes do not, 
in the end, call his actions into question or imply that they are inadequate; they do not 
invalidate the individual’s capacity to create and implement an informed response to the 
transcendent presence in the world.  Rather, once the High One’s full motivation is 
revealed, it retrospectively validates even his failed efforts.   If the transcendent impulse is 
a deliberate choice, the only possible way to contain its effects is by making another 
choice, in the full understanding of the problems created by the first, damaging one.   
 
It can be clearly seen that as the construction of the Secondary World changes from The 
Lord of the Rings to the Earthsea cycle to The Riddle-Master’s Game, and the construction 
of the ethical transition changes, so the degree of responsibility for that ethical transition 
which is attached to characters within the Secondary World changes also.  In the 
cosmically-ordered landscape of The Lord of the Rings, whereas responsibility for damage 
to the world rests firmly with those characters who attempt to control their situations, the 
responsibility for generating a response to the problem the antagonists cause lies outside 
the damaged landscape.  It is the province of the power or entity that invests the landscape 
with order in the first place.  In the inherently-ordered landscape of the Earthsea cycle, no 
such power exists to offer a solution to the problem of the transcendent presence.  
However, the Equilibrium itself offers a model from which characters can learn.  In 
Earthsea, Le Guin’s characters bear a degree of responsibility for solving the problem: they 
must recognise and adopt the solution modelled by the Secondary World.  In the 
artificially-sustained environment of The Riddle-Master’s Game, however, there is neither   134 
ordering power nor model to assist the characters in responding to the damage caused by 
Eriel’s transcendent striving.  As responsibility for damage to the world lies with 
characters within that world, so does the responsibility for generating an effective response 
to it—for making another choice. 
 
The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game all argue that 
what is needed to protect the Secondary World from the damaging effects of the 
antagonist’s transcendent action is a cultural shift: the tragedic outlook of the past must be 
replaced by an integrative, comedic perspective that enables characters to act effectively in 
the world without harming it.  This modal shift is modelled by the orchestrator character, 
who uses tragedic methods but applies them to comedic ends.  However, each fantasy 
presents a different construction of the ethical transition that the orchestrators promote.  
Their different interpretations of it are predicated on their constructions of the Secondary 
World and the transcendent impulse.  As the Secondary World changes from open to 
closed system, and the transcendent impulse from a need for control to an irresponsible 
choice, the ethical transition changes also, from an externally-determined right end, to a 
physical imperative that must be accepted, to a decision of conscience by an individual.  
And as the construction of the Secondary World changes, responsibility for all aspects of 
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5  ‘IT MUST BE SO, WHEN THINGS ARE IN DANGER’: HEROIC 
ACTION AND COSMIC ORDER IN THE LORD OF THE RINGS 
In The Lord of the Rings, the Secondary World of Middle-earth is invested with order from 
without, by a beneficent force or entity.  Within the parameters of Middle-earth everything, 
even the aftermath of transcendent action, can be incorporated into that order, and used to 
promote the world’s integrity. This does not, however, negate the need for action against 
Sauron’s transcendent presence and the effect his acts have on the landscape.  It is 
established early in the narrative that if no action is taken against Sauron, the system will 
be overwhelmed and will fail: 
 
‘ . . . to send the Ring to [Tom Bombadil] would only postpone the day of evil . . . soon or 
late the Lord of the Rings would learn of its hiding place and would bend all his power 
towards it. Could that power be defied by Bombadil alone?  I think not.  I think that in the 




The existence of the benevolent external presence that orders events in Middle-earth does 
not relieve the characters of the obligation to act to preserve the Secondary World.  Rather, 
characters must act to the limits of their ability, and contribute to the preservation of that 
order, in order for the system to work at all (Kocher 54). 
 
In this chapter, I will examine the actions undertaken by three key characters in The Lord 
of the Rings: Boromir, Aragorn and Frodo.  I will discuss the nature of the action each 
character undertakes, the specific narrative paradigm Tolkien uses to construct their 
narratives and the contribution each character makes to the ethical transition.  I will then   136 
discuss the theory of how to implement ethical transition in the Secondary World that 
Tolkien articulates through the focal narrative as a whole.  Finally, I will consider where 
Tolkien’s narrative locates responsibility for implementing the solution to the problem of 
transcendent behaviour, and for saving the world. 
 
The focal narrative of The Lord of the Rings, the final movement of the world-story of 
Middle-earth, can be regarded as Tolkien’s construction of a response to the transcendent 
ethic and its effect on the Secondary World.  As I argue in Chapter Four, Tolkien 
constructs the ethical transition as the deliberate restoration of the right order determined 
for the Secondary World by the benign external power.  The narrative of The Lord of the 
Rings is informed by this idea: in it, Tolkien argues that the ethical transition can be 
achieved by a combination of two forms of action, one of which responds to transcendent 
behaviour in the world, and the other to the transcendent impulse that produces it. 
 
The focal narrative of The Lord of the Rings as a whole reflects the traditional comedic 
movement of a group of protagonists from isolation to integration with and regeneration of 
their social context.  However, its component narratives follow a different narrative 
paradigm.  Tolkien drew on many sources to create both the Secondary World of Middle-
earth and the narrative of The Lord of the Rings; the sources he relied on most heavily were 
the Anglo-Saxon and Norse epics (St Clair 63) and medieval romances (Chance, Power 
16) that were his area of professional expertise.  These sources supplied elements from 
creatures such as dragons and dwarfs, to cultures and customs, names and character types 
(St Clair 64-5).  They supplied the idea of the long defeat, the motif of lady and knight 
(Brewer 251) and the theme of the individual’s relationship to authority (Jackson 3).  They 
also supplied the crucial narrative device that Tolkien uses to construct his argument of 
how the ethical transition can be effected: the narrative paradigm of the hero.   137 
 
In The Hero and the King: An Epic Theme, W.T.H. Jackson isolates a central element of 
the epic form: the scenario of the king and the hero, of authority and its active 
representative in the world, and the ambiguous, often antagonistic relationship between 
them (134).  The scenario of the king and the hero also appears in chanson de geste and 
romance, although in these genres the tensions between hero and king may be muted or 
transformed (Jackson viii).  And it appears in The Lord of the Rings.  There are three 
heroic scenarios of the epic/romance type contained within the landscape of Middle-earth, 
and it is through these scenarios that Tolkien sets out his argument for how to achieve 
ethical transition in the Secondary World. 
 
In epic, chanson de geste and romance, the opposite of evil is not good so much as 
heroism.  The active opposition of evil in these genres is the prerogative of the hero.  And 
in these genres, the hero is not simply the protagonist of a narrative, but a character who 
performs a particular role within that narrative—so that an epic or a romance may include 
many heroes even if it has only one protagonist.  In his essay ‘The Game and Play of 
Hero’, John Leyerle suggests that a character in epic or romance can be considered to 
perform the paradigm of the hero if his narrative displays certain markers.  According to 
Leyerle, any male character (71) who is relatively detached from his social context (Miller 
163), but who nevertheless stands in some degree of formal relationship to ‘a relatively 
passive figure of authority, often a king, who tends to be aloof from the action or even 
ineffective in controlling it’ (Leyerle 69), has the potential to take on the role of hero if 
disorder or evil intrudes on the king’s space.  Such a character becomes a hero in the 
paradigmatic sense when he ‘makes a formal commitment to accomplish a notable feat,’ 
often in response to a challenge issued by a force of evil or disorder, ‘and thereby takes 
upon himself the playing of a role’ (Leyerle 69).  The character’s objective in taking on the   138 
role of hero is, in epic, to secure or increase his personal fame (Jackson 12), and, in 
romance, to increase both his own fame and that of the king as whose proxy he acts.   
 
Once a character has taken on the role of hero, he travels outward from the stable point of 
civilisation represented by the king, into a more or less fluid landscape (Miller 133) in 
which he finds and physically opposes evil (the hero’s confrontation with this force of evil 
or disorder is usually stylised into a single combat: Leyerle 70).  However, the hero’s 
success at, and survival of, his chosen feat is not determined by his ability, the ‘courage . . . 
sense of purpose, and strength’ (Leyerle 70) he displays in the pursuit of his goal, or even 
his personal morality.  It is determined by luck, accident (whether positive or negative), 
and the character’s own degree of investment in the role he plays (Leyerle 70). 
 
Across epic, chanson de geste and romance, there are two standard conclusions to the hero 
paradigm (Leyerle 71).  In epic and chanson de geste, the stakes attached to a hero’s 
successful completion of the heroic role tend to be high—for example, the defence of a 
nation or a faith.  The hero’s potential reward of fame is correspondingly great.  In this 
scenario, the character who takes on the hero role tends to be heavily invested in playing 
the part of hero and in achieving fame for doing so (Leyerle 71).  Such a character under 
all circumstances ‘holds to his commitment and keeps to what he regards as his high 
destiny—forgetting that he usually has chosen the role himself . . . [—and as a 
consequence] is destroyed’ (Leyerle 71).  While the epic hero’s actions usually achieve 
their goal in the short term, his accidental self-destruction also has widespread negative 
consequences for the society he serves.  It can involve, or cause, ‘the destruction of his 
followers, or even of his society’ (Leyerle 71).  While this ending is characteristic of epic, 
and common in chanson de geste, it does not often occur in romance. 
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In romance the stakes attached to the successful completion of an heroic feat tend to be 
comparatively low—for example, the upholding of a king’s reputation.  The potential 
reward is also smaller.  In romance, the character who takes on the role of hero tends to 
show less investment in maintaining the heroic façade.  He is able to ‘[accept] limitations, 
even a partial failure in his performance’, and thus he ‘calls off the quest or hunt and 
abandons his role’ (Leyerle 71) in order to both succeed at his task, and survive it as the 
epic hero does not.  Having done this, the romance hero is able to return to the passive 
authority figure on whose behalf he acts, and reintegrate himself with the social context his 
actions have protected: ‘he goes home, marries, does penance, learns humility . . . lives on 
and tends to regenerate his society’ (Leyerle 71).   
 
The narrative paradigm of the hero appears to privilege a particular form of response to a 
problem—that is, public, physical action that either destroys or neutralises that problem.  
However, as Leyerle points out, in narratives of heroism ‘The aesthetics of conduct, how 
the hero acts, are almost as important as what he does’ (71).  The hero paradigm focusses 
attention on the spirit or state of mind in which the hero undertakes action.  Given that 
Tolkien constructs the transcendent impulse as the individual’s attempt to assert control 
over his or her situation in despite of the cosmic order the Secondary World manifests, the 
hero paradigm is particularly well-adapted to constructing a response to the transcendent 
presence in Middle-earth. 
 
In Middle-earth, the active opposition of the tragedic ethic is the responsibility of the hero 
figure.  There are three heroic scenarios in The Lord of the Rings: the scenarios of Gondor, 
the Western Lands and Middle-earth.  The first to clearly emerge as such is the Gondor 
scenario.  Denethor, the Steward of Gondor, is a roi fainéant, or inactive king, of a type 
common to epic (Jackson 111).  As Christine Scull points out, Denethor ‘equates himself   140 
with Minas Tirith’ (155) and his outlook is limited to Gondor alone.  In explicit contrast to 
both Aragorn and Théoden, Denethor is physically immobile, held in place at Minas Tirith 
not just by his role as the city’s protector, but by his interpretation of that role: 
 
‘ . . . [The Dark Lord] will not come save only to triumph over me when all is won.  He 
uses others as his weapons.  So do all great lords, if they are wise, Master Halfling.  Or 
why should I sit here in my tower and think, and watch, and wait, spending even my sons?  
For I can still wield a brand.’ 
 (Tolkien, III:80) 
 
As the narrative progresses, Denethor also becomes mentally immobilised, by 
foreknowledge and despair.   
 
Denethor has failed in his duty to keep his realm peaceful and prosperous.  Minas Tirith is 
‘falling year by year into decay; and already it [lacks] half the men that could have dwelt at 
ease there’ (Tolkien, III:20).  During his term as Steward, the culture of Minas Tirith has 
become unbalanced, oriented toward conflict: the guardsman Beregond comments that ‘in 
these days men are slow to believe that a captain can be wise and learned in the scrolls of 
lore and song . . . and yet be a man of hardihood and swift judgement in the field’ (Tolkien, 
III:33).  This appears to have come about not only because Minas Tirith is under threat 
from Mordor, but because Denethor perceives governance as a conflict with the rest of the 
world, rather than as a process of accommodating differences, building alliances and 
resisting genuine evils (Ellison 28).  
 
Denethor’s two sons, Boromir and Faramir, both have the potential to take on the role of 
hero.  Each stands in a responsible relationship to Denethor, the ineffective authority figure   141 
at the centre of the scenario.  Boromir is part of the military hierarchy of Minas Tirith, the 
High Warden of the White Tower and the Captain-General of the Gondorian army 
(Tolkien, II:234); Faramir is a Captain in that army.  Each brother also holds a somewhat 
tenuous position in the society he serves.  Boromir is his father’s favourite son (Tolkien, 
III:26), but is not like the rest of his family.  Whereas Denethor and Faramir are, in 
different ways, scholars and leaders, Boromir is a soldier—moreover, one his fellow 
soldier and subordinate Beregond describes ambiguously as ‘reckless and eager’ in combat 
(Tolkien, III:83)—and unlike them, he does not entirely accept his family’s status as 
Stewards of Gondor (Tolkien, II:245).  Boromir also has an eye to his own reputation: 
Faramir describes him as ‘ “ . . . proud and fearless, often rash, ever anxious for the victory 
of Minas Tirith (and his own glory therein) . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, II:247).  Faramir is viewed 
favourably by the soldiers he commands, but is set apart from his father more than Boromir 
is because Denethor distrusts his motives: 
 
‘ . . . Your bearing is lowly in my presence, yet it is long now since you turned from your 
own way at my counsel.  See, you have spoken skilfully, as ever; but I, have I not seen 
your eye fixed on Mithrandir, seeking whether you said well or too much?  He has long 
had your heart in his keeping.’ 
(Tolkien, III:75) 
 
Jackson suggests that in epic ‘The conflict between ruler and hero is often as much a 
conflict of values as of personality’ (4).  Although they express them differently, Boromir 
and his father share the same values, privileging Minas Tirith and their own achievement 
above everything; but although Faramir has the same capacity for perception and strength 
of will as his father (Tolkien, III:26), he has adopted the different, integrative values 
modelled by Gandalf.  This is the cause of his estrangement from Denethor.   142 
 
Of the two potential heroes in the Gondor scenario, it is Boromir who takes on the role, 
when he makes a formal commitment to accomplish a necessary heroic task for Minas 
Tirith—that is, to undertake the journey to Rivendell to learn the answer to the riddle of 
Faramir’s dream (Tolkien, I:236).   
 
The second heroic scenario of The Lord of the Rings is greater in scope but less traditional 
in realisation than the Gondor scenario. This is the scenario of the Western Lands.  There is 
no literal king or authority figure at the centre of this scenario.  However, there is an ideal 
of authority: the Kings of Old, Elendil and Isildur and their descendants, function as ‘the 
silent wardens of a long-vanished kingdom’ (Tolkien, I:371-2), as memories or ideals of 
authority that hold a place open for it in the present.  The Kings of Old represent a time in 
the past when authority was present and effective in keeping the land whole and safe— 
hobbits indicate that people are uncivilised or untrustworthy, or just plain strange, by 
saying that they have never heard of the King (Tolkien, I:20).  The influence of the Kings 
of Old endures through its effect on current laws and customs (Tolkien, I:20).  But as 
historical figures, they cannot directly influence the scenario they are central to.  
Furthermore, the Kings of Old are compromised ideals; the narrative reveals that they 
repeatedly failed in their role as protectors.  Isildur succumbed to the influence of the Ring 
(Tolkien, I:243); the last King, Eärnur of Gondor, answered the Witch-King’s challenge 
and vanished, leaving Gondor to be ruled by the Stewards (Tolkien, III:297).  In the 
absence of the Kings, the Western Lands have become fragmented, isolated and 
endangered. 
 
Nevertheless, these absent authorities do possess an active representative in the world.  
Aragorn is the descendent of Elendil and Isildur, and the hereditary King of the Western   143 
Lands; as such, his job is to protect the remnants of the North-kingdom from danger.  Like 
Boromir, Aragorn fulfils Leyerle’s prerequisites for herohood.  As a Ranger, he holds a 
rather awkward position somewhat outside of, and scorned by, the society he protects: 
 
‘ . . . Travellers scowl at us, and countrymen give us scornful names.  “Strider” I am to one 
fat man who lives within a day’s march of foes that would freeze his heart, or lay his little 
town in ruin, if he were not guarded ceaselessly.  Yet we would not have it otherwise.  If 
simple folk are free from care and fear, simple they will be, and we [the Dúnedain] must be 
secret to keep them so. . . . ’ 
(Tolkien, I:239) 
 
Aragorn’s connection to the Kings whose job he does in the world is tenuous.  He knows 
his own identity as the heir of the Kings of Old, as do the Dúnedain and the Wise; and he is 
the leader of the Dúnedain, the last remnants of the Numenoréan rulers of Arnor (Kocher 
132).  However, neither Aragorn’s true identity nor his work as the Kings’ proxy in the 
present day is acknowledged by the society he protects.  There is also something of a 
difference between Aragorn and the Kings of Old in that, while Aragorn values the same 
things as they, he is aware of the mistakes they made and is determined not to repeat them 
(Kocher 139).  Aragorn assumes the hero role on behalf of the Kings of Old when, during 
the Council of Elrond, he reveals to Boromir his identity as their descendent, and takes on 
the task of halting Sauron’s advance across Gondor: ‘ “ . . . the world is changing once 
again.  A new hour comes.  Isildur’s Bane is found.  Battle is at hand.  The Sword shall be 
reforged.  I will come to Minas Tirith” ’ (Tolkien, I:239).   
 
The third heroic scenario in The Lord of the Rings is both the largest, and the least 
traditional in its realisation.  This is the Middle-earth scenario, which encompasses   144 
Gondor, the Western Lands, and the rest of Middle-earth, including Mordor.  It centres on 
the narrative’s voice of authority—the primary orchestrator Gandalf, the representative in 
Middle-earth of the external power that orders the outcome of events in the Secondary 
World.  Gandalf, like the secondary orchestrators Elrond and Galadriel, is positioned as an 
authority figure who gives other characters direction, assistance and information.  It is he 
who organises the defence of Middle-earth against Sauron and takes charge of the muster 
of Rohan and defence of Gondor.  Along with Elrond and Galadriel, Gandalf preserves the 
landscape of Middle-earth by virtue of the Elven-ring he protects.  However, as an 
orchestrator, he is predominantly a passive figure: like Elrond and Galadriel, he advises 
characters and shapes events, but does not participate fully in the narrative.  Despite his 
mobility, and his involvement with events, Gandalf is confined by the limits of his human 
body, the choices of other people, and his inability to directly confront Sauron.  
Additionally, Gandalf is to all intents and purposes dead to Frodo from after his fall in 
Moria until Frodo’s return from Orodruin.  As a memory, Gandalf becomes in Frodo’s 
strand of the focal narrative the ultimate passive authority figure.   
 
However, like Denethor and the Kings of Old, Gandalf has an active representative in 
Middle-earth: Frodo.  Like Boromir and Aragorn, Frodo answers the prerequisites for 
herohood.  He holds an ambiguous position in his society: within the Shire, he is 
considered to be more than a little strange (Tolkien, I:49-50), and outside of it he is set 
apart simply by being a hobbit, a member of a species and a culture that most of the other 
inhabitants of Middle-earth do not even know exists.  Frodo’s relationship to Gandalf is the 
very informal one of friendship.  And no conflict of values exists between Frodo and 
Gandalf at all: Gandalf wants to protect Middle-earth, or as much of it as possible, and 
Frodo wants to save first the Shire, and then the rest of Middle-earth also.  Frodo takes on 
the role of hero on Gandalf’s behalf—first informally, when he makes a reluctant   145 
commitment to carry the Ring to Rivendell for Gandalf, and then formally, when he offers 
to take the Ring to Orodruin and destroy it (Tolkien, I:259).   
 
Tolkien uses these three heroic scenarios to test how effectively the traditional patterns of 
public action against disorder contribute to ethical transition.  The three heroic scenarios do 
not carry equal weight within the narrative.  The Gondor scenario, the most traditional of 
the three in terms of its similarity to Tolkien’s source materials, is also the most limited in 
terms of how much of Middle-earth it encompasses, and what it seeks to achieve.  It 
encompasses the well-being of Gondor, and nothing else.  It is the last of the three to enter 
the narrative—Boromir’s story is enclosed within both Aragorn’s and Frodo’s—and the 
first to be concluded.  Of the three king figures, Denethor holds the least authority.  As 
Steward for a vanished King, he is a substitute for authority rather than the thing itself.  
The Western Lands scenario encompasses the Gondor scenario, incorporating Gondor into 
the Western Lands as part of a wider responsibility; it is the second of the three to enter the 
narrative, as Aragorn is the second hero figure to appear.  The Kings of Old are greater 
authority figures than Denethor not just because they are Kings, but because of their 
Númenorean origins and their status as legends.  But the Middle-earth scenario 
encompasses the Western Lands scenario as the Western Lands scenario does Gondor.  It 
incorporates the Western Lands scenario and its predominantly human concerns into 
Gandalf’s wider responsibility for the entire landscape.  This is the first of the three heroic 
scenarios to enter the narrative, as Frodo and Gandalf are the first hero and authority 
figures to be introduced.  And Gandalf, as the direct representative of the power that orders 
events in the Secondary World, is the highest authority figure in Middle-earth.  As the 
heroic scenarios stand in a hierarchy of importance, so the performances of the hero role 
linked to them stand in a hierarchy of effectiveness and importance in terms of their 
contribution to the ethical transition.     146 
 
Although the Gondor scenario is the least of the three, and the last to be introduced, the 
first heroic journey Tolkien examines in The Lord of the Rings is Boromir’s.  Boromir’s 
heroic journey, as such, is not shown: Boromir enters the narrative not at the beginning of 
his journey, but at its end, Rivendell.  However, during the Council of Elrond Boromir tells 
the story of his journey from Minas Tirith to Rivendell, and his narration of his own 
performance of the hero role reveals two things.  The first is that the medieval Gondor 
scenario (Curry, Middle-earth 17) seems to require a romance hero to represent it 
(answering a riddle, accepting aid and becoming part of a group are heroic tasks more 
characteristic of the self-conscious literary game of romance than of the semi-oral epic 
genre).  The second is that Boromir displays both a marked degree of investment in his 
own admirable performance of the role of hero, and a desire for fame as a result of his 
actions.  These are characteristics of the epic hero.   
 
It is possible to argue that that the role of hero for Minas Tirith in fact belongs to Faramir, 
as Faramir is the primary recipient of the riddle dream and the dream is the sole certain 
instance of the external ordering power intervening directly in events in Middle-earth 
(Shippey, Road 137).  Boromir usurps the role of hero from Faramir because he believes 
he can do it better: 
 
‘ . . . on the eve of the sudden assault [on Osgiliath] a dream came to my brother in a 
troubled sleep; and afterwards a like dream came oft to him again, and once to me … my 
brother, seeing how desperate was our need, was eager to heed the dream and seek for 
Imladris; but since the way was full of doubt and danger, I took the journey upon 
myself. . . . ’ 
(Tolkien, I:236-7)   147 
 
This interpretation of Boromir’s behaviour is reinforced retrospectively when Faramir 
discusses the incident with Frodo.  Faramir states that ‘ “ . . . I should have been chosen by 
my father and the elders, but [Boromir] put himself forward . . . and would not be 
stayed . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, II:247).  This suggests that Boromir values performing the role of 
hero as much as he does gaining the object of his journey—the answer to the riddle that 
might save Minas Tirith.   
 
By taking on the role of hero for Minas Tirith, Boromir takes on a public responsibility.  
However, even at his first appearance in The Lord of the Rings it is clear that Boromir’s 
sense of responsibility to his society is accompanied by a strong private investment in his 
performance of the role of hero.  When Boromir speaks to the Council of Elrond on behalf 
of Minas Tirith, he emphasises his own exemplary performance under difficult physical 
conditions: ‘ “ . . . In this evil hour I have come on an errand over many dangerous leagues 
to Elrond: a hundred and ten days I have journeyed all alone. . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, I:236).  He 
also complains about the lack of recognition that Minas Tirith has had for its work in 
holding back Sauron’s advance.  This emphasis on his own physical ability and his 
society’s later develops into a persistent endorsement of the use of the Ring in a direct, 
military response to Sauron, which ignores Gandalf and Elrond’s repeated warnings about 
the dangers of doing so: 
 
‘ . . . Why do you speak ever of hiding and destroying?  Why should we not think that the 
Great Ring has come into our hands to serve us in the very hour of our need?  Wielding it 
the Free Lords of the Free may surely defeat the Enemy . . . Valour needs first strength, and  
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then a weapon.  Let the Ring be your weapon, if it has such power as you say.  Take it and 
go forth to victory!’ 
(Tolkien, I:256) 
 
Both of these characteristics suggest that Boromir not only believes in, but takes pride in, 
his own capacity to overcome the constraints imposed by his Secondary World, and 
achieve great things—and his society’s capacity to do so.  Because of this belief, Boromir 
interprets the caution of the Elves and Gandalf regarding the Ring as an insult (Tolkien, 
I:377).  All of these traits associate Boromir with the type of the epic hero. 
 
Boromir achieves the goal of his heroic journey at the Council of Elrond: he learns the 
answer to the dream-riddle, which is that Sauron’s Ring has been found, the ‘Sword that 
was broken’ is to be reforged and ‘the House of Elendil [shall] return to the Land of 
Gondor’ (Tolkien, I:237).  In fact, Boromir achieves more than he set out to.  In addition to 
gaining knowledge, he gains Aragorn’s aid for Minas Tirith.  The focal narrative then 
follows Boromir’s return, with the Fellowship, toward Minas Tirith.  But at this point 
Boromir displays the third and most conclusive marker of the epic hero.  He proves unable 
to accept an unheroic resolution to his hero act.   
 
After leaving Rivendell, despite the fact that his heroic goal has been accomplished, 
Boromir insists on maintaining his heroic persona.  His behaviour is marked by pride 
(Ellison 28) and a concern with maintaining his own self-image.  When the Fellowship 
leaves Rivendell, Boromir insists on blowing a blast on his war-horn despite the need for 
secrecy.  When Elrond rebukes him for it, he replies, ‘ “ . . . always I have let my horn cry 
at setting forth, and though thereafter we may walk in the shadows, I will not go forth as a 
thief in the night” ’ (Tolkien, I:267).  As Shippey points out, this is a show of bravado in   149 
the face of danger in line with the theory of courage expressed in the Norse epics and sagas 
(Road 194).  It is a positive aspect of Boromir’s character, but it is also a manifestation of 
his pride.   
 
Boromir’s pride manifests itself in another way also: his rejection of the informed decision 
of the Wise to oppose Sauron with stealth rather than strength.  Boromir repeatedly puts 
forward his own preferred course of action, the use of force and the Ring to defeat 
Sauron’s armies and save Minas Tirith (Tolkien, I:350).  This course of action would not 
only save Minas Tirith, but also—as his self-talk at Amon Hen reveals—elevate Boromir 
to the status of hero in the eyes of the city (Tolkien, I:377).  While Boromir never loses 
sight of his public responsibility, his concern with his own performance of the hero role 
eventually overwhelms it. 
 
This is the point at which Boromir attempts to achieve the perfect resolution to his hero 
role, by taking the Ring from Frodo by force.  His act separates the members of the 
Fellowship at a crucial moment, and leads to its fragmentation.  Boromir is killed; Frodo 
and Sam travel alone toward Mordor; Merry and Pippin are abducted by Saruman’s Orcs; 
Aragorn, Legolas and Gimli abandon Minas Tirith for an attempt to save the missing 
hobbits.  Boromir thus meets the epic hero’s end—a qualified achievement of his goal, 
followed by an isolated death that has negative consequences for those who depend on 
him, but leaves him with a degree of posthumous fame for those things he did achieve 
(Chance, Power 96).   
 
Shippey points out in J. R. R. Tolkien: Author of the Century that the narrative of The Lord 
of the Rings places a strong emphasis on the virtues of the epic form, in particular the Old 
Norse ‘theory of courage’ that is a feature of the Norse sagas and epics (149).  Tolkien   150 
described this in his essay ‘Beowulf: the Monster and the Critics’ as the maintenance of 
‘unyielding will’ in the face of certain defeat (21), and the dissociation of the idea of ‘right 
action’ from the consequences of ‘victory and reward’ (Shippey, Author 150).  The 
narrative of The Lord of the Rings reflects this theory of courage in that it is a narrative of 
inevitable failure.  Even if Sauron is defeated, many of the aspects of Middle-earth’s 
landscape that the protagonists value the most will fade from it, as a direct consequence of 
the eucatastrophe. 
 
The destruction of the Ring, says Galadriel, will mean that her ring and Gandalf’s and 
Elrond’s will all lose their power, so that Lothlórien ‘fades’ and the elves ‘dwindle’.  Along 
with them will go the ents [sic] and the dwarves, indeed the whole of Middle-earth, to be 
replaced by modernity and the rule of men; all the characters and their story will shrink to 
misunderstood words in poems here and there . . .  
(Shippey, Author 148-9) 
 
Tolkien’s characters accept the inevitability of failure, and act anyway (Mathews 902).   
 
Characters who display this epic courage are viewed positively in The Lord of the Rings, 
despite the limited effectiveness of their actions.  Théoden’s charge on the Pelennor Fields 
and Éowyn’s defeat of the Nazgûl are both positive moments, although they contribute 
comparatively little to the achievement of eucatastrophe (Elgin 49).  Boromir’s futile 
defence of Merry and Pippin is also viewed positively.  However, as Clark states, the tone 
of The Lord of the Rings is strongly elegiac (19), and one of the things it laments is the 
fading of the epic worldview from the Secondary World.  However attractive the Norse 
theory of courage may be, Tolkien argues that it must be allowed to fade from Middle-  151 
earth—in its original form at least—because it cannot contribute to the needed change in 
dominant ethics (Elgin 48). 
 
This is what Boromir’s hero journey reveals.  The narrative highlights several instances of 
unusual behaviour from Boromir leading up to his assault on Frodo.  It implies, through a 
slight evocation of Gollum’s and Bilbo’s mannerisms in these moments, that this 
behaviour is the result of the Ring’s influence: 
 
Boromir sat muttering to himself, sometimes biting his nails, as if some restlessness or 
doubt consumed him, sometimes seizing a paddle and driving the boat close behind 
Aragorn’s.  Then Pippin, who sat in the bow looking back, caught a queer gleam in his eye 
as he peered forward, gazing at Frodo. 
(Tolkien, I:362) 
 
Thus the narrative also constructs Boromir’s final attempt to seize the Ring as a product of 
the Ring’s influence.  The implication is confirmed by Boromir’s reaction after he is left 
outside the Ring’s field of influence: he both rejects his own actions (‘ “What have I said? 
. . . What have I done?  Frodo, Frodo! . . . Come back!  A madness took me, but it has 
passed.  Come back!” ’ Tolkien, I:378), and reasserts his initial, positive persona in his 
defence of Merry and Pippin immediately afterwards.  However, as Tom Shippey points 
out, Boromir’s response to the Ring is an unusual one.  Although the Ring is characterised 
by the Wise as an equal danger to all, many characters, including Gimli and Legolas, 
Merry and Pippin, Sam, Faramir and Celeborn, do not react to its presence at all.  Only a 
few, highly significant characters respond to the Ring—Frodo and Gollum, Gandalf, 
Elrond and Galadriel, Saruman, and Boromir (Shippey, Road 126).   
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As discussed in Chapter Three, Gandalf, Elrond and Galadriel, as orchestrators, act 
predominantly in the tragedic mode, along with Sauron.  Because they already act in the 
way the Ring needs its bearers to act, they are predisposed to be vulnerable to its influence.  
Leyerle suggests that epic heroism, with its commitment to the transcendence of limitation 
and the perfect performance of a role, and its focus on the self, falls within the tragedic 
mode (71).  As an epic hero, despite his positive characteristics of courage and 
determination, Boromir acts squarely within the same mode as Sauron and the Ring do.  It 
is the very virtues that define the epic hero that make Boromir vulnerable to the Ring 
where Aragorn, Legolas, Gimli, Merry, Pippin, Sam and above all Faramir are not (Ellison 
28).   When the Ring enhances those characteristics to the point where they dominate his 
character, they threaten the success of the quest—thus the salvation of the Secondary 
World. 
 
The point is reinforced in The Two Towers with the appearance of Faramir, the primary 
recipient of the riddle-dream, and the character to whom the role of hero for Minas Tirith 
properly belongs.  Faramir and Boromir have exactly the same motivation—they want to 
save Minas Tirith and Gondor from Sauron’s advancing forces (Tolkien, II:247).  
However, in most other things Faramir is Boromir’s opposite.  Boromir enjoys warfare for 
its own sake; Faramir treats it as an unpleasant necessity (Kocher 126).  Where Boromir 
appears alone, Faramir appears as part of a group—when he meets Frodo, Sam and Gollum 
in Ithilien, he is the leader of a company of Gondorian soldiers, and later in the narrative 
takes his place as part of the ruling elite of Minas Tirith.  Boromir rejects the insights of 
the Wise; Faramir values both Gandalf’s perspective, and knowledge in general, not just 
for its utility but for its own sake (Kocher 125).  And Faramir recognises the fact of 
limitation and the possibility of failure, as his discussion of tactics with Denethor and 
Prince Imrahil shows (Tolkien, III:78).  Despite the fact that he shares his brother’s   153 
motivation, Faramir is Boromir’s modal opposite; he models the qualities of community, 
limitation and survival that are characteristic of the integrative ethic.  And it is precisely 
because of his recognition of limitations that Faramir is not vulnerable to the desire for, or 
influence of, the Ring.  This is shown when he says to Frodo, 
 
‘ . . . Not if I found it on the highway would I take it I said.  Even if I were such a man as 
to desire this thing, and even though I knew not clearly what this thing was when I 
spoke, still I should take those words as a vow, and be held by them. 
 
‘But I am not such a man.  Or I am wise enough to know that there are some perils from 
which a man must flee. . . . ’ 
(Tolkien, II:256: original emphasis) 
 
Thus it is not simply a matter of Boromir being the ‘evil’ brother and Faramir the ‘good’, 
as Jane Chance characterises them (Art 46).  Faramir’s encounter with Frodo in The Two 
Towers makes it clear that it is the mode in which Boromir acts—the transcendent ethic of 
the epic hero—that makes him vulnerable to the Ring.  Through Boromir’s fall to the 
influence of the Ring and his consequent early death—and the fact that his abandoned 
heroic task is subsequently taken up, expanded and completed in a different mode by 
Aragorn—Tolkien implies that the epic method of response to a problem that threatens the 
integrity of the world is an inadequate one.  It does not counter the transcendent impulse or 
its effect on the world; rather, it reproduces and even reinforces them.  Because the epic 
hero’s actions are directed toward his private interest when they should be directed at his 
public responsibility, and the epic hero’s focus is on the self and not society—on 
controlling the world to conform to the individual’s wishes—action in the epic style 
defaults on the individual’s responsibility toward the rest of the world.  Boromir’s actions   154 
cannot themselves contribute to ethical transition except by default; only their aftermath 
can be incorporated into the inherent order of the Secondary World.
11
 
    
Having exposed the epic hero’s inability to contribute directly to ethical transition through 
Boromir, Tolkien tests the alternative—the romance hero—through the character of 
Aragorn.  Elgin argues that Aragorn, as one of the Captains of the West allied with the 
Wise, moves within the tragedic mode just as Boromir, Sauron and the Wise do (43).  
However, this is not borne out by the text: as Basney comments (‘Escape’ 34), Aragorn has 
a ‘pre-established ethical identity’ that is distinctly comedic.  Throughout the narrative, 
Aragorn is surrounded by markers that link him with the integrative ethos.  After his initial 
appearance on the fringes of human society, in the inn at Bree, Aragorn is consistently 
associated with community.  He is Elrond’s foster-son and an inhabitant of Rivendell, the 
leader of the Dúnedain and one of the Nine Walkers.  Even after the Fellowship is broken, 
he retains two companions (Legolas and Gimli), who serve no other narrative function than 
to be his companions and thus illustrate the unity of Middle-earth against Sauron.  Aragorn 
is frequently shown participating in social activities such as conversation and story-
swapping, verse-making and pipe-smoking.  His entire hero narrative can be read as an 
element of a larger romance narrative which echoes a standard New Comedy plot (Frye, 
‘Argument’ 58)—the story of Aragorn and Arwen Undómiel.  This story follows the 
pattern of love between members of the younger generation, blocked by a ban imposed 
from above (‘ “ . . . though I love you, I say to you: Arwen Undómiel . . . shall not be the 
bride of any man less than the King of both Gondor and Arnor” ’ Tolkien, III:307), which 
the hero defeats or evades so that the narrative ends in marriage (Kocher 137).   
                                                 
11 Boromir’s actions split the Fellowship, but this ultimately proves beneficial.  It gives Sam and Frodo the 
chance to enter Mordor unseen, brings Merry and Pippin to Fangorn Forest in time to rouse the Ents against 
Saruman, and brings Aragorn, Legolas and Gimli together with the returned Gandalf in time to achieve the 
muster of Rohan.  The aftermath of Boromir’s transcendent action thus forwards the right end of events in the 
Secondary World as his actions themselves do not.   155 
 
Above all, Aragorn is a healer, in both the literal sense (Crowe 77) and the metaphorical.  
Through the narrative, every instance in which Aragorn acts as a warrior is followed 
almost immediately by one in which he acts as a healer.  It is his ability to heal physical 
illness and injury that sees him recognised as King by the people of Minas Tirith after the 
end of the Siege of Gondor: ‘ . . . soon the word had gone out from the House [of Healing] 
that the king was indeed come among them, and after war he brought healing; and the 
news ran through the City’ (Tolkien, III:125).  Healing is also a function of kingship 
(Monks 6); it extends beyond the physical into the political and social realms, because a 
king’s job is to bring the disparate elements of society into an harmonious and ordered 
whole (Crowe 73).  Aragorn displays this capacity several times.  He prods Legolas and 
Gimli toward overcoming the rift between Elves and Dwarves (Tolkien, I:329-30).  He 
heals an ancient breach of trust when he summons the Dead to his assistance against 
Sauron under the terms of Isildur’s curse (Tolkien, III:135).  His coronation remakes the 
old map of Arnor that underlies the fragmented north, and binds the Western Lands into a 
whole again.  And he makes peace with the Easterlings and Haradrim who surrender after 
the fall of Sauron (Tolkien, III:218), thereby connecting the Western Lands to the whole of 
Middle-earth.   
 
Aragorn’s performance of the hero paradigm reflects his comedic identity.  It is not told, as 
Boromir’s is, but shown.  Aragorn enters the narrative before the beginning of his hero 
journey, and leaves it after its formal closure with his coronation as King of Gondor and 
Lord of the Western Lands.  Although Aragorn enacts the same paradigm as Boromir does, 
he displays none of the behavioural characteristics of the epic hero.  He does not insist on 
his own heroism when narrating his past actions to the Council of Elrond.  In fact, he 
actively downplays it; when Gandalf comments on the ‘perils’ Aragorn encountered during   156 
his hunt for Gollum, he replies only, ‘ “There is little need to tell of them . . . If a man must 
needs walk in sight of the Black Gate, or tread the deadly flowers of Morgul Vale, then 
perils he will have. . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, I:243).  The contrast with Boromir’s emphasis on his 
own physical endurance is marked.  Aragorn displays no particular reluctance to assume 
the hero role when he is called on to do so, but neither does he display any noticeable 
desire for fame or the status that will be the reward for the correct performance of his role.  
Rather, he takes on the job of kingship, because it is his responsibility to do so.  Only after 
his heroic task is complete does he display any anxiousness for a ‘reward’—and the reward 
in question is marriage to Arwen Undómiel (Tolkien, III:220), at once a personal goal, and 
a social one in that it reunites the last remnants of the Numenoréans with their former allies 
the Elves, and begins the process of regenerating the society of Gondor.  Aragorn’s heroic 
action may have private dimensions, but it is predominantly public in nature and in focus.  
 
Aragorn’s relationship to the hero role is the opposite of Boromir’s at every point.  Where 
Boromir usurps the hero role from Faramir, Aragorn is called out of anonymity into 
performance of the hero role by other people’s need (Kocher 142).  After Boromir tells the 
Council of Elrond about Minas Tirith’s situation, Aragorn asks him, ‘ “ . . . Do you wish 
for the House of Elendil to return to the Land of Gondor?” ’ and waits for his somewhat 
ungracious acceptance before formally taking on the hero’s role and responsibility with the 
statement ‘ “ . . . I will come to Minas Tirith” ’ (Tolkien, I:237-9).  And Aragorn does not 
assume an heroic persona when he takes on the hero role.  When the Fellowship is about to 
leave Rivendell on the journey that may not only save Middle-earth, but also secure for 
Aragorn his identity, his kingdom and his marriage to Arwen Undómiel, Boromir blows 
that contentious blast on his war-horn, but Aragorn sits alone ‘with his head bowed to his 
knees: only Elrond knew fully what this hour meant to him’ (Tolkien, I:267).  During the 
journey itself, he consistently positions himself as a support to the other hero figures,   157 
Frodo and Boromir, rather than as their equal (Kocher 143)—even when, after Gandalf’s 
death, he becomes default leader of the Fellowship. 
 
Further, as Kocher’s analysis of the character shows, Aragorn’s actions after he becomes 
leader of the Fellowship are not determined by what will best support his own heroic 
image—or benefit him the most.  Rather, Aragorn bases his decisions on what will be best 
for the Fellowship, and for his greater task of opposing Sauron.  He suggests travelling 
with Frodo into Mordor, and after Boromir’s death temporarily abandons Minas Tirith for 
an attempt to rescue Merry and Pippin from Saruman’s Orcs, despite the fact that his 
personal advantage lies in Minas Tirith.  Rather than disrupting the established hierarchy of 
the Rohirrim to establish his personal status and importance, as an epic hero would do 
(Jackson 15), Aragorn stays in a subordinate role in the military action at Helm’s Deep and 
Isengard (Kocher 151).  He takes back control of the palantír from Sauron, not to prove his 
own strength or regain something that belongs to him, so much as to contribute to the 
defence of the Western Lands by giving Sauron one more thing to worry about:   
 
‘ . . . I am the lawful master of the Stone, and I had both the right and the strength to use it, 
or so I judged . . . I spoke no word to [Sauron], and in the end I wrenched the Stone to my 
own will.  That alone will he find hard to endure.  And he beheld me . . . but in other guise 
than you see me here.  If that will aid him, then I have done ill.  But I do not think so.  To 
know that I lived and walked the earth was a blow to his heart, I deem; for he knew it not 
till now. . . . ’ 
(Tolkien, III:46) 
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Likewise, Aragorn rides the Paths of the Dead because it is the only way to gain both the 
soldiery and the time he needs to break the Siege of Gondor (Tolkien, III:49), and because 
he is the only person who can do it. 
 
Aragorn completes his heroic act when he breaks the Siege of Gondor and saves Minas 
Tirith; after this, he is recognised as King (Tolkien, III:120).  But because he is not 
motivated by a desire for fame or the reward of kingship per se, he is able to accept that his 
heroic act, although technically completed, has only partially achieved its aim: ‘When [the 
battle] is over, the enemy is still working on Denethor and Mordor is not destroyed’ (Jones, 
‘Narrative’ 104).  Therefore Aragorn defers receiving his reward: 
 
‘ . . . this City and realm has rested in the charge of the Stewards for many long years, and I 
fear that if I enter it unbidden, then doubt and debate may arise, which should not be while 
this war is fought.  I will not enter in, nor make any claim, until it be seen whether we or 
Mordor shall prevail.  Men shall pitch my tents upon the field, and here I will await the 
welcome of the Lord of the City.’ 
 (Tolkien, III:120-1) 
 
Because he does this, he is able to continue doing his job—protecting the society for which 
he is responsible—by leading the assault on the Morannon to aid Frodo’s quest from a 
distance (Kocher 157).  It is only once his job is completed and Sauron is destroyed that 
Aragorn accesses the narrative end he has already earned.  He returns to Minas Tirith, and 
is reintegrated with his society when he is recognised and crowned King: he then goes on 
to regenerate that society through his marriage to Arwen Undómiel, as the symbolism of 
the withered tree of Minas Tirith and the sapling on Mount Mindolluin (Tolkien, III:219)   159 
suggests.  Aragorn matches the type of the romance hero as Boromir does the type of the 
epic hero. 
 
As Leyerle identifies the epic inflection of the hero paradigm with the tragedic mode, he 
also identifies the romance inflection with the comedic mode (71).  Because Aragorn 
moves in the opposite mode to Sauron and the Ring, he is not vulnerable either to the Ring, 
as Boromir is, or to Sauron’s deceptions, as Denethor is (Shippey, Road 126).  In his first 
meeting with Frodo, Merry, Pippin and Sam, Aragorn rejects the Ring and its influence 
outright: 
 
‘ . . . If I had killed the real Strider, I could kill you.  And I should have killed you 
already without so much talk.  If I was after the Ring, I could have it—NOW!’ 
 
He stood up, and seemed suddenly to grow taller.  In his eyes gleamed a light, keen and 
commanding.  Throwing back his cloak, he laid his hand on the hilt of a sword that had 
hung concealed by his side.  [The hobbits] did not dare to move . . .  
 
‘But I am the real Strider, fortunately . . . ’ 
(Tolkien, I:169-70) 
 
Furthermore, he does this without any sense of struggle.  The moment is, like much of 
Aragorn’s behaviour at this point in the narrative, a performance designed to impress upon 
the hobbits how dangerous their situation is.  At no point afterwards does the Ring present   160 




   
It is notable that after the epic hero Boromir’s death, the romance hero Aragorn does not 
merely take up his abandoned heroic task, but (at Gandalf’s urging) expands it to 
encompass not just Gondor but the whole of the Western Lands.  Effectively, he overwrites 
Gondor’s failed epic scenario with the romance Western Lands one.  Aragorn’s heroic 
journey brings together Gondor, Rohan and the Dúnedain, and is supported by events at 
Isengard, Lothlórien and Mirkwood; his hero act achieves the salvation of Minas Tirith and 
its people, and the whole of Gondor, and therefore of the lands that lie beyond it. Through 
the success of Aragorn’s expanded heroic act, Tolkien suggests that comedic action in the 
world is an effective response to transcendent behaviour whereas tragedic action is not, and 
can contribute to the ethical transition where it cannot.  More notable still, however, is the 
fact that Aragorn does not at any point claim that his heroic act is responsible for the 
salvation of Middle-earth.  As Stephen Potts points out (7), at the moment of his 
coronation, Aragorn publicly hands back his victory to Gandalf and Frodo, and thus to the 
external ordering power they represent: 
 
. . . Aragorn did not put the crown upon his head, but gave it back to Faramir, and said: ‘By 
the labour and valour of many have I come into my inheritance.  In token of this I would 
have the Ring-bearer bring the crown to me, and let Mithrandir set it upon my head, if he 
will; for he has been the mover of all that has been accomplished, and this is his victory.’ 
(Tolkien, III:217) 
 
                                                 
12 The resemblance of Faramir’s later performance for Frodo in The Two Towers to this moment is not 
coincidental.  Faramir not only reinforces the point of Boromir’s narrative by difference; he also reinforces 
the point of Aragorn’s by repetition.   161 
Through Aragorn’s coronation, Tolkien articulates explicitly what Aragorn’s narrative 
implies: that public action in the integrative mode can contribute to the ethical transition, 
but cannot achieve it alone.  Aragorn’s story is only half of the focal narrative of The Lord 
of the Rings.  Aragorn’s job is to confront Sauron—to oppose the transcendent presence in 
the world.  However, Aragorn does not engage with the Ring.  He does not at any point 
confront the impulse to control the world that drives transcendent behaviour.  A comedic 
protagonist does not challenge or confront the disruption to her or his society, but negates 
it by evasion or strategy.  The integrative ethic does not engage with the transcendent 
impulse, but only contains it.  In order to act effectively against the root of the problem—
the transcendent impulse—an additional form of action is necessary.  Tolkien uses the third 
and largest heroic scenario of The Lord of the Rings—Frodo’s journey to Orodruin to 
destroy the Ring—to explore what this might be.   
 
Frodo’s heroic journey, like Aragorn’s, is not told but shown.  Frodo’s strand of the focal 
narrative encompasses the informal beginning of his hero journey, in the Shire, his formal 
adoption of the hero role at Rivendell and the formal end of his task at Orodruin, and its 
actual conclusion with Frodo’s departure from Middle-earth.  However, Frodo’s 
performance of the role of hero does not conform exactly to either the epic or the romance 
inflection of the paradigm.   
 
Frodo’s initial modal orientation is, like Aragorn’s, comedic.  As a hobbit, he is a part of a 
culture that values connection with others and with the landscape within which it exists.  
Although he is considered rather strange by much of that society, he does have strong 
connections to it, including family and ‘a good many friends, especially among the young 
[sic] hobbits . . . who had as children been fond of Bilbo and often in and out of Bag End’ 
(Tolkien, I:49).  Frodo’s motivation for taking action is to preserve the Shire from Sauron’s   162 
destructive malice, and his first action—taking the Ring to Rivendell before Sauron can 
look for it in the Shire—is evasive rather than confrontational.  However, Frodo’s 
engagement with the hero role itself is more ambiguous.  When Frodo takes on the role of 
hero formally, he does not do so either over-eagerly as Boromir does, or willingly as 
Aragorn does.  He only commits himself when it becomes plain to him that there is no 
other alternative: 
 
A great dread fell on [Frodo], as if he was awaiting the pronouncement of some doom that 
he had long foreseen and vainly hoped might never after all be spoken.  An overwhelming 
longing to rest and remain at peace by Bilbo’s side in Rivendell filled all his heart.  At last 
with an effort he spoke, and wondered to hear his own words, as if some other will was 
using his small voice. 
 
‘I will take the Ring,’ he said, ‘though I do not know the way.’ 
(Tolkien, I:259) 
 
Frodo shows no investment in the hero role at all.   He rejects it repeatedly, to the point of 
trying to give the Ring away (to Galadriel: Tolkien, I:346) after he has formally taken on 
responsibility for it.  Frodo rejects his position as focus of and decision-maker for the 
Fellowship, and in fact deserts the group altogether rather than take up these public 
responsibilities (Tolkien, I:382).  He displays no desire to gain fame, status or reward from 
his heroic act.  As Frodo and Sam travel toward Mordor, Sam suggests that in the future 
Frodo will be considered ‘ “ . . . the famousest of the hobbits, and that’s saying a lot” ’; 
Frodo’s response to this is that ‘ “It’s saying a lot too much” ’ (Tolkien, II:285).  Frodo 
insists on his lack of heroism: ‘ “ . . . I know what I should do, but I am afraid of doing it, 
Boromir: afraid” ’ (Tolkien, I:376).  And his actions are determined not by what will gain   163 
him fame, but by what will achieve his goal, as when he leaves the Fellowship in order to 
have the best chance of getting into Mordor undetected (Tolkien, I:384).  Frodo’s heroic 
journey has public dimensions just as Aragorn’s and Boromir’s have, but he goes about it 
is such a way as to make it a private act. 
 
Frodo may reject the heroic persona, but through his actions he displays the defining 
characteristic of an epic hero: the inability to allow any failure, total or partial, in the 
achievement of his goal.  However, this inability does not stem from the epic hero’s desire 
to gain fame from a perfect performance of the role.  It is imposed by the nature of Frodo’s 
task.  The One Ring cannot be allowed to remain in Middle-earth under any circumstances, 
because if it does, Sauron will eventually find it, and Middle-earth will be destroyed 
(Tolkien, I:254-5).  Frodo does not have the option of rejecting the hero role, or of 
accepting partial failure as a romance hero does.  He therefore intentionally plays out the 
role he has taken on to its close, in full awareness of what he is doing: he tells Sam, ‘ “ . . . 
I must carry the burden to the end.  It can’t be altered.  You can’t come between me and 
this doom” ’ (Tolkien, III:165).  Because of this commitment to his task, despite his initial 
ethical alignment, Frodo’s performance of the hero paradigm ultimately takes on an epic 
cast.   
 
This means that—as Shippey points out—Frodo is one of those few highly significant 
characters who are vulnerable to the Ring (Road 126).  As Frodo progresses in his heroic 
journey, the Ring becomes a tool he can use to get his job done, particularly in his 
interactions with Gollum.  Frodo may not put the Ring on after he leaves the Fellowship, 
but he uses it repeatedly, nevertheless, to compel Gollum to aid and obey him: 
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‘In the last need, Sméagol, I should put on the Precious, and the Precious mastered you 
long ago.  If I, wearing it, were to command you, you would obey, even if it were to leap 
from a precipice or to cast yourself into the fire.  And such would be my command.  So 
have a care, Sméagol!’ 
(Tolkien, II:218) 
 
When Frodo first uses the Ring to compel Gollum, Sam not only sees him somewhat 
ambiguously as ‘a tall stern shadow, a mighty lord who hid his brightness in grey cloud’ 
but recognises that Frodo and Gollum are ‘in some way akin and not alien: they [can] reach 
one another’s minds’ (Tolkien, II:197). This has been read as a positive moment.  Attebery 
suggests that it offers a ‘brief glimpse . . . of an underlying reality’ about Frodo’s 
transformation: ‘Tolkien’s heroic figures are invariably tall and bright’ (Strategies 72).  
However, the language seems ambivalent.  In The Lord of the Rings the term ‘shadow’ is 
most often associated with Sauron, the Nazgûl and Mordor; the other characters who hide 
brightness under grey cloaks are Gandalf and the Elves, who are, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, modally ambiguous.  The underlying reality that the image reveals is Frodo’s 
movement toward the tragedic mode.  He can reach Gollum’s mind because he now moves 
in the same mode as Gollum does.   
 
And as Diana Wynne Jones states, like all epic heroes, Frodo fails in the achievement of 
his heroic task (‘Narrative’ 105).  When he arrives at Orodruin, he cannot destroy the Ring; 
instead he gives in to it, and puts it on.  His heroic feat is successfully completed only 
because of the inherent order governing events in Middle-earth.  Once the tragic act of 
claiming the Ring is done, its aftermath is incorporated into the preserving pattern.  The 
Ring is destroyed by its effect on Frodo and its effect on Gollum playing out without   165 
hindrance at the Cracks of Doom; thus Sauron is destroyed as a direct result of his own 
malice and ambition.   The integrity of Middle-earth is preserved. 
 
Unlike a traditional epic hero, Frodo survives his formal heroic act and returns to the Shire.  
Despite his original comedic orientation, however, he does not achieve a romance hero’s 
reintegration with his social context.  He is given praise and recognition in Gondor 
(Tolkien, III:204), but when he returns to the Shire he becomes even more isolated from 
his community than he was before he left: 
 
Frodo dropped quietly out of all the doings of the Shire, and Sam was pained to notice how 
little honour he had in his own country.  Few people knew or wanted to know about his 
deeds and adventures; their admiration and respect was given to Mr Meriadoc and Mr 
Peregrin and (if Sam had known it) to himself. 
 (Tolkien, III:270) 
 
Frodo cannot regain the ‘old sense of safety and security’ associated with the Shire (Milos 
21).  The end of his narrative is actually a deferred, muted version of the epic hero’s 
isolated death: he is so badly damaged in so many ways by his heroic journey that in order 
to gain peace he chooses to leave Middle-earth, and go to the Undying Lands in the West 
(Milos 17).  All the evidence suggests that Frodo performs an act of epic heroism, but with 
one important difference.  He is an epic hero in whom the defining epic (and transcendent) 
characteristic of pride is not present.  And because no pride in his own achievement 
obstructs his judgement, Frodo is aware of what the Ring is doing to him, even as he 
becomes more dependent on it.  He says to Sam, ‘ “ . . . It is my burden, and no one else 
can bear it. . . . I am almost in its power now.  I could not give it up, and if you tried to take 
it I should go mad” ’ (Tolkien, III:189).  His self-destruction is therefore not wilful, as the   166 
epic hero’s is, but intentional.  It is a self-sacrifice (Mathews 904) both on the literal, 
physical level, and on the level of the psyche.  By carrying his heroic act to completion, 
Frodo deliberately destroys his own ability to live in Middle-earth, in order that others may 
continue to do so: ‘ “ . . . I have been too deeply hurt . . . It must often be so, Sam, when 
things are in danger: some one has to give them up, lose them, so that others may keep 
them . . . ” ’ (Tolkien, III:273).   
 
By carrying out his self-sacrifice, Frodo does what Aragorn cannot.  He engages with the 
transcendent impulse—the desire to control events, manifested in his own need to destroy 
the Ring.  Through Frodo’s story, Tolkien suggests that to defeat the tragedic impulse 
requires the individual’s private, aware engagement with it.  The Norse theory of courage, 
although ineffective in the public sphere (as Boromir’s narrative shows), becomes valid 
when it is brought to bear in the individual’s struggle with the transcendent impulse: it is 
only Frodo’s epic courage in the face of his inevitable fall to the Ring that allows him, the 
Ring and Gollum to come to the Cracks of Doom, the one place in Middle-earth where the 
order of the Secondary World can incorporate them all into itself, and transform them into 
conservative forces.  Frodo’s self-sacrifice is the one act in the narrative of The Lord of the 
Rings that ensures the survival of the Secondary World.   
 
The crucial importance of Frodo’s private, modified act of epic heroism is underlined by 
Tolkien’s treatment of Frodo’s companions.  Sam, as Elgin points out, is associated with 
the comedic mode (51), and Gollum with the tragedic.  Sam is the character who takes care 
of Frodo, who can keep him moving and get around obstacles, who is aware of both his 
own limitations and the imperatives of the situation he is in and thus is able to reject the 
Ring’s influence (Tolkien, III:155).  Sam enables Frodo to undertake his self-sacrifice, just   167 
as Aragorn does from further away when he brings the armies of Gondor and Rohan to the 
Morannon.  However, Sam cannot bear the Ring to the end (Tolkien, III:164).   
 
Gollum wants to gain the Ring for himself and make the world conform to his desires: 
 
‘ . . . if we has it, then we can escape, even from Him, eh?  Perhaps we grows very strong, 
stronger than Wraiths.  Lord Sméagol?  Gollum the Great?  The Gollum!  Eat fish every 
day, three times a day, fresh from the sea.  Most Precious Gollum!  Must have it.  We 
wants it, we wants it, we wants it!’ 
(Tolkien, II:211) 
 
When he gives Frodo to Shelob in hopes of stealing the Ring, he almost prevents Frodo’s 
self-sacrifice, and thus the salvation of Middle-earth.  Neither the integrative ethic nor the 
unreconstructed transcendent ethic can confront or contain the transcendent impulse.  
Through the story of Frodo, Sam and Gollum, Tolkien argues that only epic heroism, 
stripped of the epic hero’s defining characteristic and flaw of pride, can counter the 
impulse to act transcendently.  He argues that the epic hero’s courage to knowingly fight 
evil in the face of inevitable failure, once reapplied to the private realm of the individual’s 
relationship to the world, is the key factor that saves the Secondary World, because it 
negates the self and leaves the way open for the beneficent power that orders Middle-earth 
to act without interference, for the good of the world.   
 
Through his juxtaposition of Boromir’s, Aragorn’s and Frodo’s performances of the hero 
paradigm in The Lord of the Rings, Tolkien suggests that two types of action are needed to 
achieve the ethical transition within the Secondary World.  The epic model of action 
against evil—the public but ultimately self-serving tragedic action of the epic hero—is   168 
shown, through Boromir, to be an extension of the transcendent ethic rather than a 
response to it.  It opposes the predetermined pattern of events in the Secondary World, and 
therefore reinforces rather than counters the antagonist’s transcendent actions.  However, 
the apparent logical alternative of comedic, publicly-oriented action is also shown, through 
Aragorn, to be ineffective in isolation.  While it can counter the effects of transcendent 
action in the world, it cannot neutralise the source of that action.  Thus Aragorn’s hero act 
depends on Frodo’s for its validity and its success (Mathews 910).  In this way, Tolkien 
implies that the ethical transition depends upon two elements.  The first, modelled by 
Aragorn, is public, conservative action that negates the effect of transcendent action upon 
the physical system within which it occurs.  The second, modelled by Frodo, is a private 
confrontation with the transcendent impulse that drives damaging action.  And this, 
although it is bound to fail, is the more important of the two elements, because it negates 
the self and in doing so opens the way for the underlying order in Middle-earth to assert 
itself.   
 
This reading is reinforced by the Scouring of the Shire, which functions as what Jones calls 
a ‘coda’, a short segment of narrative that ‘reflects partly back on the movement just 
completed, and partly forwards to what is to come’ (‘Narrative’ 88).  It shows in miniature 
what the hobbits have been, in Gandalf’s phrase, ‘trained’ to do to protect the integrity of 
the Secondary World (Tolkien, III:242). Throughout the focal narrative, Merry and Pippin 
function as Aragorn’s bathetic echoes, and undergo journeys into integrative identity and 
ability comparable to Aragorn’s through their interactions with Théoden and Denethor 
(Langford 5).  During the Scouring of the Shire, they undertake public, physical action 
against Saruman’s wilful destruction of the Shire and the hobbit community.  They 
organise an insurrection against the Chief’s Men, which is notable for its drawing-together 
of the scattered Hobbit community and its use of the comedic methods of strategy and   169 
speech as a first option (the hobbits resort to force only when these methods fail: Tolkien, 
III:260).  After this is over, Frodo acts to prevent the re-emergence of the transcendent 
ethic: he forbids revenge on the Chief’s Men, and extends mercy to Saruman (Tolkien, 
III:263-4).  By doing so, he once again permits the underlying order of his Secondary 
World to assert itself and incorporate transcendent action into its self-preserving pattern.  
Wormtongue murders his corruptor Saruman, and is executed by the hobbits.  The 
aftermath of the battle becomes part of the healing of the landscape: Saruman’s malice is 
contained, if not totally blocked (Milos 19), and the Shire, like the rest of the Western 
Lands, is cleared of transcendent contamination.  It can then regenerate and make its 
necessary transition into the mundane.  
 
Between them, Aragorn and Frodo’s narratives make a clear statement about where the 
responsibility for saving the Secondary World lies.  Middle-earth is invested with a cosmic 
order; events within it manifest the intention of a greater, beneficent power.  While 
characters within the Secondary World have a clear responsibility to co-operate with that 
order, and implement the externally-generated solution to the limits of their ability, neither 
Aragorn’s public, conservative action nor Frodo’s private confrontation with the 
transcendent impulse to control, in and of themselves, save Middle-earth.  It is the greater 
order with which Middle-earth is invested, manifesting in the aftermath of Frodo’s fall to 
the Ring, that ultimately brings about the destruction of Sauron and saves the Secondary 
World. 
 
Tolkien’s Secondary World in The Lord of the Rings reflects the Christian vision of a 
world in which events are invested with order and significance by their relationship to a 
benign external power.  Tolkien’s argument for how to achieve the ethical transition and 
save the Secondary World likewise echoes the Christian doctrine of the salvation of the   170 
soul through individual action, though it applies it on a larger scale.  In The Lord of the 
Rings, Tolkien argues that in order to save the world from the effects of Sauron’s 
transcendent action, it is necessary to act heroically on two levels, and in two ways.  To 
save the world requires both the public integrative action of the romance hero (good 
practice in the world), and private action in the form of transformed epic heroism—aware 
self-sacrifice without need for reward.  This last is the crucial factor that allows the 
inherent order of the Secondary World to assert itself against the antagonist.  However, it is 
not Frodo’s self-sacrifice that ultimately saves Middle-earth, but the order that manifests 
itself in the wake of his fall, turning his transcendent action to comedic ends.  Aragorn and 
Frodo may be partially—in fact, mostly—responsible for implementing the solution given 
to them by the beneficent power that oversees Middle-earth, but in the end Middle-earth, 
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6  ‘ROKE GUIDES, BUT IT CAN’T RULE’: ALTERNATIVES TO 
HEROISM IN THE EARTHSEA CYCLE 
The Secondary World of Ursula Le Guin’s Earthsea cycle is of a type more closely 
associated with epic and epic heroism than Tolkien’s medieval Middle-earth.  As Ann 
Swinfen states, the Archipelago ‘is a Bronze Age civilization, with a mainly village 
economy . . . Homeric in concept—a civilized, sea-faring, Bronze Age culture’ (83).  
However, the cycle displays a distinct movement away from heroic action as a solution to 
the problem posed by the transcendent presence in the world.  In the original Earthsea 
trilogy, Le Guin picks up and elaborates on Tolkien’s structure, using several motifs drawn 
from the epic and romance genres, to articulate her construction of how ethical transition 
can be achieved.  However, she does not replicate Tolkien’s solution to the problem of the 
transcendent presence in the Secondary World; rather, she uses the structure to write back 
to Tolkien’s ideas, and advance her own theory of how ethical transition can be achieved.  
In the continuation volumes, she writes back to her own use of Tolkien’s model in the 
original trilogy, moving away from epic and romance motifs altogether as she both 
responds to and develops her own conclusions.  In this chapter, I will examine the use Le 
Guin makes of the hero paradigm in the original trilogy, the way she surrounds it with 
other narratives, and what this technique implies about how ethical transition is to be 
achieved in the Secondary World of Earthsea.  I will also consider the non-paradigmatic 
narratives of the continuation volumes, the ways in which they connect to and move on 
from the conclusions of the original trilogy, and the insights they offer into achieving the 
ethical transition.  Finally, I will consider where Le Guin’s narratives locate responsibility 
for saving the Secondary World. 
 
As Francis J. Molson points out in his essay ‘The Earthsea Trilogy: Ethical Fantasy for 
Children’, the Earthsea cycle is explicitly concerned with constructing an ethics of   172 
existence within the physical system of a world (135).  Le Guin’s construction of the 
ethical transition as a process of ‘learning better’, of discovering and internalising an 
appropriate conscious response to the innate impulse to prevent change, informs her theory 
of how transition from the transcendent worldview to the integrative can be brought about.  
This premise informs the series of responses to the transcendent ethic presented in Le 
Guin’s narratives.  The problem-solving of the Earthsea cycle reflects the idea of ‘learning 
better’ by working though a process of incremental repetition, moving the Secondary 
World constantly closer to a solution to the problem created by the transcendent impulse.  
Unlike Tolkien, Le Guin does not focus solely on the hero paradigm as the means of 
achieving ethical transition.   
 
The hero paradigm (with its three prerequisites of a character’s masculinity, detachment 
from society, and responsible relationship to a passive authority figure: Leyerle 69-71), 
occurs three times in the original Earthsea trilogy.  The first is in A Wizard of Earthsea.  
When Ged finishes his schooling in magic on Roke Island, he goes to work for the Isle-
Men of Low Torning, whose township is under threat from a nearby colony of dragons.  
This positions him as the active representative of a passive authority, and he takes on the 
role of hero when he makes a formal commitment to face the dragons in defence of the 
township (Le Guin, Wizard 98-100).  Ged’s second performance of the hero paradigm 
occurs in The Tombs of Atuan.  Ged learns from the dragon Orm Embar that he possesses 
half of the Ring of Erreth-Akbe—and therefore half of the lost Bond-Rune, ‘ “ . . . the sign 
of dominion, the sign of peace . . . ” ’ that will bind the lands of the Archipelago into a 
peaceful unity (Le Guin, Tombs 117).  He goes to the city of Havnor and makes a 
commitment to undertake another heroic journey: ‘ “ . . . if they liked, I would go and seek 
the rest of the ring in the Tombs of Atuan, in order to find the Lost Rune, the key to peace.  
For we need peace sorely in the world . . . ” ’ (Le Guin, Tombs 119).  By doing this, Ged   173 
positions himself as the active representative of the ‘merchants and the princes and the 
lords of the ancient domains’ at Havnor (Le Guin, Tombs 119).  He then assumes the role 
of hero on behalf of that authority.  Ged’s final performance of the hero paradigm occurs in 
The Farthest Shore, when, as Archmage, he commits himself to discover and remedy the 
cause of the slow failure of magic throughout the Archipelago, on behalf of its absent 
authority, the prophesied King of all the Isles (Le Guin, Shore 32).   
 
Ged’s performances of the hero paradigm in the original trilogy establish a premise that 
achievement of ethical transition requires some public action in the comedic mode.  Ged’s 
first performance of the hero paradigm, in A Wizard of Earthsea, establishes this through 
Ged’s use of both epic and romance methods to achieve his goals.  In the performance of 
his heroic feat, Ged initially acts in the epic mode: he issues an insulting challenge to the 
old Dragon of Pendor (Miller 234), and engages in a series of physical battles against the 
animal-like younger dragons, using his magical skill and strength to defeat them (Le Guin, 
Wizard 102).  This sets up the proposition, in contrast to Tolkien’s rejection of 
unreconstructed tragic action, that epic heroism can be a positive force when applied 
against strictly physical threats.  However, Ged’s final opponent, the old dragon Yevaud, is 
both physically and magically more powerful than Ged.  Yevaud is intelligent, and 
whereas use of the Old Speech, the dragon’s language, binds Ged to speak truth, Yevaud is 
able to lie (Le Guin, Wizard 104).  Yevaud also displays a transcendent disregard for 
limitations and a lack of concern for the rest of its Secondary World when it tells Ged, ‘ “I 
strike no bargain.  I take.  What have you to offer that I cannot take from you when I like?” 
’ (Le Guin, Wizard 105).   
 
In order to defeat this dragon and fulfil his goal of protecting Low Torning, Ged changes 
his method.  He abandons the use of force, and instead uses his knowledge of the old   174 
dragon’s name to induce it to strike a deal: ‘ “We are matched, Yevaud.  You have your 
strength: I have your name.  Will you bargain?” ’ (Le Guin, Wizard 106).  This strategic 
change of mode is a gamble, based on an educated guess, and its success recalls the good 
luck that assists the romance hero to complete his task.  But it is also a gamble planned in 
advance. 
 
[Ged] had staked this venture and his life on a guess drawn from old histories of dragon-
lore studied on Roke, a guess that this Dragon of Pendor was the same that had spoiled the 
west of Osskil in the days of Elfarran and Morred, and had been driven from Osskil by a 
wizard, Elt, wise in names.  The guess had held. 
(Le Guin, Wizard 106) 
 
Because of this strategic shift in his mode of action, Ged is able to achieve a partial 
romance resolution to his hero act.  He and Yevaud both survive their confrontation, and 
Ged also achieves his goal of protecting Low Torning from the dragons: Yevaud swears by 
its name that it will not fly to the Archipelago to find food for its remaining offspring (Le 
Guin, Wizard 107).  Ged is then able to return to his starting point at Low Torning (Le 
Guin, Wizard 108). The episode suggests that the transcendent presence in the world can 
be contained by public action in the integrative mode. 
 
The point is restated in The Tombs of Atuan.  In this volume, Ged’s hero act, the theft of 
half of the Ring of Erreth-Akbe from the Labyrinth of the Nameless Ones, again begins 
ambiguously.  His own interpretation of his action is comedic (Le Guin, Tombs 87): he 
intends to regain something that has been lost to his culture, and use it to restore peace in 
the world.  However, theft can also be read as a transcendent act, as it reorganises the 
world in line with the individual’s subjectively-defined ideal.  From the point of view of   175 
the Kargish priestesses who inhabit the Place of the Tombs and whose perspective the 
book privileges, Ged’s heroic act is experienced as a violation (Spivack, Le Guin 34).  Ged 
uses guile to enter a sacred space illicitly.  This supports a tragedic reading of his actions.   
 
In the performance this hero act, Ged again encounters powers greater than his.  The 
Nameless Ones, the malevolent Old Powers of the Earth that inhabit the Labyrinth, 
outmatch Ged’s magical and physical strength (Le Guin, Tombs 113), and through their 
priestess Arha, they imprison Ged in their Labyrinth.  The imprisonment of an epic hero 
for any length of time is ‘an extraordinary epic event’ (Miller 146) which can only be 
accomplished by powers superior to the hero’s—sovereignty, sorcery or the Otherworld.  
An epic hero can only escape imprisonment through sorcerous intervention.  However, in 
romance, there is an alternative way to gain freedom.  As in the stories of Sir Launcelot 
(Malory, I:199-200) and Alisander le Orphelin (Malory, II:74) in Le Morte d’Arthur, the 
imprisoned hero can cede agency to the female servant of his sorcerous captor, and allow 
her to release him.  In order to survive and succeed at his task, Ged must win the trust of 
the Nameless Ones’ female servant, the priestess Arha, and cede to her not only the object 
of his heroic journey, the Ring of Erreth-Akbe, but also his true name and the power to 
decide his future and her own: 
 
‘You [Arha] must make a choice.  Either you must leave me, lock the door, go up to your 
altars and give me to your Masters; then go to the Priestess Kossil and make your peace 
with her . . . or, you must unlock the door, and go out of it, with me . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Tombs 121) 
 
Again, Ged’s hero act comes to a partial romance conclusion.  He survives and succeeds, 
returning with the recreated Ring of Erreth-Akbe to the society on behalf of which he   176 
undertook the act (Le Guin, Tombs 154).  However, he does not reintegrate with that 
society. 
 
The Farthest Shore restates the premise a third time.  Here, Ged’s heroic act is modally 
unambiguous—it is comedically inflected from the outset.  And during his journey, Ged is 
shown systematically detaching himself from the role of hero.  He releases his last 
investment in his own performance of the role and its reward of fame altogether, shortly 
before his final encounter with Cob: 
 
‘A goatherd to set the heir of Morred on his throne!  Will I never learn? . . . Not in Havnor 
would I be, and not in Roke.  It is time to be done with power.  To drop the old toys, and go 
on.  It is time that I went home ... And maybe there I would learn at last what no act or 
power can teach me, what I have never learned.’ 
(Le Guin, Shore 171) 
 
This release of personal investment in the performance of the hero role permits the 
completion of Ged’s final heroic act.  Having done it, he is able to heal the breach Cob has 
made between the living world and the Dry Land of the Dead, even though doing so 
requires him to give up the factor that enables his heroic actions—his wizardry (Le Guin, 
Shore 200).  By ceding responsibility for their return to the living world to Arren, Ged 
survives his heroic feat.  He can then achieve the romance conclusion of reintegration with 
society through his return to Roke and Gont.   
 
Ged is the only character to appear in all three books of the original trilogy, and can be 
considered its central character; his three hero acts all appear to support the theory that 
heroic action in the integrative style is necessary to neutralise the effects of the   177 
transcendent impulse, and bring about ethical transition.  However, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, the role Ged plays in relation to his Secondary World is not protagonist, but 
orchestrator.  In the original Earthsea trilogy, public action in the integrative mode is 
undertaken only by the orchestrator—the character whose job it is to model ethical 
transition for others to follow.  Public activity is not the means by which the ethical 
transition is achieved, but only the means by which it is facilitated.  It is the actions of the 
other characters surrounding Ged that actually bring about the world-change.  Like 
Tolkien, Le Guin privileges the private dimension of response to the transcendent impulse 
over the public dimension of response to the damage done by transcendent action; in fact, 
she grants it even more importance than he does.  In the Earthsea cycle, private action is 
ultimately the only thing that can create the ethical transition. 
 
None of Ged’s performances of the hero paradigm is a complete narrative—or the focus of 
the narrative in which it appears.  In A Wizard of Earthsea, the heroic journey Ged 
undertakes does not constitute the whole of the narrative.  It is an inset episode, integrated 
with the primary coming-of-age narrative mostly by Yevaud’s offer to tell Ged the 
Shadow’s name (Esmonde 19), and interpolated into a specific interval in the main 
narrative.  This is the period between Ged’s completion of his formal education in the 
principle of Equilibrium at Roke, and the point at which the consequences of his past 
tragedic action—the emergence of his Shadow from the Dry Land—force him to take 
action in the world.   
 
In epic, the heroic journey can form part of a ‘maturational’ sequence in which ‘the hero is 
required to “go and find” something as an essential part of his growth into and self-
identification within the  “matured” state of hero-hood’ (Miller 166).  In A Wizard of 
Earthsea, however, the placement of the heroic journey as an inset narrative means that it   178 
functions less as a part of the coming-of-age narrative than as a commentary on why that 
coming of age is necessary.  Ged’s deployment of tragedic and comedic strategies in his 
encounter with Yevaud suggests that at this point he acts from a sound theoretical 
understanding of the principle of Equilibrium: he balances the transcendent principle by 
deploying its inverse to contain its effect on the world.  However, he does not reach the 
conclusion of the romance hero’s narrative.  While he succeeds in his heroic feat, survives 
it and returns from it, Ged cannot reintegrate with the society he returns to: 
 
The next day . . . Ged felt afresh the unease and impatience that had driven him to Pendor, 
and drove him now from Low Torning . . . though they would have kept him gladly the rest 
of his life to praise and boast of, he left . . .  
(Le Guin, Wizard 109) 
 
Ged is prevented from reintegrating with the community he returns to by his Shadow, 
which is the unfaced consequence of his own transcendent action—and is also, as Slusser 
points out, the death he defies when he calls up the spirit of Elfarran during his duel with 
Jasper (37). 
 
Ged’s response to his Shadow’s presence in the world is very different from his response 
to the dragons of Pendor.  His first reaction is an attempt to escape from the consequences 
of his actions by returning to the protected space of Roke Island (Barrow and Barrow 29).  
However, the Roke-wind will not let him land (Le Guin, Wizard 111): denial is not an 
option.  Ged then tries to run away from the Shadow, despite knowing that it will be 
useless (Le Guin, Wizard 113-4).  Finally, he tries to gain ‘a sword to fight shadows with’ 
(Le Guin, Wizard 115) at the Court of the Terrenon in Osskil—in other words, he looks for 
a way to gain mastery over the Shadow, to defeat a transcendent act with a transcendent   179 
act.  However, this also is ineffective.  The Terrenon, which is one of the Old Powers of 
the Earth, can (like Yevaud) tell Ged the name of his Shadow.  But because Ged’s Shadow 
shares Ged’s name, this will lead to Ged’s being consumed by the Shadow in the end: 
 
Once his will was captured by the power of the Stone, then [Serret and Benderesk] would 
let the Shadow into the walls, for a gebbeth was a better slave than a man.  If he had once 
touched the Stone, or spoken to it, he would have been utterly lost. 
(Le Guin, Wizard 135) 
 
In the attempt to defeat the transcendent presence in the world, transcendent action in the 
private sphere is a trap that leads only to the individual’s destruction.  When Ged realises 
this, his only recourse is to run away again, and find temporary sanctuary with Ogion. 
 
Ged’s responses to the presence of his Shadow in the world imply that his understanding of 
the principle of Equilibrium is limited.  He understands it as a system guiding public 
actions in the world, such as his dealings with Yevaud (Crow and Erlich 204), but not as a 
model for the relationship between the individual self and the world (Molson 137).  The 
turning point, literally, of the primary narrative of A Wizard of Earthsea is the moment at 
which Ged leaves his refuge with Ogion, and goes out to face the consequences of his 
actions rather than trying to evade them.  When he begins to hunt his Shadow, Ged applies 
the principle of Equilibrium to himself for the first time.  Because this might well result in 
his own death or destruction, as Slusser points out, making the decision to hunt the Shadow 
is an ‘act of mind which necessarily denies [Ged’s] exceptional nature, and places him on a 
level with all the rest—the acceptance of his common mortality’ (37).  In accepting the 
possibility of his own death, Ged begins to move towards a comedic state of being.  
Having done this, Ged is able to neutralise the effects of his own transcendent actions on   180 
the world, by incorporating his Shadow into himself.  He subordinates his impulse to 
transcend his environment to his acquired understanding of the Equilibrium and his own 
part in it.  He is thus able to achieve a temporary reintegration with his society, through his 
return to the Archipelago and his friend Vetch’s family (Le Guin, Wizard 200-1).  Ged’s 
narrative in A Wizard of Earthsea implies public integrative action in the world is less 
important to the achievement of ethical transition than is the individual’s private 
acceptance of the principle of existence within limitations, and nonheroic action in line 
with this principle.  However, this is not in itself enough to achieve the saving world-
change.  Ethical transition may be forwarded in A Wizard of Earthsea, but it is not 
achieved. 
 
Le Guin elaborates on this idea in the second volume of the original trilogy, The Tombs of 
Atuan.  Ged and his heroic deeds are not the focus of The Tombs of Atuan.  The narrative 
focusses on the coming of age of Arha, the One Priestess of the Nameless Ones (Cummins 
39); Ged’s hero narrative forms an element of Arha’s story, and as Le Guin points out in 
Earthsea Revisioned, Ged’s success at and survival of his hero act are dependent on Arha’s 
narrative (9).  Unlike Ged in A Wizard of Earthsea, Arha is well aware of how to live 
within limitations, up to and including the fact of mortality—in fact, too aware.  The first 
four chapters of The Tombs of Atuan depict the transformation of the child Tenar into 
Arha, the Priestess of the Nameless Ones.  This is a symbolic transformation—Tenar goes 
through a ritual, the Remaking of the Priestess, after which she loses her own name and is 
called by the title of Arha, the Eaten One, instead (Le Guin, Tombs 15).  But it is also a 
literal transformation.  After the ritual, Arha is educated in the knowledge and actions 
prescribed for a Priestess by her society.  This, as Spivack points out, is an education in 
passivity: after she becomes the Eaten One ‘Arha has no opportunity for either personal 
choice or voluntary actions’ (Le Guin 33).  Arha’s knowledge of her duties and of the   181 
world outside the Place of the Tombs is learnt by rote.  The only public action she is 
required to perform during her tenure as the One Priestess (the execution of a group of 
political prisoners) is in fact an inaction.  Pressured away from direct action by the 
Priestess of the Godking, Arha orders that the prisoners be starved to death—a withholding 
from action rather than an action undertaken.  Arha lacks the capacity to act that 
complements and validates integrative understanding. 
 
By the point at which Ged enters the narrative, Arha understands her world by means of a 
set of received wisdoms that encompass every aspect of it—physical, political, 
philosophical, religious and metaphysical.  This official education is undermined 
somewhat by Arha’s informal exposure to the different opinions of her guardian Manan 
and her friend Penthe.  Manan tells Arha about the history of the Godkings and the 
marginalisation of the religion of the Nameless Ones (Le Guin, Tombs 48); Penthe’s 
matter-of-fact disbelief in the divinity of the Godking she is consecrated to serve teaches 
Arha about ‘unfaith’ (Le Guin, Tombs 48).  These subversive viewpoints have some effect.  
Arha comes to view the Godkings as ‘upstarts, false gods trying to filch the worship due to 
the true and everlasting Powers’ (Le Guin, Tombs 47).  However, Manan and Penthe do 
not offer alternatives strong enough to challenge Arha’s indoctrinated worldview, because 
they are founded on the same premises that underlie Arha’s formal education—that gods 
exist in the Secondary World of Earthsea, that the Nameless Ones are those gods, and that 
the inactive state in which Arha exists is the right one.  Penthe is afraid of ‘the dark’ and 
the Nameless Ones that inhabit it (Le Guin, Tombs 48); Manan agrees with Arha that the 
Place is ‘the centre of things’ (Le Guin, Tombs 32). 
 
The physical domain of the One Priestess is the underground Labyrinth inhabited by the 
Nameless Ones.  This is what R. Rawdon Wilson calls a weak or mimic labyrinth, a   182 
‘construction in words of walls, corridors, passageways and rooms . . . [that] merely 
represent[s] details of exterior appearances, specific constructions’ (153) and that exists to 
serve plot purposes.  The Labyrinth is presented to the reader of The Tombs of Atuan as an 
image before the story of The Tombs of Atuan begins: the book contains two frontispiece 
maps, the first of the aboveground Place of the Tombs and the second of the Labyrinth.  As 
the order of the maps indicates, the Labyrinth physically underlies the Place, though few of 
the Priestesses who live there know of its existence (Le Guin, Tombs 51).  Arha learns to 
navigate the Labyrinth exactly as she learns to navigate her public role—by rote, 
memorising lists of directions before ever setting foot in it (Le Guin, Tombs 50).  The 
physical Labyrinth signals the presence of the other labyrinth within which Arha is 
trapped: her falsely-founded worldview, which forms what Wilson calls a strong or 
conceptual labyrinth, a ‘purely conceptual’ maze which is ‘constructed out of alternatives, 
choices, a series of decisions, symmetrically opposed sets of criteria’ (153-4).  Arha’s role 
comprises her conceptual labyrinth, her intellectual domain, as the Labyrinth does her 
physical domain (Cummins 42).   
 
But labyrinths, as Wilson states, are traps out of which characters must ‘play’ their way 
(160).  Ged’s arrival within the enclosed space of the physical Labyrinth immediately 
introduces potential alternatives into Arha’s intellectual space: obedience or autonomy, 
Priestess or person (Molson 143).  Arha’s interaction with Ged makes her increasingly 
aware of her own ignorance, although she attempts to deny that awareness: 
 
‘You are lying,’ the girl said fiercely, ‘you are making it all up . . . All I know is the dark, 
the night underground.  And that’s all there really is.  That’s all there is to know, in the end 
. . . You know everything, wizard.  But I know one thing—the one true thing!’ 
(Le Guin, Tombs 93)   183 
 
These alternatives open up for Arha the possibility—and eventually, because of the 
political pressures brought to bear on her, the requirement—that she take action.  While 
Arha’s understanding of her social and cultural context is accurate and acute, her 
understanding of the physical reality within which she exists is distorted.  Her interaction 




  The alternatives Ged represents allow Arha to discover, slowly and 
privately, a way out of her conceptual labyrinth.  She becomes able to recognise the false 
foundation upon which her worldview has been built, that is, the belief in gods that are not 
gods (Le Guin, Tombs 112).   
Having recognised that fact, Arha is able to reject her imprisoning worldview and take 
integrative action in the world.  But she does not take heroic action; as Le Guin states in 
Earthsea Revisioned, her actions are those of a heroine (9).  She releases Ged from the 
Labyrinth and gives him the Ring of Erreth-Akbe, and leaves the Place of the Tombs with 
him (Le Guin, Tombs 122).  Arha’s exit from the Labyrinth with Ged signals her conscious 
rejection of the conceptual labyrinth of her indoctrinated worldview.  She still has some 
way to go before she is entirely free of her indoctrinated habits of thought, as is shown 
when, in anger and confusion, she decides to murder Ged, just before making the final 
break with her old life.  However, after leaving the Labyrinth she is called by her birth 
name of Tenar again, not only by Ged but by the impersonal narrative voice which relates 
her story.  Once Tenar has moved out of her passive state and accepted both her ability and 
her responsibility to act (shown by her guilt over the death of Manan and the political 
prisoners she executed), she achieves a comedic integration with society.  She goes to live 
with Ogion on Gont, marries, and becomes part of a community.   
                                                 
13 The reader is expected to recognise that Ged’s answers to Arha’s questions are more accurate than her 
statements because of how closely they accord with what is presented in A Wizard of Earthsea.   184 
 
Arha may be dependent on Ged to supply the information she needs to play her way out of 
her conceptual labyrinth, but Ged’s survival and achievement of his goal are equally 
dependent on Arha’s success at working her way through her conceptual labyrinth (Le 
Guin, Revisioned 9).  It is her action, not Ged’s, that furthers ethical transition in The 
Tombs of Atuan.  This implies that achievement of ethical transition in the Secondary 
World depends on the individual’s acceptance of, not just limitations, but the responsibility 
to act integratively within those limitations.  To bring about the metamorphosis that saves 
the Secondary World, the individual must reject the state that permits the transcendent 
presence to dominate the world—that is, ethical passivity. 
 
However, the narrative of The Tombs of Atuan is does not bring about the ethical transition 
any more than that of A Wizard of Earthsea does.  Even though the ring of Erreth-Akbe is 
whole again, Cob is able to undertake his attempt to transcend mortality.  The social 
landscape of the Archipelago is still fragmented: one of the students of Roke comments at 
the beginning of The Farthest Shore, 
 
‘ . . . How long has it been, seventeen years, or eighteen, since the Ring of the King’s Rune 
was returned to the Tower of the Kings in Havnor?  Things were better for a while then, 
but now they’re worse than ever.  It’s time there was a king again on the throne of 
Earthsea, to wield the Sign of Peace . . . Roke guides, but it can’t rule. The Balance lies 
here, but the Power should lie in the king’s hands.’ 
(Le Guin, Shore 24) 
 
Thus in The Farthest Shore, Le Guin develops her argument to its logical conclusion.  
Once again, Ged’s performance of the hero paradigm is enclosed within another narrative,   185 
this time the coming-of-age narrative of the young prince Arren.  Ged’s and Arren’s 
stories, seen together, recall a common epic motif—the dyad of interdependent hero and 
companion.  There are many variations on this motif in epic literature; the best-known is 
that in which ‘the heroic dyads are identified, flower as part of the dynamic of the drama, 
and then—usually—die’ (Miller 103).  Such heroic dyads famously include Roland and 
Olivier, and Achilles and Patrocles.  They usually comprise a young man whose strength is 
action and whose goal is fame, and another man who may be ‘older and presumably more 
experienced’ than the hero, but who nevertheless ‘projects an insufficiently heroic force 
and excellence’ to undertake heroic action himself (Miller 103).  The hero’s companion 
usually predeceases the hero, and his death either pushes the hero toward the completion of 
his heroic feat (Achilles), or else strips him of his strength and brings about his death 
(Roland).   
 
In The Farthest Shore, Ged and Arren resemble such an heroic dyad, with Ged as the 
older, wiser companion and Arren as the young hero.  Arren has the potential to take on the 
hero role himself.  However, he does not perform the hero paradigm.  He begins his 
narrative as his father’s messenger: messengers are neutral in mode because they do not act 
independently (Miller 334).  And although Arren carries markers that could link him to 
either the tragedic mode or the comedic, neither is dominant.  Arren carries a sword, the 
symbol of action in the world (Slusser 46); but it is a sword that ‘never had been drawn, 
nor ever could be drawn, except in the service of life.  For no purpose of bloodlust or 
revenge or greed, in no war of gain, would it let itself be wielded’ (Le Guin, Shore 38). 
Arren has an heroic ancestry; he is the descendent of the hero Morred, but also of 
‘ “ . . . Serriadh who was born beyond despair, the gentle king” ’ (Le Guin, Shore 84), and 
the sword he carries is Serriadh’s.  This suggests that Arren has the potential to develop 
into either a transcendent or an integrative figure.     186 
 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, in the Earthsea trilogy heroic action is the province 
of the orchestrator.  In The Farthest Shore, therefore, the older and more experienced 
member of the dyad does possess sufficient force to complete the heroic act.  Ged closes 
the breach between worlds created by Cob, and also heals the damage Cob has done to 
himself (by renaming him in death: Crow and Erlich 214).
14
 
  The focus of the narrative is 
therefore on a coming of age that is not dependent on heroic action—that is, Arren’s 
development into the role of King. 
At the beginning of The Farthest Shore the narrative voice positions Arren as a child 
within his culture.  Like Arha before Ged enters the Labyrinth in The Tombs of Atuan, 
Arren is ‘not yet used to thinking widely’ (Le Guin, Shore 13), to considering either his 
Secondary World as a system, or himself as part of that system: 
 
[Arren] did not like to think that he feared the Archmage’s gaze, but he could not meet it.  
It seemed to enlarge the world yet again around him, and now not only Enlad sank into 
                                                 
14 This part of the narrative has not, to my knowledge, been unpacked in any study of The Farthest Shore.  
The narrative voice describes Ged’s final act after healing the breach between worlds: 
 
. . . bending over the blind man, who was crouched on his knees, Ged whispered in his ear, under the 
white tangled hair. 
 
Cob stood up.  He looked about him slowly, with seeing eyes . . . There was no anger in his face, no 
hate, no grief.  Slowly he turned, and went off down the course of the Dry River, and soon was gone 
from sight. 
(Le Guin, Shore 202) 
 
What Ged does at this point is never specified.  However, the description closely parallels Ged’s earlier 
renaming of Akaren, the Dyer of Lorbanery, and may be intended to recall it: 
 
. . . with his lips close to her ear he spoke a little in the Old Speech, and once more kissed her, and 
let her go. 
 
She opened her eyes, and looked at him a while with a brooding, wondering gaze . . . She turned 
slowly and went to her door, and entered it, and closed it behind her: all in silence, with the still look 
of wonder on her face. 
(Le Guin, Shore 96-7) 
 
The implication is that the two acts are the same—that Ged, at this point, completes Cob’s healing by giving 
him a new name.   187 
insignificance, but he himself, so that in the eyes of the Archmage he was only a small 
figure, very small, in a vast scene of sea-girt lands over which hung darkness. 
(Le Guin, Shore 14) 
 
As Arren later says himself, he does not ‘believe in death’ (Le Guin, Shore 150).  
However, as he accompanies Ged’s heroic journey, Arren is repeatedly forced to confront 
the fact of human mortality—through his abduction by slave-takers, the suicide of the 
madman Sopli, Ged’s injury and illness at Obehol, Arren’s inability to save himself and 
Ged when their boat drifts on the open ocean, and finally the journey into the Dry Land of 
the Dead (Erlich 457).  The narrative emphasises Arren’s fear of death, and his consequent 
attraction to the transcendent possibility falsely offered by Cob.  It juxtaposes Arren’s fear 
against Ged’s acceptance of death as a certainty: 
 
‘ . . . there is a way.  The way he looked for.  Sopli.  And Hare, and the others.  The way 
back to life, life without death.  You—you above all—you must know of that way—’ 
 
‘I do not know it.’ 
 
‘But the others, the wizards—’ 
 
‘I know what they think they seek.  But I know that they will die, as Sopli did.  That I will 
die.  That you will die . . . And I prize that knowledge . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Shore 135) 
 
Ged’s heroic journey thus serves as the site of Arren’s education in the integrative ethic 
that underlies Ged’s actions.  Unlike Ged, however, Arren learns before he acts.  During 
their journey, Ged introduces Arren to the comedic theory of the individual’s relationship   188 
to the world, in the fullest statement anywhere in the Earthsea cycle of the concept of 
Equilibrium: 
 
‘ . . . The winds and seas, the powers of water and earth and light, all that these do, and all 
that the beasts and green things do, is well done, and rightly done.  All these act within the 
Equilibrium. . . . But we, in so far as we have power over the world and over one another, 
we . . . must learn to keep the balance.  Having intelligence, we must not act in ignorance.  
Having choice, we must not act without responsibility . . . ’ 
 (Le Guin, Shore 77) 
 
The journey complements this theory with a practical illustration of why acceptance of 
mortality is imperative: Cob’s achievement of his false immortality results only in a 
demonstrable ‘blight’ upon the landscape that leaves ‘ “ . . . The arts of man forgotten.  The 
singer tongueless.  The eye blind. . . . No births; no new lives.  No children. . . . ” ’ Le 
Guin, Shore 151).   
 
Arren’s journey into the Dry Lands and his encounter there with Cob, the embodiment of 
the transcendent impulse and actor of the tragedic paradigm, is the point at which his 
theoretical understanding must transform into action.  But as with Arha, Arren does not 
undertake heroic action (Slusser 43).  He makes one gesture towards epic heroism, when 
he tries to use force to stop Cob from attacking Ged.  However, this is ineffective.  Cob, 
being dead already, is invulnerable to physical injury (Le Guin, Shore 201).  But Ged’s 
completion of his heroic feat is not the close of Arren’s narrative.  After Ged closes the 
breach between the worlds, he collapses.  This performs the same function as the older 
companion’s death in the epic dyad: it calls out the young hero’s response from Arren, 
pushing him towards the completion of his own narrative.  Because the heroic action is   189 
already completed, however, Arren must achieve his coming of age in a different way.  He 
undertakes non-paradigmatic action that is oriented entirely toward survival.  Arren guides, 
and then carries, Ged through the Mountains of Pain and into the living world again.  His 
method is not transcendence of his context, but endurance of its imperatives combined with 
action within those limitations: ‘Arren knew that the way they had come was closed to 
them.  They could only go on.  They must go all the way’  (Le Guin, Shore 202-3).   
 
This physically and emotionally difficult journey across the Mountains of Pain and back to 
the living world completes Arren’s coming of age (Crow and Erlich 215).  It also makes 
him the fulfilment of prophecy: he has ‘crossed the dark land living and come to the far 
shores of the day’ (Le Guin, Shore 25) and is therefore the King of All the Isles—the 
central authority figure needed to stabilise the socially fragmented Archipelago.  Arren’s 
coming of age also makes possible Ged’s first and only complete performance of the 
romance hero paradigm in the Earthsea cycle—one that incorporates not only success and 
survival, but also a return from the heroic feat to reintegrate with society.  Ged and Arren 
return to their public starting point of Roke Island.  There, Ged enables the regeneration of 
Archipeligan society; his public acknowledgment of the fulfilment of prophecy that makes 
Arren the King of All the Isles transfers responsibility for the wellbeing of the Secondary 
World to Arren (Le Guin, Shore 213).  Ged then returns alone to his private starting point 
of Gont, where he is able to reintegrate with his own, original society through his marriage 
with Tenar, and foster-fatherhood of the dragon child Tehanu.   
 
Arren’s coming of age develops beyond the movement into private integrative action 
modelled by Arha in The Tombs of Atuan; it models a movement into the integrative ethic, 
an achievement of comedic understanding and orientation that is lived rather than acted, 
and that has power to affect the world.  Through it, Le Guin suggests that the ethical   190 
transition is dependent not on public action in the world, but the individual’s development 
beyond heroic action, to the living of the integrative ethic in the world.  Without that, 
heroic action will be unsuccessful in achieving its ends.  Tolkien posits, through Aragorn’s 
and Frodo’s narratives, that public integrative action cannot preserve the Secondary World 
unless it is founded on a modified form of tragedic action in the private sphere.  In the 
original Earthsea trilogy, in contrast, Le Guin argues that in a Secondary World that 
balances itself, the success of public action in achieving ethical transition depends on the 
adoption of the comedic ethic in the private sphere. 
 
The close of The Farthest Shore is stylised and symbolic, and Le Guin uses exactly the 
same symbol to close its focal narrative as Tolkien does in The Lord of the Rings: the 
restoration of the true King.  As Crowe says, 
 
the symbol of the True King really has little to do with politics.  It has many layers of 
meaning; it suggests order against chaos, the rule of law, the legitimate use of power, the 
union of sacred and secular.  It is a powerful symbol of social and spiritual unity. 
(Crowe 73) 
 
Arren’s movement into the role of King of All the Isles symbolically instates the 
integrative ethic as the dominant in the Archipelago.  However, this ending does not solve 
the problem of the transcendent presence in Earthsea; it only obscures it.  The symbolic 
presence of an authority figure oriented to the integrative ethic cannot actually change the 
nature of the Secondary World.  The Dry Land of the Dead still exists: Arren’s new 
comedic order is still founded on the tragedic principle that human consciousness is 
separate from and superior to its environment.  Individual minds are still driven by the 
same inherent consciousness of and fear of death that drives Cob, and as Ged points out to   191 
Arren in The Farthest Shore, ‘ “ . . . It is much easier for men to act than to refrain from 
acting . . . ” ’ (77): the human impulse to ‘action’, the transcendent impulse, is still present 
in the world Arren, as Lebannen the King, rules.  In Tehanu the wizard Aspen still acts to 
gain power over death and power over the world (Le Guin, Tehanu 241), and in 
‘Dragonfly’ the Master Summoner Thorion comes back to Roke from death in an attempt 
to deny and control the eucatastrophic change (Le Guin, Tales 260).  In The Other Wind, 
the wall between the living world and the Dry Land of the Dead still stands, and there is 
still enmity between dragons and humans because of it.  There is still need for action 
against the transcendent presence; but heroic action, even by the orchestrator, is no longer 
appropriate, and cannot be effective.  To work within the symbolic order and oppose the 
problems it obscures, new patterns of action are required.   
 
After the close of The Farthest Shore, the conditions that produce paradigmatic heroism as 
a solution to disorder (Jackson 4) no longer pertain.  There is a functioning authority figure 
at the centre of the Secondary World.  Because of his learning experiences in The Farthest 
Shore, Lebannen embodies the integrative ethic, but he is not the roi fainéant (feeble king) 
common in epic and romance.  He is not paralysed by his youth and inexperience; when 
Tenar encounters him for the first time in Tehanu she recognises ‘something in his eyes 
that [makes] her think: He has been through the fire.’  (Le Guin, Tehanu 145).  Lebannen is 
mobile and active.  In Tehanu he travels to Roke and Gont; during his reign he goes out 
with his navy to fight pirates and slave-traders (Le Guin, Wind 190); in The Other Wind he 
travels about Havnor, and sails to Roke.  Lebannen is a working king: he is active in 
diplomacy and in government despite being an ‘indifferent politician’ (Le Guin, Wind 
138).  He in fact fulfils the function of the ideal king figure in epic and romance: ‘the 
sovereign, at least in the myth-borne and perfect pattern, aims to guide and balance his 
realm with an eye to the gains of fruitful peace’ (Miller 140).     192 
 
Because there is a functioning authority figure in the Earthsea scenario for the first time, 
there is no further need for its proxy, the orchestrator.  Ged retires from the role at the end 
of The Farthest Shore, and thereafter stays out of public life entirely.  He does not attend 
Lebannen’s coronation (Le Guin, Shore 214), or interfere in his reign: ‘[Ged] had handed 
over the power—wholly, freely. He would not even seem to meddle, to cast his shadow 
across Lebannen’s light’  (Le Guin, Wind 78).  No Archmage can be chosen to replace him 
(Le Guin, Tehanu 156).  Furthermore, the wizardry that enabled eucatastrophe in The 
Farthest Shore is no longer presented as heroic, or even positive.  The wizards of Roke, in 
the continuation volumes, are more likely to be antagonists than protagonists, and even 
those who are not antagonists are (except for the three passive Masters, the Doorkeeper, 
the Patterner and the Namer) ambiguous figures.  In the three continuation volumes, in a 
change of direction possibly referencing some of McKillip’s insights in The Riddle-
Master’s Game, Le Guin explores the potential for different action to move the world 
closer to a real, rather than a symbolic, ethical transition, and one that extends beyond the 
personal and social into the physical. 
 
In Earthsea Revisioned, Le Guin describes Tehanu as a ‘re-visioning’, a literal re-seeing of 
the Earthsea of the original trilogy.  In it, she interrogates the symbolic end of The Farthest 
Shore, and its non-symbolic implications for the Secondary World.  Tehanu can be 
described as a return to and retake on the original trilogy, which is an essentially 
prefeminist text: ‘ . . . I look back and see that I was writing partly by the rules, as an 
artificial man, and partly against the rules, as an inadvertent revolutionary’ (Le Guin, 
Revisioned 7).  Tehanu was written during the period of disillusionment and bitterness 
following the apparent failure of second-wave feminism to achieve its goals.  It is 
predominantly concerned with revealing the problems inherent in The Farthest Shore’s   193 
stylised conclusion (D. White 107).  It does not, however, offer a solution to those 
problems.  That is not its job.   
 
The protagonist of Tehanu is Tenar.  The story occurs immediately after The Farthest 
Shore, and in it, Tenar occupies one of the few traditionally ‘free’ spaces for women in 
literature.  She is ‘the widow Goha’, a middle-aged woman with two adult children and a 
young foster-daughter, the burned child Therru.  Tenar is already in the state that Arren 
attains at the end of The Farthest Shore.  She embodies the integrative ethic that The 
Farthest Shore posits as the solution to the problem of the transcendent ethic—but she 
does so in a very different way from the detached ‘Taoist sage’ (Wytenbroek 177) ideal of 
The Farthest Shore (McLean 112).  Tenar is integrated with a social world.  She has a job: 
she is a farmer.  She is tied to places—first her farm, and later Ogion’s hut as well—and to 
a community that includes her children, her neighbours and friends, the local witches and 
the people who buy from her farm.  Tenar recognises her own abilities.  She knows that 
she can save Therru’s life where Ivy and Ogion cannot, because as the former Priestess of 
the Nameless Ones she understands the source of Therru’s injuries in a way that neither 
Ivy nor Ogion can: ‘ “I served them and I left them,” she said.  “I will not let them have 
you” ’ (Le Guin, Tehanu 5).  She also knows her own limitations—she knows, for 
example, that the study of magic is not right for her (Le Guin, Tehanu 95). 
 
However, despite being a widow, Tenar is not ‘free’.  She is confined by a set of 
limitations imposed on her from outside, by other people’s ideas of who and what she is, 
and what it is appropriate for her to do and be: 
 
. . . there in the Middle Valley, Flint’s wife, Goha, had been welcome, all in all, among the 
women; a foreigner, to be sure . . . but a notable housekeeper, an excellent spinner, with   194 
well-behaved, well-grown children and a prospering farm: respectable.  And among men 
she was Flint’s woman, doing what a woman should do: bed, breed, bake, cook, clean, 
spin, sew, serve.  A good woman. 
 (Le Guin, Tehanu 34) 
 
Tenar is confined by how her culture sees her, and can be trapped and made vulnerable by 
its rules, as she is when Handy and his crew—the men who raped and burned Therru—use 
that definition to threaten her (Le Guin, Tehanu 192).  If, as Albert Cook suggests, the 
literary genre of comedy is concerned with ‘manners’ and the individual’s fit in society 
(34), then the ethic it expresses can easily be misinterpreted as unquestioning acceptance of 
the arbitrary rules of society.  This is the point at which the integrative ethic becomes 
stagnant; and this is the face of the comedic ethic that Le Guin presents in Tehanu. 
 
Tehanu shows that the traditional comedic methods of evasion and containment are, in this 
stultified comedic state, ineffective ways of dealing with the transcendent presence.  Tenar 
resists culturally-imposed limitations on what she can be and do as far as she can, in small 
matters—when she runs Oak Farm herself in her son’s absence, when she takes Therru into 
her family after she is burned, when she forces the Gontish wizards to hear her say Ogion’s 
true name after his death rather than let him die nameless (Le Guin, Tehanu 29).  However, 
in large matters, she cannot entirely escape the limitations imposed by her society.  She 
recognises Aspen as a dangerous presence on Gont, and responds to him as such, before 
any other character, but because of her status as an ageing common woman she cannot act 
directly against the problem he represents.  She uses the traditional comedic method of 
evasion in an attempt to block his actions and stay safe herself, adopting her local persona 
of Goha the widow (rather than the prominent and powerful Tenar of the Ring) in an 
attempt to shield herself from his enmity (Le Guin, Tehanu 126-7).  She survives Aspen’s   195 
later curse by sidestepping it, drawing on the knowledge of ‘the girl Arha, who she had 
been long ago . . . [who] had known how to curse, and how to live in the dark, and how to 
be silent’ (Le Guin, Tehanu 136).  By thinking in Kargish and keeping silent, Tenar is able 
to turn Aspen’s curse aside for long enough to make her way to Lebannen, the ‘haven’ (Le 
Guin, Tehanu 147).  When Handy and his crew attack her home, Tenar protects herself and 
Therru by retreating, bolting all the doors and windows of her house until help arrives in 
the form of Ged, who may not have magic any more but who proves ‘useful with a 
pitchfork’ (Le Guin, Tehanu 201).   
 
However, these strategies create only temporary refuges, and produce predominantly 
negative results.  Tenar evades Aspen’s first curse thanks to the timely intervention of the 
King’s messengers, but this only increases Aspen’s malice and inspires his second curse.  
Lebannen’s intervention buys Tenar and Therru a long peace at Oak Farm, but that is 
eventually shattered by Handy’s assault.  Tenar, Therru and Ged leave Oak Farm in the 
end, in response to a combination of duplicity and the uncomfortable presence of Tenar’s 
son Spark.  When they do, Tenar and the powerless Ged are trapped by Aspen’s malicious 
magic ‘with a thong through her tongue and a thong through his heart’ (Le Guin, Tehanu 
244).  The traditional comedic method of evasion, of working within limitations and using 
them to contain and defeat transcendent ambition and isolation, does not serve, because the 
restrictions imposed by cultural conservatism are too great.  Another, new form of action is 
needed—one that can access the integrative ethic but escape the limitations created by 
human culture.   
 
This new possibility comes in the form of the abused and burned child Therru, whose body 
has had restrictions imposed on it by others (McLean 115), but who is not entirely limited   196 
by them.  Although she is ‘not one of the winged ones’ (Le Guin, Tehanu 244), Therru is a 
dragon child; to save Tenar and Ged, she calls her dragon kin out of the west: 
 
[Therru] ran as fast as she could . . . to the edge of the cliff, where she was not to go 
because she could see it only with one eye.  She was careful.  She looked carefully with 
that eye.  She stood on the edge . . . She looked into the west with the other eye, and 
called with the other voice the name she had heard in her mother’s dream [i.e. Kalessin]. 
(Le Guin, Tehanu 244-5) 
 
The dragon Kalessin answers Therru’s call and reduces Alder to a pile of ‘scorched rags of 
cloth and leather, and other things’, almost incidentally, in the course of freeing Tenar and 
Ged from his spell (Le Guin, Tehanu 250).  This is in stark contrast to Ged’s gentle 
renaming of Cob in the Dry Land: no reconciliation with or containment of the 
transcendent ethic is possible any more.  Furthermore, this scene reveals that Kalessin is 
also Segoy, the creator of both the language and the landscape of Earthsea (Le Guin, 
Tehanu 249).  Kalessin’s intervention in the narrative at this point, and its destruction of 
Aspen and his transcendent actions, suggests that it is not the solution to a problem, but a 
beginning point from which a new solution must evolve: ‘the dragon is subversion, 
revolution, change—a going beyond the old order . . . of oppression.  It is the wildness of 
the spirit and of the earth, uprising against misrule’ (Le Guin, Revisioned 23-4). 
 
The narrative of Tehanu does not unpack the dragon symbol to say what that new vision of 
the integrative ethic might look like: Therru who is Tehanu, the dragon in a human body, 
still has ‘work to do here’ (Le Guin, Tehanu 249).  Instead, the idea is unpacked in the next 
of the Earthsea continuations, the novella ‘Dragonfly’.  The structure of ‘Dragonfly’ 
resembles that of Tehanu somewhat, in that the narrative of a female protagonist’s   197 
individual development—Irian’s need to discover who and what she is—brings her into 
conflict with both the transcendent impulse and comedic stagnation.  However, unlike 
Tehanu, the narrative of ‘Dragonfly’ moves on from the failure of the old form, and (to 
adapt a phrase from McKillip: Game 547) explores a new possibility into existence.    
 
In ‘Dragonfly’, everything is stagnant, both the integrative ethic and the transcendent.  
Roke, the home of the doctrine of Equilibrium and thus of the institutionalised version of 
the integrative ethic, is defined by its exclusions—of women, of sexuality, of knowledge—
and shown to be incapable of accepting change or incorporating differences of opinion.  
Irian’s father, the Master of Old Iria, has slipped from a lukewarm variety of transcendent 
endeavour—his pointless pursuit of ‘his right to the whole domain [of Iria] as it had been a 
hundred years ago’ through the courts of law—into a state of slow self-destruction through 
drunkenness (Le Guin Tales, 198).  The Master Summoner Thorion, who has summoned 
himself out of death to bring the old order of the Archmages back to Roke, is in fact a dead 
man still: 
 
As [the Summoner] walked slowly past Irian, she shrank back from him.  It was as if a 
grave had opened, a winter grave, cold, wet, dark.  Her breath stuck in her throat.  She 
gasped a little for air. 
(Le Guin, Tales 235) 
 
The stagnant culture of Iria imposes heavy restrictions on Irian’s identity, life and actions.  
Her father’s pride and bitterness keep her confined by poverty and ignorance, and her 
knowledge of the world limited to the boundaries of Old Iria; the restrictions of Roke deny 
her the chance to discover the truth about herself.  But within these restrictions Irian, like 
Tenar, embodies the integrative ethic.  She is associated with a specific place—her father’s   198 
estate of Old Iria, on which she does ‘all the work’ (Le Guin, Tales 206)—and is part of a 
community including her father’s small household and a nearby village.  She is, however, 
more closely connected to the animal world than Tenar, through her preference for the 
company of the ‘dogs and horses and cattle’ of the farm (Le Guin, Tales 199).  And there is 
something unusual about Irian—she has ‘a strength’ that is not magic, that the village 
witch Rose cannot name (Le Guin, Tales 201).   
 
Like Tenar, Irian initially uses the traditional comedic method of evasion to overcome the 
restrictions imposed on her.  When her father insists that she ‘honor her inheritance and be 
true to Iria’, she promises herself that she will ‘be loyal to her mother, whom nobody knew 
or honored or was true to, except herself’ instead (Le Guin, Tales 198-9).  The Master of 
Old Iria refuses to let either Rose or his neighbour’s sorcerer give his daughter her true 
name: the one is too lowly and the other a challenge to his nonexistent authority.  Irian 
retorts, ‘ “He can keep me poor and stupid and worthless, but he can’t keep me 
nameless!” ’ (Le Guin, Tales 201), and persuades Rose to name her in secret anyway.  
Irian overcomes her ignorance by talking to the sorcerer Ivory and learning about the world 
from him (Le Guin, Tales 212).  Above all, she recognises that her true name, Irian—with 
its implication that she is identified solely with her father’s land and its tangled history—is 
not her full true name and does not express her whole self:  
 
‘ . . . It’s his name.  He can have it.  He’s so proud of it, his stupid domain, his stupid 
grandfather.  I don’t want it.  I won’t have it.  It isn’t me.  I still don’t know who I am.  I’m 
not Irian!’  
(Le Guin, Tales 203) 
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When, at the age of twenty-three, Irian leaves home to discover the truth about herself, her 
methods recall a narrative device traditional to dramatic comedy.  She colludes in the 
sorcerer Ivory’s scheme for revenge on the Masters of Roke, and lets him disguise her as a 
man so that she can enter the School.  However, this is ineffective; as soon as Irian gives 
her name to the Master Doorkeeper, he knows her true sex (Le Guin, Tales 229).  Irian 
must then confront both the limits of the integrative ethic and the problem of the 
transcendent ethic directly—and simultaneously—and find a solution to both.  They are, 
this implies, equally problematic and dangerous. 
 
Comedic evasion proves inadequate for Irian as it did for Tenar.  The sanctuary offered by 
the Master Patterner Azver in the Immanent Grove is temporary and tenuous; the Master 
Patterner himself recognises that he cannot act, but only ‘hide in [his] woods’ (Le Guin, 
Tales 253).  Any response to Thorion and the transcendent ethic he embodies has to be 
direct; but when Irian undertakes such a response, it is neither heroic, nor a question of 
adopting or adapting to a particular ethos as in The Tombs of Atuan or The Farthest Shore.  
Instead, it is an extension of the way Irian has always dealt with the world—‘standing up 
and speaking truth’ (Le Guin, Tales 229), not only about the world, but about herself. 
 
In an understated echo of the duel between Ged and Jasper in A Wizard of Earthsea, Irian 
challenges Thorion to meet her on Roke Knoll.  Roke Knoll is a point of truth in the 
Secondary World, the place where ‘things are what they are’ (Le Guin, Tales 261).  When 
Irian and Thorion step onto the Knoll they are revealed for what they truly are, and this 
revelation suggests Le Guin’s new solution to the problem the transcendent impulse poses.  
In Tehanu Therru calls Kalessin into the story from outside; but when Irian stands on Roke 
Knoll, she discovers the truth previously indicated by her close attachment to the animal 
world—that her true nature is that of a dragon.  Standing on Roke Knoll also reduces   200 
Thorion to his true state, ‘a huddle of clothes and dry bones and a broken staff’ (Le Guin, 
Tales 264).  This serves to at least partially unpack the unexplored dragon imagery at the 
end of Tehanu.  The dragon revealed at Roke Knoll is the intrinsic truth of Irian’s nature, 
her whole self set free of the restrictions imposed on her by human culture.  Irian’s 
transformation into her dragon self and her defeat of Thorion suggests that to further 
ethical transition in the Secondary World, it is necessary for the individual to reject the 
artificial constraints imposed by human society, and accept the fact that human beings are 
part of the animal as well as the social world.  After Irian’s transformation, the Master 
Doorkeeper suggests that the wizards of Roke should ‘ “ . . . go down to [their] house, and 
open its doors” ’ (Le Guin, Tales 265): this implies that the stagnation of both the 
transcendent and the integrative ethic have been cleared away by Irian’s self-revelation. 
 
Le Guin explores the full implications of this idea in The Other Wind, the final volume of 
the Earthsea continuations at the time of writing (2003).  In his review in the Spectator, 
Philip Hensher describes The Other Wind as a narrative of ‘metamorphosis’ that ‘turns on 
conversations between men and dragons, and beings who exist in an indeterminate state’ 
(49).  This is an accurate description.  There is no antagonist figure whose attempt to 
transcend the world sparks the narrative or crosses the protagonist’s path.  Instead, there is 
a pair of problems to solve, and the means of solving them is communication.  Solving 
those problems changes the nature of the Secondary World, inducing a true, physical 
metamorphosis rather than the symbolic and social change of The Farthest Shore.   
 
In The Other Wind, dragons have begun to move into the Archipelago again after hundreds 
of years, and to harass the people living there in very specific ways: ‘ “ . . . They’ve been 
after people’s livelihood.  Harvests, hayricks, farms, cattle.  They’re saying, Begone—get 
out of the West!” ’ (Le Guin, Wind 96).  At the same time, a village sorcerer, Alder, begins   201 
to dream of his dead wife calling to him from across the wall that separates the living 
world from the Dry Land of the Dead: 
 
‘ . . . She was reaching her hands out to me, and so I reached out to her, and we took each 
other’s hands . . . I wanted to go to her, but I could not cross the wall.  My legs would not 
move.  I tried to draw her to me, and she wanted to come, it seemed as if she could, but the 
wall was there between us.  We couldn’t get over it.  Se she leaned across to me and kissed 
my mouth and said my name.  And she said, “Set me free!” . . . ’  
(Le Guin, Wind 18) 
 
After this, Alder dreams repeatedly of all the dead in the Dry Land trying to break down 
the wall—a thing that has never occurred before in Earthsea.  Both the dragons’ 
threatening behaviour and Alder’s dreams of the dead indicate a disruption to Equilibrium.  
The narrative of The Other Wind turns on discovering the connection between the two 
symptoms, and discovering how to solve the problem they signal. 
 
The narrative of The Other Wind unpacks the dragon image from Tehanu and ‘Dragonfly’ 
to its fullest extent, confirming the theory (first advanced in Tehanu) that dragons and 
humans are essentially one species.  Dragons in Earthsea occupy an ambiguous position 
somewhere between the human and the animal.  They have human intelligence, speech and 
magic, but animal bodies.  When they die, their spirits do not go to the Dry Land of the 
Dead, but return to become part of the physical world like those of the animals and the 
Kargish people (Le Guin, Wind 145).  Dragons are animals that speak, human in 
everything but their shape, and their presence makes a forceful argument for the fact that 
human beings also ‘are only animals that speak’ (Le Guin, Wind 145).  The solution to the 
problems that disrupt Equilibrium in The Other Wind lies in not only the conscious   202 
recognition of that fact, but the full acceptance of its consequences—the letting-go of the 
tragic habit of thought that constructs the human mind as separate from the system within 
which it exists. 
 
The narrative of The Other Wind is pervaded by divisions and images of divisions.  The 
most prominent is the wall between the living world and the Dry Land of the Dead; others 
are the Kargish High Princess Seserakh’s feyag veils, Roke wizardry and Pelnish wizardry, 
the differences of language between Archipeligans, Kargs and dragons, and Tehanu’s scars 
and ruined voice.  In order for the two problems that drive the narrative to be solved, these 
divisions must be broken down or revealed as false.  In this process two characters serve as 
guides: Tenar and Orm Irian—Irian, the protagonist of ‘Dragonfly’, in her dragon identity.  
Significantly, these are both characters who have already been through the process of 
casting off artificial, culturally imposed limitations.  Orm Irian lives within her dragon 
identity, describing herself as ‘ “ . . . sister to Orm Embar . . . and grandchild of Orm . . . ” ’ 
(Le Guin, Wind 151).  Tenar has dropped the Hardic use-name Goha, and maintains a 
Kargish perspective on the world regardless of the conventions of Archipeligan culture: 
 
In the Kargad Lands people did not have a true name that they kept secret, as the speakers 
of Hardic did . . . [Tenar] was her true name; but it was not a word of the Old Speech; it 
gave no one any power over her, and she had never concealed it. 
(Le Guin, Wind 116-17) 
 
In The Other Wind, Tenar functions primarily to break down barriers to understanding 
between other human characters.  It is Tenar who convinces Lebannen to listen to 
Seserakh, and Seserakh to learn to speak Hardic and to take off her feyag veils, and tell 
Lebannen the Kargish story of the Verdurnan.  Tenar also provides crucial information   203 
from her Kargish culture and education, which the Archipeligan cultures and the Masters 
of Roke lack:  ‘ “You are not immortal,” Tenar said to the Summoner. . . . “We are!  We 
[the Kargish people] die to rejoin the undying world.  It was you who foreswore 
immortality” ’ (Le Guin, Wind 222-3).  Orm Irian functions similarly to break down the 
barriers that block understanding between humans and dragons. Because of her experience 
with Thorion in ‘Dragonfly’, she is able to point out the fundamental similarity that 
underlies Roke wizardry and the Pelnish Lore (Le Guin, Wind 154).  She provides 
information about the verw nadan that neither Kargish nor Archipeligan cultures can.  And 
she shows Tehanu the way to become her whole, dragon self.  Orm Irian and Tenar are 
supported by a character who connects even them—Irian’s former ally, the Kargish Roke 
wizard Azver, the Master Patterner. 
 
All of the understandings these diverse characters supply are necessary for them to 
recognise the source of the problem—the desire of the ancient wizards of the Archipelago 
to both defeat death, and isolate their consciousness from the natural world.  The ancient 
wizards achieved both of these goals by creating the Dry Land of the Dead: 
 
‘ . . . they made a wall which no living body could cross, neither man nor dragon. For they 
feared the anger of the dragons.  And their arts of naming laid a great net of spells upon all 
the western lands, so that when the people of the islands die, they would come to the west 
beyond the west and live there in the spirit forever . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Wind 227-8) 
 
The linchpin of the solution to the problem caused by the ancient mages’ transcendent 
actions is Alder, nominally the protagonist of the book.  Alder is an informally-taught 
sorcerer, low in the hierarchy of Earthsea’s magic-workers, who has a talent as a mender of   204 
things.  As such, he is strongly associated with the integrative ethic.  He has been married, 
and part of a community.  He knows the possibilities of his talent, but he also knows its 
limitations: his wife Lily, a mender of greater talent than he, could ‘[heal] broken limbs of 
animals and people, something Alder had never dared try to do’ (Le Guin, Wind 16).  In 
order for the imbalance caused by the ancient wizards’ attempt to circumvent death to be 
put right, Alder has to transform his understanding of the world, and show all the other 
characters involved in the narrative how to make the same change: he must discover the 
point at which breaking becomes mending.  It is Alder who realises the solution to the 
problem that threatens Earthsea, and begins to break down the wall between the living 
world and the Dry Land (Le Guin, Wind 228).  Although he takes action—integrative 
action—in the world, it is not heroic action any more than is Therru’s or Irian’s.  In order 
to understand the problem, Kargs and Archipeligans—humans—and dragons must 
recognise themselves as part of the same continuum; in order to respond to it they must act 
not as individuals but as a group.  And in the end, it takes not only Alder, but an entire 
team—Lebannen, Tehanu and Orm Irian, the Pelnish wizard Seppel and the Roke wizard 
Onyx, and the Master Summoner and the Master Patterner—all acting together, to pull 
apart the wall, plus Seserakh and Tenar to ‘keep the house’ so that they can return to the 
living world after they have done so (Le Guin, Wind 237).   
 
A king, a princess and a peasant, Roke wizards and a Pelnish wizard, two dragons, three 
Kargs, four women, changing the constitution of Equilibrium (Le Guin, Wind 235)—on 
Roke, the bastion of conservative male power in the Archipelago.  This manifests in fact 
what the symbolic eucatastrophe at the end of The Farthest Shore implies: that the human 
community’s understanding of its relationship to the Secondary World within which it 
exists has changed.  Although the breaking of the wall between the Dry Land and the 
living world does not involve the whole of Earthsea’s society, and thus in some respects is   205 
as symbolic as the restoration of the ‘true king’ at the end of The Farthest Shore, it is 
nevertheless the result of cultural, as well as personal, change in Earthsea.  As such, the 
breaking-down of the wall restores the natural order of the physical and nonphysical 
elements of the Secondary World: 
 
Lebannen stood by the ruined wall and watched the dawn brighten in the east.   There was 
an east now, where there had been no direction, no way to go.  There was east and west, 
and light and motion . . . the wall of stones beyond where they had broken it shuddered and 
slid into rubble.  Fire broke from the far, black peaks of the mountains called Pain . . .  
He looked into the sky over those mountains and saw, as he and Ged had seen them once 
above the western sea, the dragons flying on the wind of morning. 
(Le Guin, Wind 239) 
 
Only one division is maintained in The Other Wind.  This is the verw nadan, the agreed-
upon division of states of being in the world between humans and dragons, which, as Orm 
Irian explains, was violated by human greed: 
 
‘ . . . You own the earth, you own the sea.  But we [the dragons] are the fire of sunlight, we 
fly the wind!  You wanted land to own.  You wanted things to make and keep.  And you 
have that.  That was the division, the verw nadan.  But you were not content with your 
share.  You wanted not only your cares, but our freedom.  You wanted the wind!  And by 
the spells and wizardries of those oath-breakers, you stole half our realm from us . . . ’ 
(Le Guin, Wind 227) 
 
The solution to the problem caused by the ancient wizards’ transcendent striving is, quite 
simply, the restoration of the verw nadan.  Le Guin’s human characters must give back the   206 
lands in the west beyond the west to the dragons.  After the wall is broken down, the 
dragons leave the physical world of Earthsea altogether, probably forever, although it is 
not certain whether human wizards are still able to enter the west beyond the west (Le 
Guin, Wind 241).  Through its restoration of the verw nadan, the narrative of The Other 
Wind constructs transcendent action as not only a violation of natural limitations, but a 
betrayal of trust with the world within which the individual exists.  It suggests that the 
solution to the problem of transcendent behaviour in the Secondary World is not only the 
acceptance of natural limitations by both individuals and societies, but the conscious 
maintenance of those limitations—not the adaptation of the world to suit society or the 
individual, but the adaptation of the individual and society to suit the world.  While 
complete ethical transition may never be achieved, the narrative of The Other Wind implies 
that it can be consistently worked towards, and brought closer. 
 
In The Lord of the Rings, Tolkien argues that responsibility for saving the Secondary 
World lies partly with the characters within that world, but ultimately with an external 
power that invests it with order and meaning.  In the Earthsea cycle, however, no external 
power exists, and the Secondary World has only an inherent, physical order.  Through the 
narratives that make up the cycle, Le Guin argues that characters within the Secondary 
World also bear full responsibility for implementing the solution they adopt: in the 
Earthsea cycle, it is the characters acting within their landscape who save the Secondary 
World. 
 
Le Guin’s development of Tolkien’s theory of achieving ethical transition in the Earthsea 
cycle is informed by her construction of the Secondary World as a system that possesses 
inherent balance, in which actions derive their significance not from their importance in a 
schema that extends beyond the world but by their physical and social consequences for it.    207 
In the Earthsea cycle, Le Guin argues that, contrary to Tolkien’s conclusions, heroic action 
is not the key to the salvation of the world, whether it occurs in the public domain or the 
private.  Rather, in Earthsea, to save the world it is necessary for both individuals, and 
society as a whole, to move toward an integrative state of being—mentally, socially and 
physically.  In order to achieve ethical transition, individuals and societies must be in the 
world in such a way as to promote its inherent balance, and must consciously suppress or 
override their innate tendency to transcendent action.  In the Earthsea cycle, it is not the 
order of the world, but the characters within it, acting in awareness of and in accordance 
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7  ‘YOU, I NEVER EXPECTED’: ACTION, TRANSFORMATION 
AND BALANCE IN THE RIDDLE-MASTER’S GAME 
In The Lord of the Rings and the Earthsea cycle, Tolkien and Le Guin construct formulae 
for ethical transition that are appropriate for Secondary Worlds balanced by relatively 
robust systems.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, however, the system that maintains the 
integrity of the Secondary World is highly vulnerable.  The land-law is an artificial 
construct, which cannot exist independently of its creator, the High One; thus the integrity 
of the High One’s realm can be destroyed as easily by accident as by the shape-changer 
Eriel’s transcendent endeavour.  Through her narrative, McKillip develops a solution to the 
problem of the transcendent presence in the world that is specifically adapted to existence 
within this fragile system; thus while McKillip, like Le Guin, uses Tolkien’s structure as 
the basis for her fantasy, she innovates on it as much as Le Guin does.  But her 
innovations, and the theory of ethical transition that they express, are very different from 
Le Guin’s.  The narrative of The Riddle-Master’s Game contains elements not present in 
either Tolkien’s solution or Le Guin’s, and privileges different elements of the high fantasy 
paradigm. 
 
In this chapter, I will examine the separate stories of Morgon and Raederle, and discuss the 
narrative paradigms associated with these characters, the use McKillip makes of them, and 
the contribution they make to the achievement of ethical transition in the High One’s 
realm.  I will explore how McKillip’s solution to the problem of a transcendent presence in 
the Secondary World represents a development from both Tolkien’s solution and Le 
Guin’s.  Finally, I will discuss where McKillip’s narrative locates responsibility for saving 
the world. 
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As discussed in Chapter Four, in The Riddle-Master’s Game, McKillip interprets the 
source of the ethical transition as the individual’s decision of conscience to take on 
responsibility for the world’s well-being, and her representation of the achievement of that 
transition turns on the same issues: choice and change.  McKillip creates her argument for 
the achievement of the transition from transcendent ethical dominance to integrative by 
combining a narrative device used by Tolkien in The Lord of the Rings with the hero 
paradigm used by both Tolkien and Le Guin, and a new element, the narrative paradigm of 
the female Gothic heroine.  As discussed in Chapter Five, although Aragorn’s performance 
of the hero paradigm is a focus of narrative attention in The Lord of the Rings, it is not a 
discrete narrative as Boromir’s or Frodo’s is.  Rather, it is part of a larger narrative, the 
love story of Aragorn and Arwen Undómiel.  This New Comedy-like narrative of love, an 
obstacle to marriage imposed from above, the defeat of the ban, and marriage, frames 
Aragorn’s performance of the hero paradigm.  However, it is only vestigially present in the 
narrative of The Lord of the Rings.  It is referred to obliquely at the beginning of Aragorn’s 
hero narrative, and becomes prominent only at its close; the story itself is exiled to the 
appendices.   
 
A similar structure of framing romance narrative and inset hero narrative is present in The 
Riddle-Master’s Game, but in McKillip’s fantasy, it is considerably more developed, in 
ways that reflect both McKillip’s feminist perspective (Wymer 1070) and her vision of the 
ethical transition.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, before the narrative begins, Morgon of 
Hed wins a riddle-game against a murderous wraith, and by doing so unknowingly wins 
the right to marry his friend Raederle, the daughter of the King of An: 
 
‘[Peven’s] crown is yours by right.  Mathom would be the last to contest that.’  . . . [Deth] 
added gently, ‘And yours, if you choose, is Mathom’s daughter, Raederle . . . The King   210 
made a vow at her birth to give her only to the man who took the crown of Aum from 
Peven.’ 
(McKillip, Game 18) 
 
The first chapter of The Riddle-Master of Hed is concerned solely with the implications of 
Morgon’s winning the riddle-game.  When Morgon leaves home at the beginning of the 
second chapter, it is to ask Raederle to marry him (McKillip, Game 19); only after he has 
begun this movement toward marriage, and the social integration it symbolises, is his 
understanding of his Secondary World disrupted by the appearance of the tragedic power 
out of the past (the shape-changers attack Morgon during his sea voyage from Caithnard to 
Anuin).  The sinking of Morgon’s ship by the shape-changers isolates Morgon from the 
marriage narrative, and leaves him injured and amnesiac in the ruined city of the Earth-
Masters.  This is the point at which his hero narrative begins. 
 
In The Lord of the Rings, Tolkien focusses narrative attention on only one element of the 
framing narrative: Aragorn’s removal of the bar to marriage by the defeat of Sauron’s 
invasion and the restoration of the Kings of Gondor.  Tolkien uses Aragorn’s narrative to 
create a line of progress from the problem of transcendent behaviour in the world, to the 
resolution of comedic blocking action, the containment of the transcendent presence, and 
regeneration.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, however, McKillip divides narrative attention 
between the two elements that make up the framing narrative, and tells both of the stories 
implicit in the comedic structure of movement towards marriage—not just the (male) 
protagonist Morgon’s, but also the (female) secondary protagonist Raederle’s.  Each of 
these stories constitutes an engagement with narrative paradigm, and therefore with the 
idea of action in the world; each forms part of McKillip’s schema for the accomplishment 
of the ethical transition.  McKillip uses her doubled narrative to both build on from Tolkien   211 
and Le Guin’s argument, and suggest a solution to the transcendent problem that is almost 
the exact opposite of theirs.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game, the achievement of ethical 
transition depends on the complementary and interdependent actions of Morgon and 
Raederle; in combination, their narratives model an effective response to both transcendent 
behaviour, and the irresponsible choice that produces it.   
 
Through the narrative of Morgon of Hed, McKillip responds to Tolkien’s and Le Guin’s 
construction of public action in the Secondary World, and its degree of importance to the 
ethical transition.  In Strategies of Fantasy, Attebery claims that Morgon’s character is 
only ‘sketched’ in the first chapter of The Riddle-Master of Hed, and is at all times 
subordinate to his role-playing or ‘actant’ function (75).  However, the chapter presents 
Morgon as nothing but character.  It establishes him vividly as a young man with a 
distinctive personality, manner and temper, who governs an island, runs a farm, gets 
hangovers, fights with his younger brother and sister, grieves for his dead parents and is 
driven by a need he does not entirely understand, to answer every riddle but one: 
‘ “ . . . The stricture [of the riddle of Kern of Hed], according to the Riddle-Masters at 
Caithnard is this: Answer the unanswered riddle.  So I do” ’ (McKillip, Game 10).  This 
first chapter also establishes Morgon’s literal connection to the land he rules, when he 
comments to Deth, ‘ “ . . . The Princes of Hed are rooted to Hed . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 
17).  This connects him firmly to the integrative ethic of comedy (Spivack, Daughters 
121).  The chapter serves to establish Morgon as an individual, a person, and—despite his 
title of Prince of Hed—one located firmly in the private sphere.   
 
It is only in the second chapter of The Riddle-Master of Hed, as more information becomes 
available, that Morgon’s potential to take on the role of hero emerges.  Morgon may be a 
land-ruler, but he is also a working farmer whose island realm is considered by the rest of   212 
the High One’s realm to be both marginal (Wymer 1070) and rather negligible: the wraith 
of Peven of Aum loses his riddle-game to Morgon because of his mistaken belief that there 
are no riddles from Hed (McKillip, Game 29), and the wizard Talies describes the realm as 
‘ “ . . . uninhabitable . . . without history, without poetry, and utterly without 
interest. . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 102).   As the Prince of Hed, Morgon is responsible to the 
High One for Hed’s well-being (McKillip, Game 67-8).  The High One appears at this 
point to be a passive authority, and as a land-ruler Morgon is active in the world on his 
behalf.  Thus Morgon fulfils the three prerequisites of the hero paradigm: masculinity, 
isolation from society and a tie to a passive authority figure.     
 
Additionally, Morgon is marked by a sign indicating that some form of action is required 
of him by his Secondary World: a pattern of three stars on his forehead (Nicholls 1816).  
The exact significance of the three stars is not understood, by Morgon or by anyone around 
him (McKillip, Game 30), but their general implication is: because it is a physical, external 
sign, that can be seen and read by others, Morgon’s birthmark implies that he is required to 
undertake a movement from the private sphere in which he lives to the public.  Morgon not 
only has the potential to fulfil the role of hero, but an obligation to do so.  He must 
formally confront the transcendent presence on behalf of his Secondary World.  The 
narrative emphasis created by Morgon’s drawn-out and reluctant movement from his 
private identity to his public role of Star-Bearer makes a clear statement that the 
achievement of ethical transition in the world requires public action by the individual; 
through Morgon’s narrative, McKillip explores what type of action that should be. 
 
The structure of The Riddle-Master’s Game is based on the literary trope of the godgame. 
This is McKillip’s second innovation on the high fantasy structure established by Tolkien.  
A godgame is a situation in which a character in a narrative   213 
 
is made a victim by another character’s superior knowledge and power.  Caught in a 
cunningly constructed web of appearances, the victim, who finds the illusion to be 
impenetrable, is observed and his behaviour is judged. 
(Wilson 123) 
 
A godgame is created by a character within the narrative, a magister ludi who ‘creates an 
illusion, a mazelike sequence of false accounts, that entraps other characters.  The 
entrapped character becomes entangled in the threads of . . . an incomprehensible strategy 
plotted by another character’ (Wilson 124).  The purpose of a godgame is the entrapment, 
observation and judgement of the victim (Wilson 128).  Although Gandalf and Ged both 
manipulate and organise the characters around them, they are too visible, and their motives 
too transparent, to be magisteri ludum; furthermore, neither is the ultimate authority in his 
Secondary World.  The High One, because of his hiddenness, his obscured motives and his 
status as the most powerful individual in his realm, can be read as a magister ludi. 
 
In The Riddle-Master’s Game, Morgon begins his hero narrative as the victim of a 
godgame.  He is trapped in a double illusion.  The first layer of this illusion is the one 
created by the false High One, the wizard Ghisteslwchlohm.  In order to gain access to 
Morgon’s power as Star-Bearer when the High One dies, Ghisteslwchlohm has, as one 
character puts it, built a ‘wall of ignorance’ around every mind in the realm, first at 
Lungold, and then as the Riddle-Master Ohm at Caithnard (McKillip, Game 100).  He has 
erased from the realm’s store of knowledge all information relating to Morgon’s role 
marker of ‘three stars’, and silenced the last living wizards who hold some of that 
information (Haunert 132).  As Master Ohm, he has also directly controlled Morgon’s 
access to knowledge.  As a result, Morgon begins his hero journey trapped by the belief   214 
that no information regarding his role or the forces surrounding it exists anywhere in the 
High One’s realm, and that the only way he can find answers is to ask the High One in 
person—that is, to deliver himself directly into Ghisteslwchlohm’s hands at Erlenstar 
Mountain, beyond any possibility of help from the other land-rulers of the realm. 
 
However, Ghisteslwchlohm is not the true magister ludi of The Riddle-Master’s Game.  
Despite the creation of his massive illusion, Ghisteslwchlohm lacks several crucial pieces 
of information.  He has bound the wizards, but cannot control what they do within those 
bindings.  He does not know of the existence, or nature, of the shape-changers (McKillip, 
Game 451-2).  And he does not know the location or identity of the true High One.  His 
illusion is therefore easily disrupted by other forces, including the shape-changers, Deth 
(the High One, pursuing his own ends), and the wizards.  Deth gives Morgon conflicting 
accounts of his own past, that are meant as clues.  The wizard Iff, in disguise as a scholar at 
the Morgol’s court, helps the Morgol to open some of his old books that contain riddles of 
the Star-Bearer.  Suth comes out of hiding, knowing he will die, to tell Morgon that he ran 
away during the destruction of Lungold because of ‘Ohm’.  Nun, as the Lord of Hel’s pig-
woman, teaches Raederle the skills she later uses to access her shape-changer’s 
inheritance.  When Eriel reveals her presence in the High One’s realm to Morgon, she 
reveals the extent of the forces in play around him, and forces him to become aware of the 
illusion.  For Morgon, who is trained to solve riddles, these discrepancies in the illusion act 
as clues, and eventually allow him to fracture Ghisteslwchlohm’s illusion.  However, even 
when he is aware of that illusion, Morgon remains trapped by it, because 
Ghisteslwchlohm’s illusion is only one element of the larger godgame played by the High 
One. 
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The High One’s is not a classic godgame as Wilson defines them; the High One’s illusion 
of his own absence, indifference and inhumanity has purposes apart from entrapment and 
observation.  It is meant to protect the High One from the shape-changers who are hunting 
him, and to develop Morgon’s capacity to become the new High One (Nicholls 1817).  
Unlike a true magister ludi, the High One from the outset intends to dissolve the illusion 
himself, at a predetermined time and under controlled circumstances, when he judges that 
Morgon has played his way to an acceptable level of understanding: 
 
‘I didn’t dare let you see too much . . . I needed you powerful, confused, always searching 
for me, yet never finding me, though I was always near you . . . You startled the truth out 
of me, in Herun.  I lost to you there. . . . ’ 
(McKillip, Game 592) 
 
For characters trapped within it, a godgame forms a conceptual labyrinth; it can only be 
navigated by making choices based on what limited information is available to them.  But 
in the case of a godgame, the trapped character is judged by the magister ludi based on the 
choices she or he makes.  The High One’s godgame is designed not only to protect Morgon 
and the High One himself from the shape-changers as far as possible, but also, by offering 
Morgon choices, to let him develop his own understanding of the relationship between the 
individual and the world, and how that relationship affects action in the Secondary World: 
 
‘ . . . You wanted a choice.  I gave it to you.  You could have taken the shape of power you 
learned from Ghisteslwchlohm: lawless, destructive, loveless.  Or you could have 
swallowed darkness until you shaped it, understood it, and still cried out for something 
more. . . . ’ 
(McKillip, Game 590)   216 
 
Playing the High One’s godgame through, according to the tenets of riddle-mastery, 
prepares Morgon to take on the role of High One.  McKillip’s use of the godgame trope to 
structure The Riddle-Master’s Game implies that to implement the ethical transition in the 
Secondary World, the individual must first develop understanding of the situation within it, 
and then take action based on that understanding.  Morgon’s choices throughout the 
narrative are how McKillip articulates what kind of action that should be.   
 
As soon as Morgon leaves home in The Riddle-Master of Hed, he is confronted with an 
heroic task—solving the riddle of ‘three stars’—which, if taken up, will inevitably move 
him out of the private sphere and into the public.  Morgon chooses not to pursue the hero 
role, announcing that all he wants is ‘ “ . . . to go to Anuin, marry Raederle, and then go 
home and plant grain and make beer and read books . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 30).  
However, because of his identity as the Star-Bearer, the High One’s land-heir, he is not 
permitted to do this. Once he leaves home, Morgon is repeatedly confronted by the fact of 
the transcendent ethic in the world.  The shape-changers attempt to drown Morgon and 
Deth during their voyage to Anuin; two shape-changers wearing the shapes of dead men 
try to kill Morgon and his rescuer Astrin Ymris; Morgon and Astrin disturb the shape-
changer Eriel in her attempt to disrupt the land-law of Ymris; finally, shape-changers try to 
kill Morgon in Isig after he takes the Star-Bearer’s sword from the Earth-Masters’ dead 
children.  Eriel three times tries to kill Morgon before he can begin his heroic task, 
confirming by implication how important it is for him to take up the hero role for the 
realm: 
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‘ . . . you shouldn’t have left your land to begin weaving riddles at Caithnard.  The wise 
man knows his own name.  You don’t know my name; you don’t know your own.  It’s 
better for me if you die that way, in ignorance.’ 
(McKillip, Game 65) 
 
Eriel’s repeated attempts to kill Morgon confirm by implication his importance to the 
Secondary World’s survival.  Morgon must take on the role of hero and perform an heroic 
task—learning ‘his own name’, the meaning of the title of Star-Bearer that gives him his 
public identity—in order to negate the effect of Eriel’s transcendent striving on the rest of 
the world. 
 
However, unlike those characters who perform the hero paradigm in The Lord of the Rings 
and the Earthsea cycle, Morgon’s reaction to the role imposed on him is not acceptance—
not even the deeply reluctant acceptance shown by Frodo in The Lord of the Rings.  
Morgon initially misinterprets the nature of the task his Secondary World requires of him.  
There are distinct signs that Morgon’s hero act must be integrative: his task is to find the 
answer to a riddle or series of riddles, which are linked to disruptions to the land-law; the 
first and most important of the two tools made for the Star-Bearer by the wizard Yrth is a 
harp, the sound of which restores Morgon’s voice and memory after the chape-changers’ 
attempt to drown him, and the lowest note of which shatters weapons.  But Morgon is 
distracted from seeing this, by the other tool, the three-starred sword for ‘death’ that 
appears (wrongly) to point to a violent, destructive identity for the Star-Bearer.  The public 
role prepared for Morgon appears to threaten his established, comedic identity: 
 
‘[Morgon] saw a Prince of Hed with three stars on his face leave his land, find a starred 
harp in Ymris, a sword, a name, and a hint of doom in Herun.  And these two figures out of   218 
the ancient tale: the Prince of Hed and the Star-Bearer, stood apart from each other; he 
could find nothing to reconcile them.’ 
(McKillip, Game 116) 
 
Morgon therefore, as Spivack states (Daughters 121), rejects the role, three times: in 
Ymris, after his encounter with Eriel; when confronted with the name and role of Star-
Bearer for the first time in Herun; and when he learns of the existence of the three-starred 
sword from the shape-changer Corrig (McKillip, Game 110).   
 
However, Morgon’s resistance to taking up the hero role has violent consequences, which 
not only begin to erode the peaceful identity he wants to preserve, but also harm the people 
around him.  At first Morgon blocks Eriel’s violence with an evasive action, using the low 
string on Yrth’s harp with its ability to shatter weapons (McKillip, Game 66).  However, 
Eriel, baulked in her attempt to kill Morgon, puts out Astrin Ymris’ eye in revenge.  Later, 
in Herun, Morgon kills the shape-changer harpist Corrig to save his own life; he is forced 
to kill again in Isig Mountain, using the Star-Bearer’s sword, to save a child from the 
shape-changers hunting him.  Through the pattern of negative consequences following on 
Morgon’s refusal to take on the hero role, McKillip constructs refusal to act against the 
transcendent presence in the world as an inadequate response to the problem it poses.  The 
point is reinforced when, after receiving the three-starred sword from the dead children of 
the Earth-Masters, Morgon finally makes a firm—if reluctant—commitment to enact the 
hero role required of him: ‘ “ . . . If there is nothing I can do but what I am meant to do, 
then I will do it now, as quickly as possible” ’ (McKillip, Game 186).  After this, his 
actions produce no negative consequences for anyone but himself until he retreats again 
after the destruction of Lungold in Harpist in the Wind, and the shape-changers tear apart 
the realm in their attempts to find him (McKillip, Game 515).   219 
 
At the end of The Riddle-Master of Hed, Morgon reaches Erlenstar Mountain, the home of 
the High One and the traditional source of answers to questions in McKillip’s Secondary 
World, the ostensible end-point of Morgon’s heroic journey.  At this point, 
Ghisteslwchlohm’s illusion collapses, and Morgon begins to engage directly with the High 
One’s larger illusion.  He learns of the apparent absence of the High One from his own 
realm, and the usurpation of the High One’s place by Ghisteslwchlohm.  However, before 
he can continue with his heroic journey, he is subjected to a year-long period of 
imprisonment within Erlenstar Mountain, and during this time Ghisteslwchlohm invades 
his mind in an attempt to learn from him the nature and power of the Star-Bearer.   
 
Morgon’s imprisonment in Erlenstar Mountain recalls Ged’s entrapment within the 
Labyrinth in The Tombs of Atuan.  However, there are important differences between the 
two episodes.  Because the Nameless Ones are not transcendent entities but immanent and 
passive ones, the Labyrinth forms a neutral space within which Ged can transform his 
mode of action, and complete his heroic task.  Morgon is imprisoned in a space dominated 
by Ghisteslwchlohm and used to further his transcendent ambitions.  In order to escape his 
imprisonment, Morgon must effectively become Ghisteslwchlohm.  When 
Ghisteslwchlohm strips Morgon’s mind of his strongest integrative characteristic (his 
capacity to hold the land-law of Hed: Nicholls 1817), Morgon replaces the loss with 
Ghisteslwchlohm’s closest comparable characteristic—his power of wizardry—and uses 
that to free himself: 
 
‘ . . . the Founder of Lungold was looking for something in Morgon’s mind, some piece of 
knowledge, and in probing every memory, every thought, burning away at the deep, private 
places of it, he opened his own mind and Morgon saw his vast reserves of power.  That’s   220 
how he broke free from Ghisteslwchlohm at last, by drawing from the wizard’s own mind 
the knowledge of his strengths and weaknesses, using his own power against him. . . . ’ 
(McKillip, Game 292) 
 
But in taking on Ghisteslwchlohm’s abilities, Morgon also takes on his modal 
orientation—so much so that at one point Raederle mistakes Morgon’s mind, touching 
hers, for Ghistelwchlohm’s (McKillip, Game 355).  After freeing himself from Erlenstar 
Mountain, Morgon does not resume his broken heroic journey.  Instead, he pursues a 
course of vengeance against the person who he believes betrayed him: Deth, his 
companion in The Riddle-Master of Hed, the disguised High One: ‘ “ . . . That was one 
thing Morgon said he wanted to do before he went back to Hed . . . Deth betrayed Morgon, 
led him straight into Ghisteslwchlohm’s hands, and Morgon intends to kill him” ’  
(McKillip, Game 292-3). 
 
Revenge is a transcendent action; the pursuit of vengeance is the attempted creation by an 
individual of a subjectively-defined ideal state of affairs in the world.  Revenge can be an 
act of epic heroism (Miller 339).  In Renaissance drama, it is an act of tragic heroism, but 
one that carries a strong public, political significance.  However, like all acts of tragic 
heroism, revenge has increasingly been constructed as an essentially private act; in the 
modern era, it tends to be represented as private except insofar as it violates the law 
(McEntee 4).  In taking up the pursuit of vengeance, then, Morgon is deliberately 
abandoning the heroic role he previously committed himself to—and the responsibility for 
others that he took up along with it, and retreating to the domain of private action.  Morgon 
knows quite well that he has ‘greater powers in the world to contend with’, and that by 
abandoning his hero role to pursue his vengeance he leaves his entire Secondary World in 
danger from the shape-changers (McKillip, Game 293-4).  However, he chooses to ignore   221 
that fact in favour of revenging an—admittedly staggeringly great—personal injury 
(Haunert 145).  When Deth and Morgon meet again at the end of Heir of Sea and Fire, 
Deth accurately comments that in pursuit of his private goal Morgon, like 
Ghisteslwchlohm and Eriel, has lost interest in ‘the implications of action’ (McKillip, 
Game 373).   
 
Morgon does not complete his act of vengeance in Heir of Sea and Fire.  Deth, in a last 
attempt to avert his own premature death, offers a riddle to direct Morgon’s attention back 
to the godgame (McKillip, Game 593).  Thus Morgon’s tragedic actions have no 
consequence for the Secondary World.  However, McKillip returns to the moment at the 
close of Morgon’s heroic journey in Harpist in the Wind, to make it plain that Morgon’s 
planned act of revenge, if carried out, would have carried the full consequences of tragic 
heroism—inadvertent self-destruction forming the epicentre of wider devastation.  The 
High One tells Morgon, ‘ “ . . . If I had let you kill me, out of despair, because we had 
brought one another to such an impasse, the power passing into you would have destroyed 
you . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 593).  The premature death of the High One would have 
released the shape-changers from their bound state, and the consequent death of the High 
One’s land-heir would have destroyed the land-law and left the landscape vulnerable to the 
shape-changers’ desire for power once more.   
 
Through Morgon’s pursuit of vengeance in Heir of Sea and Fire, McKillip addresses the 
potential of tragedic action to counter the transcendent presence in the world.  Unlike 
Earthsea, the land-law of the High One’s realm has no independent ability to rebalance 
itself; unlike Middle-earth, it cannot incorporate the consequences of transcendent action 
into a larger, self-preserving pattern.  Unlike Le Guin in A Wizard of Earthsea, McKillip 
cannot admit tragedic action to be even a partially valid option; unlike Tolkien, she cannot   222 
present it as an error that can be recovered from.  Through Morgon’s dismissal of the 
godgame and his abandonment of his hero role to pursue a course of revenge, McKillip 
constructs tragedic action as not just an inadequate, but a catastrophically irresponsible 
response to the transcendent presence in the world. 
 
At the end of Heir of Sea and Fire, Deth arrests Morgon’s tragedic action with the 
comment, ‘ “They were promised a man of peace” ’ (McKillip, Game 374); in doing so, he 
gives Morgon back the integrative identity that Morgon believes he lost along with the 
land-rule of Hed.  The restoration of Morgon’s comedic identity enables him to take up his 
heroic task again.  He accepts the title of Star-Bearer and the responsibility for his 
Secondary World which it carries, as the opening line of Harpist in the Wind suggests: 
‘The star-bearer [sic] and Raederle of An sat on the crown of the highest of the seven 
towers of Anuin’ (McKillip, Game 383).  He then plays the godgame to its conclusion in 
Harpist in the Wind.  He does this by solving riddles—that is, by increasing his 
understanding of the situation he and his Secondary World are in—and by increasingly 
taking on responsibility for ameliorating that situation.  As his understanding increases, 
Morgon takes up the responsibility to act protectively.  He protects Hed by taking the dead 
of An to defend it against the shape-changers.  He confronts the shape-changers and 
Ghisteslwchlohm directly, and in doing so realises again the potential of comedic, blocking 
action to contain them (this time he uses the low string of the three-starred harp to stop an 
entire battle).  He learns the land-law of every kingdom in the High One’s realm, 
integrating himself with his landscape.  And he solves every riddle but the last one, to 
realise that the High One is the last of the Earth-Masters, the creator as well as the holder 
of the land-law of his realm, who has been hiding from his shape-changer enemies in plain 
sight in the shapes of the wizard Yrth and the harpist Deth (McKillip, Game 555). 
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Once Morgon is aware of this fact, he is able to dispel the High One’s illusion, by making 
another choice.  Where he has spent much of the later half of Harpist in the Wind 
challenging Yrth to reveal himself (Haunert 227), Morgon eventually chooses to show 
Yrth the degree of understanding he has achieved instead.  Therefore, in Yrth’s hearing, he 
tells the Morgol that Deth died to protect her from Ghisteslwchlohm. This is not only a 
signal to the High One that Morgon has recognised him.  It is a deliberate act of healing, 
‘returning the riddle of the harpist’s life to him unanswered, in exchange for nothing’ 
(McKillip, Game 572), that re-establishes broken connections between many characters: 
not only the Morgol and Deth, but the Morgol and Lyra, Lyra and Deth, Morgon and 
Raederle, and Morgon and the High One.  By making this gesture, Morgon makes it 
impossible for the High One to ‘play’ him as part of the godgame any further, partly 
because his level of knowledge now endangers them both, and partly because of the 
relationship of trust that now exists between them.  The High One later tells Morgon, 
 
‘ . . . I lost to you, there.  I could endure everything from you but your gentleness . . . I was 
forced to turn everything I had ever said to [the Morgol] into a lie.  And you turned it back 
into truth.  You were that generous with someone you hated.’ 
(McKillip, Game 592) 
 
After this point, Morgon is able to complete his heroic task.  The luck that helps the 
romance hero complete his task comes into play when Raederle makes the connection 
between the High One nobody can find and the one place in the realm nobody can go to 
look for him: the top of the unclimbable Wind Tower in the ruined city of the Earth-
Masters (McKillip, Game 581).  Finally, when his understanding is complete, Morgon is 
able to let go of his need to perform the role of Star-Bearer as he originally understood it, 
and do as the High One has planned instead.   224 
 
Morgon begins his heroic journey in The Riddle-Master of Hed with the implicit aim of 
protecting the status quo.  The role of Star-Bearer seems to threaten his initial comedic 
identity, so he refuses to take it up; the shape-changers directly threaten the land-law that 
sustains the realm, so when Morgon takes on the hero role he does so to protect the land-
law, the land, and the High One from them (McKillip, Game 185).  However, this is an 
impossible aim.  The fact of the High One’s mortality is non-negotiable, a point recognised 
both by the High One himself and by Eriel (McKillip, Game 594), which is why she adopts 
the strategy of trying to prevent the transfer of power from the High One to the Star-Bearer 
as well as trying to discover the High One’s location.  When Morgon’s understanding 
develops to the point that he recognises the meaning of the harpist’s name (Deth/death: 
Haunert 234), he comes to terms with the impossibility of his aim, and is able to let go of 
his construction of the role of Star-Bearer and his task.  He acquiesces to the High One’s 
solution—that is, the High One’s strategic death and Morgon’s assumption of the land-law 
in his place (McKillip, Game 587).  Because he does this, Morgon is able to succeed in his 
larger aim of defending his Secondary World from the shape-changers.  He takes up the 
land-law, and uses the High One’s power over the winds, land-law and the Earth-Masters’ 
dead to imprison the shape-changers in Erlenstar Mountain ‘ “ . . . until they die, or I die, 
whichever comes first . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 608).  He is also able to restore the 
landscape after their influence has been contained: 
 
He wandered through the land, taking many shapes, reworking broken bindings, until there 
was not a tree or an insect or a man in the realm he was not aware of, except for one 
woman. 
(McKillip, Game 611) 
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Morgon manages to fuse his private, comedic identity with his final understanding of the 
role of Star-Bearer when he refuses to destroy the shape-changers.  Because he does so, he 
is able to survive the completion of his task.  He achieves the romance hero’s conclusion of 
return to, reintegration with and reinvigoration of his context—shown on the physical level 
through his assumption of the land-law of the realm, on the social level through his newly 
developed relationships with the realm’s land-rulers, and on the individual level through 
his relationship with Raederle.  Through Morgon’s long and hostile engagement with the 
concept of public action and the heroic role, McKillip argues, in agreement with Tolkien, 
that there is only one valid form of response to the transcendent presence in the world.  
Public action in the integrative mode of comedy, because it moves in exact opposition to 
transcendent action, is the only thing that can effectively contain the destructive effects of 
the tragedic ethic on the Secondary World.   
 
However, as previously stated, Morgon’s story is not the whole story of The Riddle-
Master’s Game.  Where the first volume of The Riddle-Master’s Game focusses on 
Morgon’s story, the second, Heir of Sea and Fire, focusses on Raederle of An, and her 
contribution to the ethical transition.  Raederle occupies an ambiguous position in The 
Riddle-Master’s Game.  At the end of Harpist in the Wind, when Morgon returns to Wind 
Tower after assimilating the land-law of Ymris, he is surprised to find Raederle there.  She 
explains to him that whereas he reached the top of the tower by the expected route—by 
climbing an illusory endless stair—she flew in from outside in crow shape: ‘ “ … the High 
One let me come in.  Otherwise I would have flown around the tower squawking all 
night” ’  (McKillip, Game 596).  This image encapsulates exactly both Raederle’s 
relationship to the godgame played between the High One and Morgon, and her 
relationship to the high fantasy paradigm in general.  In neither The Lord of the Rings nor 
the Earthsea cycle is there a female character who models Raederle’s role; while Raederle   226 
initially shares Arha’s passivity, her narrative develops in very different ways, and while 
like Éowyn she acts rebelliously, her actions are both more significant than Éowyn’s, and 
different in kind.  McKillip uses this intruder into the structure of the high fantasy to 
articulate a private component of the ethical transition, that is subtly different from those 
offered by Tolkien and Le Guin.   
 
Like Morgon, and the rest of her Secondary World, Raederle is caught in both 
Ghisteslwchlohm’s illusion and the High One’s.  However, Raederle is not ‘played’ in 
either godgame.  She is excluded from Ghisteslwchlohm’s godgame as an irrelevance, only 
becoming important when he realises that he can use her to manipulate Morgon (McKillip, 
Game 447).  The High One initially dismisses her recognition that she is part of the 
solution to the problem posed by the shape-changers (McKillip, Game 307).  However, 
Raederle has access to information from other sources than the privileged disciplines of 
wizardry and riddle-mastery.  Her knowledge of her family history and her own magical 
talents compensates for her artificially-created ignorance, and allows her to solve a crucial 
riddle—that of her own identity.  Raederle’s story is of an individual coming to terms with 
both the presence of the transcendent ethic in the world, and the necessity for constructing 
a private response to it.  It implies that public action, as represented by Morgon’s 
engagement with the hero paradigm, must occur in conjunction with private action in order 
to be effective.  Thus far, McKillip appears to agree with Le Guin and Tolkien.  However, 
Raederle’s narrative diverges significantly from the concepts of private action towards 
ethical transition, and its importance, in both the Earthsea cycle and The Lord of the Rings. 
 
At the beginning of her narrative, Raederle is in the opposite position from Morgon.  In 
The Riddle-Master of Hed, whereas Morgon is a character, Raederle is—in her complete 
absence from the narrative—constructed as an object (Mains 58).  She is an image toward   227 
which Morgon looks as the conclusion or reward of his quest.  She is a public figure, the 
daughter of the King of An; as ‘the second most beautiful woman in the three portions of 
An’ (McKillip, Game 26) and the prize of the winner of Peven’s riddle-game, she is a 
performer of role rather than a character.  Raederle performs the role of an imprisoned 
heroine, ‘the human prize fought for by the hero’ (Miller 169).  She is metaphorically 
imprisoned in the tower haunted by the riddling wraith of Peven, the dead Lord of Aum; 
she also perceives herself as trapped by her father’s vow to marry her only to the man who 
wins Peven’s riddle-game and his crown.
15
 
  And whereas Morgon is connected to the 
integrative ethic through his holding of the land-law of Hed, Raederle is connected to the 
transcendent ethic through the tragedic history of An; despite the fact that her father is the 
King of An, she has no more connection to the land-law of An than any other inhabitant of 
that realm. 
Although Mains (58) and Rita M. Haunert (96) both claim that Morgon rejects the 
expectation imposed by Mathom’s vow—that having ‘rescued’ Raederle, he will 
automatically marry her—at the outset, in fact he does not begin to consider whether this is 
acceptable to Raederle until he has some experience himself of being trapped in a role he 
does not want to play (McKillip, Game 78).  Once Raederle has been ‘rescued’ from her 
imprisonment by Morgon, she is expected by everyone to complete the narrative of the 
imprisoned heroine by marrying her rescuer.  She can communicate distress at this 
situation, as when she tells her brother of her dream of ‘some huge, nameless, faceless 
stranger riding to Anuin with the crown of Aum on his head, claiming her and taking her 
away’ (McKillip Game, 27-8).  However, she cannot act to ameliorate it.  Within her 
                                                 
15 In fact Mathom’s vow is not intended to impose a future on Raederle; it is meant to protect the future she 
will make for herself.  Mathom, who dreams the future, foresees Raederle’s relationship with Morgon before 
her birth, and makes his vow in order to allow that future to come to pass.  However, because Mathom cannot 
explain the rationale behind the vow to Raederle, she experiences it as a trap.   228 
public role of imprisoned heroine, Raederle is as inactive as Morgon is at the beginning of 
The Riddle-Master of Hed. 
 
But Raederle, like Morgon, is marked out for activity in the Secondary World, although 
her sign is less obvious than Morgon’s.  In McKillip’s Secondary World, names can 
express otherwise unsayable clues to a character’s nature.  The High One’s personae of 
Deth and Yrth are not randomly named (Attebery, Strategies 74).  Yrth is a vowel-shifted 
form of the word earth, which signals the wizard’s true identity as an Earth-Master and as 
the holder and protector of the land-law; Deth is death, and signals the approaching death 
of the High One, the physical imperative that drives the entire narrative (Nicholls 1820).  
Raederle has a shape-changer (i.e. Earth-Master) ancestor, Corrig, whose half-human son 
Ylon became, briefly, King of An (McKillip, Game 212).  Her name, like the High One’s 
names, is a disguised form of another word: riddle.  It implies that Raederle embodies the 
same riddle of shape-changers and Earth-Masters that Morgon, elsewhere in the Secondary 
World, is required to unravel (Haunert 152)—and it implies an that she must undertake an 
equally necessary movement from the public sphere to the private, from role to identity, in 




When Morgon loses the land-law of Hed at Ghisteslwchlohm’s hands, it is taken by almost 
everyone to mean that he is dead (McKillip, Game 222).  This prevents the completion of 
the imprisoned heroine’s narrative: there is no rescuer for Raederle to marry.  However, it 
also confronts Raederle with the fact of the tragedic ethic in the Secondary World, in the 
                                                 
16 Male characters have historically been associated with the public sphere and female characters with the 
private (Pateman 4); in The Riddle-Master’s Game McKillip uses this gendered convention to access the two 
elements required for ethical transition, but the emphasis created by first Morgon’s reluctant movement from 
private to public spheres, and then Raederle’s movement from a limited public to an expanded private role, 
indicates that the point of the transfer in each case is not movement into a gender-‘appropriate’ sphere, but 
movement from inaction to action.   229 
form of Ghisteslwchlohm’s transcendent striving and the effect it has had on someone she 
cares about: 
 
‘Rood, that’s the terrible thing I can’t get out of my mind.  That while I was waiting, 
while we were all waiting, safe and secure, thinking [Morgon] was with the High One, he 
was alone with someone who was picking his mind apart as you would pick apart the 
petals of a closed flower.  And the High One did nothing.’ 
(McKillip, Game 231) 
 
Raederle, like Morgon, is a riddle-master, though her qualification is informal (her father 
has educated her to be ‘a riddle-master’s wife’: McKillip, Game 308).  In accordance with 
the tenets of riddle-mastery, when she is faced with an unsolved riddle, she must attempt to 
answer it.   
 
An imprisoned heroine can do nothing about evil except endure it, and perhaps offer covert 
assistance to her rescuer.  However, the role of imprisoned heroine shares several of its 
early elements with a more complex and active narrative paradigm which, as Kate 
Ferguson Ellis points out in The Contested Castle: Gothic Novels and the Subversion of 
Domestic Ideology, deals explicitly with a female character’s engagement with ethical 
issues and the need to take action against evil.  This is the paradigm of the female Gothic 
heroine, the female protagonist who ‘chooses knowledge over innocence’ (Ellis 38) and by 
taking action in the world develops from ‘an innocent “young lady” ’ into ‘a heroine who 
has encountered evil, learned from it, and triumphed over it’ (Ellis 37). 
 
The female Gothic heroine begins her narrative in a prison, often a haunted building.  
However, unlike an imprisoned heroine, she is attached to her prison by a mystery   230 
surrounding her identity (Frank 441).  The female Gothic heroine actively wishes to escape 
imprisonment to pursue a preferred life; her paradigm begins to diverge from that of the 
imprisoned heroine when she rebels against a parental and/or societal injunction to inaction 
(Ellis 58) and escapes from her prison to pursue this desired vision.  Her rebellion is 
vindicated when, during her usually circular (Ellis 107) wanderings, she unravels the 
mystery of her identity, and by doing so moves ‘from innocence . . . to a level of 
experience of good and evil’ that enables judgement (Ellis 5).  The female Gothic heroine 
then uses her acquired knowledge and experience to undo the evil that imprisoned her, and 
create her chosen future (Ellis 37). 
 
In much the same way as the second chapter of The Riddle-Master of Hed reveals 
Morgon’s potential to take on the hero role, the first chapter of Heir of Sea and Fire 
establishes that while she performs the role of imprisoned heroine, Raederle also has the 
potential to take on the larger and more active role of the female Gothic heroine.  If she is 
not precisely an innocent at the beginning of Heir of Sea and Fire, Raederle is certainly 
inexperienced.  Her engagement with her environment has been limited: she has ‘never 
done anything in [her] life’ (McKillip, Game 341), and her knowledge is purely theoretical.   
There is a mystery attached to her identity.  She possesses an odd, apparently small talent 
for working illusions that derives from her sea-born ancestor Ylon (McKillip, Game 213), 
but is shared by no-one else in her family.  And although she is not literally imprisoned, 
she is constrained to endure an uncongenial situation—her father’s vow, which forces on 
her the unpleasant consequences of limited movement, unwanted male attention and 
objectification: 
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‘ . . . I’m not going to stay here and be argued over like a prize cow out of Aum . . . I’d 
rather listen to the pig herds of Hel during a thunderstorm than another spring council 
arguing with you [Mathom] about what to do with me.’ 
(McKillip, Game 206) 
 
Raederle makes repeated attempts to escape from this situation.  First she tries to negotiate 
a visit to a friend (McKillip, Game 206), and when that fails, she runs away to visit a friend 
of her dead mother’s, the Lord of Hel’s pig-woman. 
 
Morgon’s apparent death therefore does not just confront Raederle with the fact of the 
transcendent presence in the world.  It also fractures the role of imprisoned heroine, and 
opens up the latent female Gothic heroine’s paradigm that underlies it; in the aftermath of 
Morgon’s death, Raederle begins to move beyond the confines of her original role.  Sent to 
Caithnard to bring her brother Rood home from the College of Riddle-Masters, she meets 
the Morgol’s daughter Lyra, a friend of Morgon’s, and they decide to act.
17
 
  This is not, as 
Peter Nicholls (1816) and other commentators claim, a search for Morgon.  When Raederle 
and Lyra commandeer the King of An’s ship and sail to Erlenstar Mountain, it is with the 
explicit intention of demanding an explanation from the High One for the fact of the 
transcendent presence in the world, and doing something about it.  As Lyra explains to the 
rest of the Morgol’s guard, ‘ “ . . . I couldn’t protect the Prince of Hed while he was alive; 
all I can do now is find out from the High One who killed him and where that one is . . . ” ’ 
(McKillip, Game 242-3).   
                                                 
17 It is no accident that it is an encounter with one female land-ruler in the High One’s realm, and her 
confident soldier daughter, that triggers Raederle’s movement into the female Gothic heroine’s paradigm; for 
this female character intruding into a male-dominated genre from a male-dominated history (there are no 
Queens of An), autonomy must be modelled by a female mentor, not bestowed by a male figure, in order to 
be genuine.   232 
However, neither the false High One, Ghisteslwchlohm, nor the real High One is 
accessible.  Raederle must discover the answers she needs herself.  As she and her group of 
female companions—Lyra, the Morgol’s guard and eventually also Morgon’s young sister 
Tristan—journey north and Raederle experiences more of her Secondary World, it forces 
another fact on her attention.  Raederle begins to realise that she has a connection to the 
forces that are disrupting her Secondary World.  When she looks at a ruined city of the 
Earth-Masters in Ymris, she feels ‘something beyond all comprehension, a longing, a 
loneliness, an understanding [play] in the dark rim of her mind’ (McKillip, Game 264).  
Later, when she uses a jewel taken from that city to create an illusion of fire to escape from 
the Ymris King’s determination to send her home, she creates a double connection between 
herself, the Earth-Masters (she sees an image of the High One shaping the stone) and the 
shape-changers (Eriel is able to enter her mind and observe her thoughts: McKillip, Game 
226-7).  These incidents imply that Raederle is connected to both the Earth-Masters and 
shape-changers, and thus to the conflict that is in the process of completion around her:  
‘ “ . . . I think there is something sleeping inside of me, and if I wake it, I will regret it until 
the world’s end.  I have a shape-changer’s blood in me, and something of his power.  
That’s an awkward thing to have” ’(McKillip, Game 268).   
 
The nature of Raederle’s connection to the past is unpacked when she encounters the 
shape-changer Eriel face to face.  She recognises their similarity, and by doing so solves 
the riddle of her identity: her strange ancestor out of the sea was the shape-changer harpist 
Corrig killed by Morgon in The Riddle-Master of Hed (McKillip, Game 302).  Raederle’s 
‘small’ talent for making illusions is the same in source, nature and scope as Eriel’s power 
for destruction (McKillip, Game 300).  To all intents and purposes, she is a shape-changer.  
And not only does she inherit a shape-changer’s capacity to act in the world—she also 
recognises in herself a desire to exercise that capacity:   233 
 
[Eriel] reached down, touched the white fire with one hand, drew it softly into a glistening 
spider’s web, a polished bone, a scattering of stars, a moon-white chambered shell . . . 
Raederle, watching, felt a hunger stir in her, a longing to possess the knowledge of the fire, 
the fire itself. 
(McKillip, Game 300) 
 
Raederle’s connection to the shape-changers suggests that the transcendent ethic is not 
simply an element of the past that intrudes into the innocent, integrative present.  Rather, it 
is an influence from the past that extends into, and informs, the present.   
 
Having solved the riddle of her heritage, Raederle must, like a female Gothic heroine, 
come to terms with her connection to the transcendent ethic, and assimilate that 
information into her identity. Like Morgon, however, Raederle at first misinterprets her 
own abilities.  Lacking the one piece of information that would allow her to connect the 
shape-changers and the High One (that is, the fact that they are all Earth-Masters), the only 
models on which she can base her understanding of action are Ghisteslwchlohm, the 
history of An, and the shape-changers. Raederle assumes that if she exercises her capacity 
to act in the world, she will act as the shape-changers, Ghisteslwchlohm and the dead 
Kings of An do—destructively, without care.  She therefore rejects action altogether: she 
refuses to access her shape-changer’s power under Eriel’s aegis (McKillip, Game 301), and 
runs away from her.  But when she encounters Deth, his dismissal of her newly-acquired 
understanding of her place in the world, and her importance to the world-story, forces her 
to claim her power to make her point.  When Raederle handles fire for the first time and 
makes Deth pay attention to her (McKillip, Game 307), she acknowledges her shape-
changer’s power as part of her own identity.   234 
 
A female Gothic heroine incorporates the secret of her identity into her self as a positive 
factor, which enables her to create her own future (Ellis 121).  Raederle, however, 
assimilates this new information about herself as a negative.  Her shape-changer heritage 
changes her shape, both in her own eyes and in the eyes of the world: when she returns to 
Anuin after her journey, one of her brothers literally fails to recognise her (McKillip, Game 
367).  Raederle can no longer be the imprisoned heroine or the second most beautiful 
woman in the Three Portions of An, because she is part of the transcendent force that 
threatens her Secondary World (Haunert 152):  
 
‘ . . . I would be mute, beautiful, changeless as the earth of An for you.  I would be your 
memory, without age, always innocent, always waiting in the King’s white house at 
Anuin—I would do that for you and for no other man in the realm.  But it would be a lie, 
and I will do anything but lie to you . . . ’ 
(McKillip, Game 340) 
 
Nevertheless, having both knowledge of her identity and experience of the nature of the 
transcendent ethic, Raederle goes on to fulfil the final stage of the female Gothic heroine 
paradigm.  After they meet briefly at Caithnard, Morgon leaves to continue his pursuit of 
Deth across An; at the same time, the land-law of An, neglected since Raederle’s father left 
his realm to look for answers on his own account, erupts from its bindings into chaos.  
Raederle goes out alone into this disrupted landscape, and draws on her full identity—her 
knowledge of the history and land-law of An, her old skill with illusion and her new shape-
changer’s power—and attempts to protect Morgon from both the land-law of An and from 
what she believes is Ghisteslwchlohm hunting him (McKillip, Game 353).  She calls up the 
wraiths of the Kings of Hel to escort Morgon safely to Anuin.  And, as discussed in   235 
Chapter Three, when Raederle begins to act for the first time, she replicates the patterns of 
thought and feeling associated with the exercise of power in her own cultural context: the 
tragedic ethic.  While doing so, however, she also recognises the damage she is capable of 
doing, and rejects that form of action of her own volition.  As discussed in Chapter Three, 
Raederle forces herself ‘to see clearly for the first time’ (McKillip, Game 370), and, like 
Morgon when he drops his three-starred sword and lets Deth walk out of Anuin unharmed, 
she makes a choice to not act transcendently.  By doing so, she shapes the future she wants.  
At the beginning of Harpist in the Wind Raederle closes the paradigm of the Gothic 
heroine, by establishing the romantic relationship that signals integration with society, but 
on her own terms rather than those her society demands of her.  She tells Morgon,  
 
‘ . . . my father has meddled enough with my life.  He may have foreseen our meeting, and 
maybe even our loving, but I don’t think he should have his own way in everything.  I’m 
not going to marry you just because maybe he foresaw that, too, in some dream.’ 
(McKillip, Game 386) 
 
Through Raederle’s performance of the role of the Gothic heroine, McKillip suggests that 
the transcendent presence in the Secondary World is not only a power out of the past, but 
an influence on the present.  It is therefore necessary to recognise the influence that it 
exerts on present patterns of behaviour and action, and to consciously refuse to perpetuate 
it.  Thus far, McKillip echoes Le Guin’s argument for the rejection of the transcendent 
impulse and the achievement of a comedic state of being to counter it.  However, McKillip 
goes further than Le Guin.  Recognition of the individual’s implication in the ethic of 
transcendence does not constitute action against it.  Although Raederle completes the 
narrative paradigm of the Gothic heroine in Heir of Sea and Fire, her story continues 
through the final volume of the trilogy alongside Morgon’s.     236 
 
In Harpist in the Wind, Raederle moves outside of any pre-existent narrative paradigm, and 
undertakes a second stage of private response to the transcendent presence in her 
Secondary World.  This is a change of worldview—Raederle transforms her own 
construction of the nature of action in the world, from her inherited tragedic concept to the 
integrative one modelled by the High One.  McKillip articulates this narrative of self-
transformation through the issue of changing shape.  Raederle’s initial response to the 
shape-changer’s power she possesses echoes Morgon’s initial response to the necessity of 
performing the hero role in The Riddle-Master of Hed.  While she uses some aspects of her 
abilities (notably her capacity to manipulate fire and to curse) to defend herself and 
Morgon against horse-thieves, shape-changers and Ghisteslwchlohm during their journey 
to Lungold, she flatly refuses to change her shape (McKillip, Game 415).  She refuses to 
accept the full implications of her power, because they contradict her idea of who she is 
and what place she fills (or should fill) in her world (Mains 61).  However, this is an 
ineffective strategy.  Raederle’s refusal to change shape leaves her and Morgon vulnerable 
to a trap set for them by Ghisteslwchlohm, from which they only escape because shape-
changers intervene for their own purposes (McKillip, Game 452).   
 
After this incident, Raederle recognises the need to engage with her own capacity for 
action, on her own terms: ‘ “Morgon, teach me the crow-shape.  At least it’s a shape of the 
Kings of An.  And it’s faster than walking barefoot” ’(McKillip, Game 458).  As she 
cannot erase her power, her capacity for action, from her self, Raederle works through 
several stages to transform her construction of that power into one she can accept.  First, by 
learning the crow-shape associated with the Kings of An (including her father), she 
integrates her shape-changing ability, and all the other powers it implies, with the human 
heritage she values.  Having done this, she is able to recognise the positive aspects of her   237 
power—particularly during her first flight in crow shape with Morgon (McKillip, Game 
459-60).  While Morgon is in hiding in the wastelands, learning to harp the winds, 
Raederle reinterprets her capacity for action, moving away from its initial association with 
the destructiveness of the shape-changers to discover the possibility of constructive or 
conservative use: ‘ “ . . . The wizards have been searching everywhere for you [Morgon].  
So have the shape—the shape-changers.  So have I . . . I searched.  In every shape I could 
think of . . . ” ’ (McKillip, Game 515).  Defining herself in opposition to the shape-
changers, Raederle subordinates her ability to change shape to the purpose she uses it for, 
and thus is able to accept it; after she finds Morgon in the wastelands and calls him back 
into the High One’s godgame for the last time, she evinces no more reluctance about 
changing her shape.   
 
Eventually, Raederle develops the capacity to not only admit her desire to exercise power, 
but to accept it—to integrate her abilities with her self.  When she and Morgon travel 
across the High One’s realm with Yrth in falcon-shape, she recognises that Yrth models 
power informed by care (Haunert 228).  Following Yrth’s model, she finally reintegrates 
her ability with her identity, associating herself by her own choice neither with, nor in 
opposition to, the shape-changers, but rather alongside the conservative power of the High 
One, the last of the Earth-Masters.  When the High One attempts to send her away from 
Wind Tower before Morgon’s last confrontation with Eriel, she refuses to go, telling him, 
‘ “I am half Earth-Master.  You will have at least one of your kind fighting for you after all 
these centuries … ” ’ (McKillip, Game 598).  This is the first time she describes herself as 
an Earth-Master.  And once she does this, she becomes able to act in the world.  After the 
High One’s death, she uses her inherited power to act to oppose the shape-changers’ bid 
for transcendence alongside Morgon.  Through Raederle’s narrative in Harpist in the Wind, 
McKillip argues that in order to act against the transcendent impulse, the individual must   238 
not simply adopt an integrative state of being, as Le Guin suggests in the Earthsea cycle, 
but acknowledge her or his impulse to transcendence and actively reconfigure it into a 
conservative ethic—and then act on that conservative impulse.  This is an idea Le Guin 
does not begin to approach until ‘Dragonfly’. 
 
McKillip’s narrative may contain echoes of Tolkien and Le Guin’s solutions to the 
problem of the transcendent presence in the Secondary World, but her ordering of the 
elements that create ethical transition reveals her argument to be the opposite of both of 
theirs in one crucial way.  In The Riddle-Master’s Game as in the Earthsea cycle, the 
characters within the Secondary World are entirely responsible for its salvation; only their 
methods differ.  Once Raederle enters the phase of nonparadigmatic movement in Harpist 
in the Wind, she makes several crucial contributions to Morgon’s narrative.  It is Raederle 
who recognises that Deth and Yrth are the same entity, and uses that knowledge to draw 
Morgon back to solve the High One’s godgame.  Raederle is the first to realise that the 
vanished High One may be at Wind Tower.  And in the final confrontation with the shape-
changers on Wind Plain, Raederle sets Morgon free of their influence for long enough to 
summon the winds.  Morgon makes only two contributions to Raederle’s narrative, and 
they are not on the same scale: backhandedly, through his insistence on her innocence, he 
leads her to the realisation that she has ‘never done anything in [her] life’ (McKillip, Game 
341); and he teaches her how to take the crow-shape.  Raederle’s narrative also begins after 
Morgon’s, and ends some time before his does. 
 
As Mains states, Raederle’s and Morgon’s stories do not carry equal weight within the 
overall focal narrative: ‘Although Raederle’s separate quest occupies most of the second 
volume . . . [Morgon] is the primary focus, the obvious hero of the third and final volume’ 
(54).  This does not mean that ‘Raederle’s quest is only an element of Morgon’s’ (Mains   239 
54).  But it does imply that in order to achieve ethical transition, not only must there be 
both private and public action, self-transformation and integrative action in the Secondary 
World, but that self-transformation must precede and inform public action in order for it to 
be effective.  It is Morgon’s public action, not Raederle’s self-transformation, which saves 
the Secondary World.  Morgon’s narrative depends on Raederle’s (Wymer 1071), but 
Raederle cannot effect the ethical transition.  Only Morgon, as the High One’s land-heir, 
can do that.  In McKillip’s Secondary World, because of how vulnerable it is to the 
transcendent actions of Eriel and her shape-changer allies, public comedic action is the 
crucial element that saves the world. 
 
McKillip’s resolution of the two characters’ narratives confirms this reading.  The 
conclusions of the inset narratives are in one way identical: the High One dies, and 
Morgon, the Star-Bearer, assumes the position of holder and protector of the land-law of 
the realm, and transforms it by doing so; Eriel, bound to the death of the High One 
(McKillip, Game 602), dies or otherwise vanishes from the realm, and Raederle moves into 
her place as shape-changer and transforms that also.  However, when Raederle takes on the 
characteristics of the shape-changer, she does not take on any responsibility for land-law, 
or assume a formal, publicly recognised role comparable to Morgon’s role as High One.   
Through her narrative Raederle develops personal autonomy and makes a significant 
contribution to the achievement of ethical transition.  However, after the eucatastrophe, 
there is every possibility that in the eyes of her Secondary World she will become ‘the 
High One’s wife, rather than Mathom’s daughter . . . still defined by her relationship to a 
male figure in her life, rather than by any meaningful work accomplished in her own right’ 
(Mains 71).  She may even vanish from sight altogether, as the shape-changers did.  This is 
problematic in gender terms (Mains 71).  In terms of the narrative of ethical transition, 
however, the close of Morgon’s narrative and the close of Raederle’s reflect and maintain   240 
the balance between private and public domains, in which the private supports the public, 
but the public is the more important.   
 
The closure of Morgon and Raederle’s individual stories returns the focal narrative to 
McKillip’s framing romance plot; and the resolution of the romance narrative confirms that 
Morgon and Raederle’s apparent inequity is indeed part of the system’s balance.  The 
situation McKillip has created through Morgon and Raederle’s characters and their 
complementary narratives is too complex for comedy’s stylised resolution of marriage to 
accommodate convincingly.  Morgon and Raederle between them have taken on the equal 
and opposite configuration of orchestrator and antagonist, as is evident not only from their 
spheres of action but from their association with the elements.  Morgon, like the High One, 
is associated with earth and air.  Raederle, like Eriel, is associated with fire and water.  In 
the neopagan circular schema of the elements, fire and earth are schematic opposites, as are 
water and air (Greenwood 84-5).  But Raederle’s fire and Morgon’s air are also both 
masculine elements with similar associations (will and intellect) while Raederle’s water 
and Morgon’s earth are feminine elements with similar associations—emotion and 
intuition (Mains 70).  The High One and Eriel represented a fractured elemental schema 
because of their fundamental modal difference.  Morgon and Raederle, through their 
common movement into the integrative ethic, bring the schema back into balance.  
However, the tensions inherent in the structure still remain (Nicholls 1819-20).  In order to 
accommodate this, McKillip modifies the standard comedic conclusion of the romance 
narrative.  Morgon and Raederle do not marry, or even live in the same space, but they 
retain their relationship and their connection nevertheless: 
 
‘ . . . I loved the sea.  Maybe I’ll live in it.’ 
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‘I’ll live in the wastes,’ [Morgon] said.  ‘Once every hundred years, you will shine out of 
the sea and I’ll come to you, or I will draw you into the winds with my harping. . . ’ 
(McKillip, Game 615) 
 
Thus between them, Raederle and Morgon create a stable and inhabitable landscape within 
which the comedic ethic that their actions both express and defend can continue to exist; 
through their relationship, the integrity of the landscape is preserved and reaffirmed.  
 
Tolkien argues, in the Lord of the Rings, that saving the world is partly the responsibility of 
characters within it, but is ultimately achieved by the greater order those characters’ 
actions promote.  Le Guin, in the Earthsea cycle, argues a different case: that the 
characters within the Secondary World are fully responsible for saving it.  In The Riddle-
Master’s Game, McKillip clearly agrees with Le Guin: through the narratives of Morgon, 
Raederle and the High One, she shows that it is the characters within the Secondary World 
who are responsible for implementing the ethical transition and ensuring its success.  As in 
Earthsea, in the High One’s realm it is the characters within the Secondary World who 
save it; only the means by which they do so differ. 
 
In The Riddle-Master’s Game, McKillip builds on both Tolkien’s argument in The Lord of 
the Rings and Le Guin’s in the Earthsea cycle, to argue a case that is ultimately the 
opposite of both.  Working from the premise that the Secondary World is a damaged 
system, maintained artificially and from within, McKillip argues, like Tolkien and Le 
Guin, that saving it requires both private and public forms of action.  However, through 
Raederle’s story, she argues that to save the world, action on the personal level must be a 
question of, not overcoming and suppressing an inherent aspect of the self to achieve an 
integrative state of being, but recognising the desire to act transcendently and consciously   242 
transforming it into an ability to act conservatively.  McKillip also argues, through 
Morgon’s story, that while such self-transformation is necessary for the salvation of the 
world, its survival ultimately depends on individuals taking public action in the integrative 
mode, to contain and repair the damage done by the antagonist’s irresponsibility.  In The 
Riddle-Master’s Game, the protagonists are as wholly responsible for the salvation of the 
High One’s realm as the antagonists are for the damage done to it.  The constitution of the 
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8  CONCLUSION: ‘THE WORLD IS CHANGING’ 
In this thesis, I have argued that The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-
Master’s Game share a common perspective on patterns of human behaviour within the 
world.  The three fantasies hold that the integrity of the Secondary World is endangered by 
the presence within it of the tragedic worldview—the idea that the human mind is superior 
to and isolated from its physical context—and the transcendent behaviour it inspires.  They 
also hold that an effective response to the danger posed by the tragedic worldview can be 
found in the integrative ethic of comedy, with its emphasis on community, continuity and 
survival.  In the cosmically-ordered landscape of Middle-earth, the transcendent impulse 
manifests as characters’ need or desire to control their circumstances, in opposition to the 
world’s inherent order.  To neutralise this threat and save the world, Tolkien’s characters 
must consciously co-operate as best they can with the cosmic order with which their 
landscape is invested.  Tolkien argues that Middle-earth can be saved by a combination of 
public comedic action that contains the damage done to the world, and a private struggle 
with the instinct to control, which permits the cosmic order to assert itself and bring events 
to their right conclusion.  While Tolkien’s characters assist in saving his Secondary World, 
ultimately it is the cosmic order that does so. 
 
In the inherently-balanced world of Earthsea, the transcendent impulse appears as the 
desire to escape death: Le Guin argues that to contain this danger to the Equilibrium, 
characters must consciously override their fear of death and replace it with an acceptance 
of mortality as part of the world’s balance.  To save Earthsea from destruction, Le Guin’s 
characters must let go of the desire to act, and develop instead an integrative state of 
being—and only then act, in accordance with the principle of Equilibrium.  In the Earthsea 
cycle, the characters are fully responsible for saving the Secondary World, but do not 
generate for themselves the solution to the transcendent problem.     244 
 
In the artificially-sustained landscape of the High One’s realm, transcendent behaviour is 
an irresponsible choice that can only be contained by other characters making the choice to 
act responsibly with regard to the world around them.  McKillip argues that saving the 
Secondary World requires characters to consciously transform their understanding of the 
nature of action, from a tragedic to a comedic model, and then to take comedic action to 
prevent further damage to the landscape.  The characters in The Riddle-Master’s Game are 
responsible not only for saving their landscape, but for working out how to do so in the 
first place.   
 
A clear trend is visible in the three fantasies.  As the construction of the Secondary World 
changes—as the external apparatus that endows the Secondary World with order is 
stripped away and the source of the landscape’s integrity is revisioned from divine, to 
physical, to a fragile artificial construct—so responsibility for every stage of the process of 
saving the Secondary World is transferred to characters within that Secondary World.  The 
changing nature of the Secondary World in fact requires this shift of responsibility. 
 
If, as discussed in Chapter One, genre fictions are coded ways of speaking about and to 
society as a whole, it is possible to speculate that through their different interpretations of 
the high fantasy paradigm, The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-
Master’s Game may speak, indirectly, about issues of concern in the modern Western 
world.  In his essay ‘Heroic Fantasy and Social Reality: ex nihilo nihil fit’, Zanger suggests 
that although the Secondary Worlds created by fantasists are nominally discrete from 
Primary Reality, they nevertheless exist in ‘a symbiotic relationship with reality and its 
conventionalized representation’ (227).  Secondary Worlds are generated out of an author’s   245 
conscious rejection or transformation of certain aspects of Primary Reality.  This rejection 
is intended to make a critical point: 
 
the distance between [the] real world and the world created by the fantasist reveals those 
stress points at which the real world chafes the writer and reader, and chafing, generates the 
imaginative alternative . . .  
(Zanger 227) 
 
In The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game alike, the 
point that differentiates Secondary World from Primary Reality most clearly is the level of 
awareness and importance of the physical environment.  Tolkien’s love of nature—
particularly trees—and his dislike of the effects of industrialisation on the landscape of 
England are well-documented.  They find expression in many places in The Lord of the 
Rings: Tom Bombadil; the power of the Elves and the Elven-Rings to preserve the land; 
the Scouring of the Shire; the battered landscape of Ithilien; and, perhaps most powerfully, 
the Ents and their trees, who although they are forgotten and disregarded by the rest of 
Middle-earth are able to destroy Isengard and bring down Saruman in their outrage over 
his industrial-scale land-clearing.  In the Earthsea cycle, the Equilibrium (the philosophical 
and physical principle on which every narrative in the series turns) is ecology writ large.  
McKillip’s story in The Riddle-Master’s Game hinges on the concept of the land-law—the 
conscious preservation of the environment, even the uninhabited ‘wastelands’ that Morgon 
comes to love even above his homeland of Hed, purely for its own sake. 
 
An explicit concern with the environment, with characters’ actions in relation to that 
environment and with preserving the environment runs through The Lord of the Rings, the 
Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s Game.  This suggests that it may be possible to   246 
read these three fantasies as a series of thought-experiments that respond to the looming 
environmental crisis of the twentieth (and now the twenty-first) century.  The latter half of 
the twentieth century especially was marked by increasing recognition of the extent of 
environmental damage (as opposed to aesthetic degradation) in the aftermath of the 
Industrial Revolution—and of how quickly that damage was escalating toward crisis point.  
As scientific understanding of the concept of ecology increased, emphasis was increasingly 
placed on human responsibility for creating, and escalating, the crisis; at the same time, 
popular understanding of the Earth and how it functions as a system began to change.  
Initially the Earth was viewed as, more or less, a massive machine that would, if not 
interfered with, continue to function as it had always functioned—a view stretching back 
as far as the seventeenth century (Pepper 137).  During the later half of the twentieth 
century, two alternative interpretations began to replace this one.  The first was of the 
Earth as a robust, self-correcting organism that could cope with all but catastrophic 
changes—the Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock 107-8).  The second, less optimistic vision of the 
Earth was that of a fragile system already damaged to such a degree by human activities 
that only concerted effort from within would ensure that it remained inhabitable. 
 
The three views of the Earth outlined above correspond remarkably closely to the 
constructions of the Secondary World in, respectively, The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea 
cycle and the Riddle-Master’s Game.  Even Tolkien’s story, given in The Silmarillion, of 
Ilúvatar creating Middle-earth and then leaving it to the care of the Valar (9-10) echoes the 
early modern construction of God as a Creator who ‘set the machine going and then left it’ 
(Pepper 137).  The reproduction of popular understandings of the world in the 
worldbuilding of The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s 
Game, combined with their narrative focus on problem-solving—literally saving the 
world—and with the nature of the solution they collectively propose, suggests that these   247 
three fantasies might be read as not only reflections of, but responses to the environmental 
crisis that threatens the world.  The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-
Master’s Game are thought-experiments; through narrative, they represent a problem, 
locate a solution to it, and model the implementation of that solution, in abstract forms.  As 
understanding of the way the Earth functions develops in Primary Reality, the common 
solution that the three texts espouse is rewritten in new theatres, which display its 
continued validity, and put forward new means by which it can be achieved. 
 
The genre of high fantasy, and the argument its structure encodes, have developed in two 
main directions since the publication of The Riddle-Master’s Game—possibly because of a 
change in reading taste or authorial interest, but perhaps also because McKillip’s trilogy 
stretched the paradigm almost to the limits of what its unreconstructed form could contain.  
On the one hand, there is a tendency to replace the Secondary World with a template 
landscape—an imaginary world that is incapable of eucatastrophe, the saving change.  
Within that landscape, some authors tend to reproduce the unaltered high fantasy paradigm 
until it begins to collapse.  Others attempt to reject the paradigm altogether: ‘Contemporary 
fantasists all bow politely to Lord Tennyson and Papa Tolkien, then step around them to go 
back to the original texts for inspiration’ (Eddings 7).  This, ironically, tends to produce 
fractured versions of both the paradigm and its ethical argument.  More interesting, and 
perhaps more significant in terms of genre development, is the tendency for authors to 
combine the high fantasy paradigm with the governing motifs of other modern fantasy 
subgenres such as the wainscot fantasy, the world-crossing narrative or the urban faerie 
tale.  This trend began with Stephen Donaldson’s First Chronicles of Thomas Covenant the 
Unbeliever, written almost simultaneously with The Riddle-Master’s Game; it continues 
today in fantasies such as J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series.   
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As the construction of the Secondary World changes in all these texts, and the treatment of 
the high fantasy paradigm shifts, so the ethical argument that the paradigm encodes 
continues to develop, moving away from the original texts’ concern with environment into 
other, often more explicitly social territory.  But no matter how much the form changes, or 
how far the argument shifts its ground, wherever the high fantasy paradigm appears, the 
concerns established in The Lord of the Rings, the Earthsea cycle and The Riddle-Master’s 
Game remain central to the stories told within that framework: ethics, responsibility and 
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